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First Amendment
I. The News Media and the First Amendment
A. PunishingBreaches of the Confidentiality of JudicialReview
A,

Commissions." Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,' the Supreme

Court addressed the problem of accommodating a state's legitimate interest in maintaining the confidentiality of proceedings before a state
judicial review commission2 with the First Amendment guarantee that
the news media shall be free of restrictions in discussing governmental
affairs.3 The Court held unconstitutional a Virginia statute4 which
made it a misdemeanor for any person to divulge information concerning proceedings before the state's Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.' The Court's decision in Landmark serves to underscore the
protection afforded the news media by the First Amendment when it
engages in the "free discussion of governmental affairs. "' 6
1. The Virginia Supreme Court Decision
The facts underlying the Landmark litigation are relatively simple.7 Landmark Communications, Inc., publishes The 1irginian-Pilot,
a general circulation newspaper in the Tidewater area of Virginia. On
October 4, 1975, the Pilot published an article stating in pertinent part
that the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission (hereinafter Commission) had conducted a "formal hearing concerning possible disciplinary action against" a judge in Norfolk, Virginia. The newspaper
account included the judge's name, and went on to state that the hear1. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).

2. Id. at 835. In recognition of this interest, the Court cited W.

BRAITHWAITE, WHO

JUDGES THE JUDGES 161-62 (1971); Buckley, The Commission on JudicialQualfications: An

Attempt to Deal with JudicialMisconduct, 3 U.S.F.L. REV. 244, 255-56 (1969).
3. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). In Mills, the Court upheld the right of a
newspaper to publish an election day editorial urging voters to support changing their form
of government. The Court noted: "Whatever differences there may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." Id. at 218
(footnote omitted).
4. VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (1973).
5. This commission was created pursuant to VA. CONsT. art. VI, § 10, which provides,
inter alia, for the creation of a commission "vested with the power to investigate ...
charges which would be the basis for retirement, censure, or removal of a judge."
6. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). See note 3 supra.
7. Except where otherwise noted, this summary of the facts is taken from the opinion
of the Virginia Supreme Court. See Landmark Communications, Inc. %,.Virginia, 217 Va.
699, 701-03, 233 S.E.2d 120, 122-23 (1977).
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ing "apparently stemmed from charges of incompetence against the
. ..judge." On November 5, 1975, Landmark was indicted for violating Virginia Code section 2.1-37.13, which provides that "[a]l papers
filed with and proceedings before the Commission. . .including the
identification of the subject judge. . . shall be confidential and shall

not be divulged by any person to anyone except the Commission, except that the record of any proceeding filed with the Supreme Court
shall lose its confidential character."' The code further provides that
"[a]ny person who shall divulge information in violation.

. .

of this

section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 9 In the subsequent trial, the
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk found Landmark guilty of violating section 2.1-37.13 and fined the corporation the sum of $500.00.
Landmark appealed its conviction to the Supreme Court of Virginia.l0 Its initial contention was that the statute's proscription against
divulging information regarding Commission proceedings was ambiguous in that it failed to indicate whether its sanctions applied only to
participants in the proceedings or also to nonparticipating observers
such as the news media. Landmark argued that the statute's penal nature required that any such ambiguity be resolved against the Commonwealth and in favor of the alleged violator." The newspaper
urged the Virginia court to construe section 2.1-37.13 to mean that a
violation would occur only upon "thefirst act of disclosure. . .by an

individual who had actuallypartic6oatedin some manner in the proceedings of [the] Commission."' 2 Under such a construction,
Landmark contended, the statute had been violated not by the newspaper but by the Commission participant who first disclosed the confidential information. Landmark's subsequent publication of information
"voluntarily andfreely given to it" was therefore outside the scope of
the statute.' 3 The major constitutional argument raised by Landmark
on appeal was that the imposition of the statute's criminal sanctions
"would unconstitutionally abridge its First Amendment guaranty of
freedom of the press."' 4 Landmark argued that the statute either constituted an impermissible prior restraint' 5 or imposed a subsequent
8. VA. CODE § 2.1-37.13 (1973).
9. Id.
10. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va. 699, 233 S.E.2d 120 (1977).
11. Id. at 701, 233 S.E.2d at 122.
12. Id. at 702, 233 S.E.2d at 122-23 (emphasis in original).
13. Id, 233 S.E.2d at 123 (emphasis in original).
14. Id. at 703, 233 S.E.2d at 123.
15. Id. at 704, 233 S.E.2d at 124. Landmark based this contention on the decisions of
the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), and Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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punishment for publication without satisfying the requisite "clear and
16
present danger" elements necessary to impose such punishment.
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected Landmark's statutory
construction argument, holding that the statute was clear and unambiguous in its terms and that its proscription applied to any person (including corporate entities) who divulged information' regarding
Commission proceedings before a complaint was filed with the state
supreme court. 17 Turning to the constitutional claim, the state court
disagreed with Landmark's contention that the statute imposed a prior
restraint, finding instead that its provisions fit more properly into the
subsequent punishment category.' 8 This characterization compelled
the court to subject the statute to a clear and present danger analysis.
The court examined and then distinguished the administration of justice cases cited by Landmark.' 9 Whereas those cases involved a court's
common law power of contempt, and thus arose from the exercise of
judicial power, the Virginia Supreme Court observed that the instant
case was based on the violation of a statute designed to protect a legislatively determined state interest. 20 The court asserted that the requirement of confidentiality was essential to preserve the legitimate state
interest in maintaining the effectiveness of the Commission and ensuring the orderly administration of justice. 2 1 The Virginia Supreme
Court concluded its opinion by accepting the Commonwealth's position that criminal sanctions are a legitimate and necessary means to
protect those state interests and prevent the clear and present danger
16. 217 Va. at 705, 233 S.E.2d at 124. Landmark relied on a line of cases which had
applied the "clear and present danger" test in overturning contempt citations based on media criticism of the manner in which courts were handling pending matters. These cases are
discussed infra: Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Pennekamp N. Florida, 328 U.S.
331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
While the contempt citations stemmed from a perceived threat to "the orderly administration ofjustice," the Supreme Court held in each case that expression crit(cal of a court or its
operations is protected by the First Amendment unless it poses a clear and present danger to
the system. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 449-59

(1970); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 623-31 (5th ed. 197S).
17. 217 Va. at 702-03, 233 S.E.2d at 123.
18. Id. at 704, 233 S.E.2d at 124.
19. See note 16 supra.
20. 217 Va. at 707-08, 233 S.E.2d at 126-27.
21. Id. at 712-13, 233 S.E.2d at 129. The court pointed out that the requirement of
confidentiality provides the following benefits: "(1) protects the reputation of an individual
judge by shielding him from publicity involving frivolous complaints, t 2 ) protects public
confidence in the judicial system by preventing disclosure of a complaint against a judge
until the Commission has determined the charge is well-founded, and (3) protects complainants and witnesses from possible recrimination by prohibiting disclosure of their identity
prior to a determination that the complaint is meritorious." .Id. at 712, 233 S.E.2d at 128-29.
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which would result from premature disclosure of the Commission's

proceedings.22
2. The United States Supreme Court Decision
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed.2 3 Chief Justice Burger,
writing for the six-member majority, ' disagreed with the Virginia
Supreme Court's conclusion that a clear and present danger to the ad-

ministration of justice justified the curtailment of speech by criminal
sanctions. 5 He noted that some form of confidential judicial inquiry
and disciplinary procedure exists in virtually every state.26 The "substantial uniformity" of these plans suggested that "confidentiality is
perceived as tending to insure the ultimate effectiveness of the judicial
review commissions."2 7 But Landmark did not challenge the need for
confidentiality in proceedings to review the conduct and integrity of

judicial officers. Rather, it claimed only that confidentiality could not
be preserved by the imposition of criminal sanctions on third parties
not involved in the proceedings themselves, an approach that only one
other state besides Virginia had found necessary to adopt.2 8
In view of the foregoing, the Chief Justice formulated the issue in
Landmark as follows: "The narrow and limited question presented,
then, is whether the First Amendment permits the criminal punishment
22. Id. at 712-13, 233 S.E.2d at 129.
23. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
24. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, Rehnquist
and Stevens. Justice Stewart filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justices Brennan
and Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
25. 435 U.S. at 845.
26. Id. at 834. The Chief Justice pointed out that 47 states, the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico have such judicial inquiry and disciplinary procedures. All of these jurisdictions except Puerto Rico require confidentiality in the early stages of the proceedings. A
list of the states and their relevant constitutional and statutory provisions was attached as an
appendix to the opinion. Id. app., at 846-48.
27. Id. at 835. Chief Justice Burger summarized the interests said to be served by the
requirement of confidentiality as follows: "First, confidentiality is thought to encourage the
filing of complaints and the willing participation of relevant witnesses by providing protection against possible retaliation or recrimination. Second, at least until the time when the
meritorious can be separated from the frivolous complaints, the confidentiality of the proceedings protects judges from the injury which might result from publication of unexamined
and unwarranted complaints. And finally, it is argued, confidence in the judiciary as an
institution is maintained by avoiding premature announcement of groundless claims ofjudicial misconduct or disability since it can be assumed that some frivolous complaints will be
made against judicial officers who rarely can satisfy all contending litigants." Id. (footnote
omitted). See note 2 supra. Confidentiality is also thought to facilitate the removal or
retirement ofjudges without a formal proceeding with its attendant publicity, and to permit
a judge to be made aware of valid complaints. 435 U.S. at 835-36.
28. Id. at 836-37.
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of third persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including the news
media, for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding
confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission."2 9 Before examining this issue in light of the facts of the case, the
Court considered Landmark's contention that recent decisions regard30
ing the truthful and even untruthful reporting about public officials
and the dissemination of accurate commercial information 3 ' should be

dispositive of the question presented. Holding that the speech in question "lies near the core of the First Amendment," 32 the Court rejected
the need to rely on the more tangential First Amendment values implicated in the context of libel or commercial speech. As Chief Justice
Burger observed: "The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern. 3 3
The operation of the Commission was deemed such a matter of
public interest, and Landmark's article of October 4 was found to have
provided accurate factual information about its proceedings.34 In the

Court's view, this reporting "clearly served those interests in public
affairs which the First Amendscrutiny and discussion of governmental
35
ment was adopted to protect.
The Court responded to the Commonwealth's argument that the

First Amendment does not protect the publication of information
"which by Constitutional mandate is to be confidential."3 6 The state
had relied on Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn3 7 in support of this position. In Cox the Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amend29. Id. at 837 (footnote omitted). In an accompanying footnote, the Court explained
that while the statute in question might have been construed by the Virginia Supreme Court
so as to apply only to participants to the proceedings and not to third parties, the broad
construction given the statute by the lower court precluded a narrow reading by the
Supreme Court since "'it is not our function to construe a state statute contrary to the construction given it by the highest court of a State."' Id. at 837 n.9 (quoting O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 531 (1974)).
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
32. 435 U.S. at 838 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1970)).
33. 435 U.S. at 839. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966); Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 289 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Cf. Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("With respect to judicial proceedings in particular,
the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to bring to bear the
beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice.").
34. 435 U.S. at 839.
35. Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964)).
36. 435 U.S. at 840 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 17). VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10, provides, inter alia, that "[p]roceedings before the Commission shall be confidential."
37. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).

Fall 19781

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

ments shielded a newspaper from liability for invasion of privacy based
on the accurate reporting of the name of a deceased rape victim. 38 Crucial to the decision in Cox was the fact that the name of the victim had
been revealed in a public proceeding. 39 Moreover, the Court in Cox
specifically reserved the question of the scope of First Amendment protection where, as in Landmark, public records are not involved.40 Because Cox did not answer the question presented, the Landmark Court
undertook an inquiry to determine whether Landmark's actions were
protected by the First Amendment.
The Court examined the interests which the Commonwealth
claimed were protected by the statute.4 1 The Court was willing to assume that confidentiality serves legitimate state interests, but nevertheless concluded that this did not justify the imposition of criminal
42
sanctions on third parties to the proceedings such as Landmark.
Chief Justice Burger noted that the Commonwealth had provided no
factual basis to demonstrate the necessity for criminal proscriptions
43
and emphasized that most states had not adopted such an approach.
Injury to official reputation does not constitute a sufficient justification
for punishing otherwise protected speech.' Consequently, the reputa45
tion of the courts as an institution merits no greater protection. Supwas found in Justice Black's observation in
port for these conclusions
46
California:
v.
Bridges
The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by
shielding judges from public criticism wrongly appraises the
character of American political opinion. . . . [A]n enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment,
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance
respect.4 7
Since the Commonwealth had not justified the burden its statutory
scheme placed on protected speech, the Supreme Court reversed
38. Id. at 495.
39. Id. at 496-97.
40. Id. at 497 n.27.
41. Criminal sanctions were said to be necessary to prevent the public discussion of
unfounded allegations of judicial misconduct and the premature disclosure of the details of
proceedings before the Commission. See 435 U.S. at 840. See also note 27 supra.
42. 435 U.S. at 841.
43. Id. & n.12.
44. Id. at 841-42 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964)).
45. 435 U.S. at 842.
46. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
47. Id. at 270-71. See also id. at 291-92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Landmark's conviction.48
In the final section of the Landmark opinion, the Court criticized
the Virginia Supreme Court's reliance upon and mechanical application of the clear and present danger test.41 A legislatively determined
state interest was viewed as an insufficient basis for a judicial finding of
a clear and present danger.50 In the words of Chief Justice Burger:

"Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when
First Amendment rights are at stake."'5 1 The Court disapproved of the

Virginia court's attempt to distinguish Landmark from prior cases
which had rejected findings of clear and present danger arising from
out-of-court media commentaries. 2 If anything, the Court noted, the
threat to the administration of justice posed in those cases was more
direct and substantial than that presented by Landmark's disclosure. 3

Referring to the availability of contempt powers to punish breaches of
confidentiality by commission members and staff, as well as to oaths of

secrecy sometimes required of commission members, staff and witnesses, the Court concluded that "much of the risk [to the administration ofjustice] can be eliminated through careful internal procedures to

protect the confidentiality of Commission proceedings."

4

Despite the

availability of alternative measures for protecting the state's interest in
confidentiality, the Court found that the "danger" embodied in

Landmark's publication "'is precisely one of the types of activity envisioned by the Founders in presenting the First Amendment for
48. 435 U.S. at 842, 845-46.
49. Id. at 842-43: "Mr. Justice Holmes' test was never intended 'to express a technical
legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases.' Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Properly applied, the tcst requires a court
to make its own inquiry into the imminence and magnitude of the danger said to flow from
the particular utterance and then to balance the character of the evil, as well as its likelihood, against the need for free and unfettered expression. The possibilitN that other measures will serve the State's interests should also be weighed."
50. Id. at 844. See also Justice Pof's dissent from the Virginia Supreme Court's decision, 217 Va. 699, 713, 233 S.E.2d 120, 129 (1977) (Poff, J., dissenting) "Just as a court
cannot infer the existence of a clear and present danger from allegations rr ade in a contempt
citation and adopt that inference as a conclusion of law, Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962), a court cannot infer the existence of a clear and present danger from the mere enactment of a penal statute." Id.
51. 435 U.S. at 843. In support of the need for an independent judicial inquiry into the
existence of a clear and present danger, the Chief Justice quoted from Peanekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) and Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 37S-79 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See 435 U.S. at 843-44.
52. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra.
53. 435 U.S. at 845.
54. Id. (citing 435 U.S. at 841 n.12).
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ratification.' "'I
Justice Stewart concurred in the Court's judgment but could not
agree that section 2.1-37.13 was unconstitutional.5 6 In his view, "[tihere
could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a State's interest in
the quality of its judiciary."5 " Based on this paramount concern, Justice Stewart recognized the legitimate "derivative interest" in maintaining the confidentiality of Commission proceedings. 8 Thus, the state
could constitutionally punish any individual who breached this confidentiality. 9 However, rather than attempting to enforce criminal sanctions against an individual, Virginia sought to punish a newspaper for
its publication of the information. This application of the statute to the
press was deemed unconstitutional: "If the constitutional protection of
a free press means anything, it means that government cannot take it
upon itself to decide what a newspaper may and may not publish."6
3. Analysis
Analysis of the questions raised and resolved in Landmark can
best be accomplished by focusing on two aspects of the case. The first
section that follows will discuss the extent to which Landmark is consistent with the "clear and present danger" cases relied upon by the
Virginia Supreme Court. The second section will examine the utility of
applying the clear and present danger test in future media cases.
a. Backgroundof the Clear andPresent DangerStandard
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Bridges v.
California,6 1 Pennekamp v. Mlorida,62 Craig v. Harney6 3 and Wood v.
55. Id. at 845 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 388 (1962)).
56. 435 U.S. at 848 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 849. Because Justice Stewart refused to join the majority opinion, his concurrence must be taken as an endorsement of the state's right to punish any nonmedia individual or entity who divulges information concerning Commission proceedings. The majority
declined to address the question of the possibility of imposing criminal sanctions on persons
who actually participated in the proceedings. See id. at 837 & n.9. Indeed, the Court even
suggested that such punishment would be constitutional. See id. at 841 n. 12. But the majority did not limit its holding to the protection of the news media; any third person who was a
stranger to the proceedings is within the Court's decision. See id. at 837. Justice Stewart
apparently wrote separately to emphasize his belief that First Amendment protections for
the disclosure of confidential information should be extended only to members of the press.
60. Id. at 849 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
62. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
63. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
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Georgia64 constitute the "clear and present danger" cases upon which
the Virginia Supreme Court relied in affirming Landmark's conviction. 65 Each of these cases involved a lower court's use of the common
law power of contempt to punish out-of-court statements concerning
pending cases or investigations. Such statements, in the view of the
courts, created a clear and present danger to the orderly administration
of justice.
Writing for the Court in Bridges, Justice Black reversed a decision
the
California Supreme Court66 which upheld a ruling that the Los
of
Angeles Times had been in contempt of court when it published an
editorial urging a judge to imprison two criminal defendants then on
trial. Justice Black began his analysis by noting that there had been no
legislative determination that such out-of-court commentary posed a
danger justifying punishment.6 7 Thus, the decision by the California
Supreme Court did not come up for review "encased in the armor
wrought by prior legislative deliberation."6 Relying on language from
Cantwell v. Connecticut,6 9 Justice Black noted that had there been an
indication of legislative intent, such a "'declaration of the State's policy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the law as infringing constitutional limitations.' "70 In the absence of such a legislative
declaration, the Court in Bridges was reluctant to rely on the California
courts' determinations that the editorials at issue had either an "inherent" or "reasonable" tendency to interfere with the orderly administration of justice. Unfortunately, the Court failed to set forth with any
specificity precisely what type of speech would be punishable under a
clear and present danger analysis. Instead, Justice Black provided the
following summary: "What finally emerges from the 'clear and present
danger' cases is a working principle that the substantive evil must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before
utterances can be punished."7 "
Five years later, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Penne64. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
65. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 217 Va. at 70o-13, 233 S.E.2d at
125,29.
66. Bridges v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 464, 94 P.2d 983 (1939). Compare Times
Mirror v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 99, 98 P.2d 1029 (1940).
67. 314 U.S. at 260.
68. Id. at 261.
69. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (absence of a state policy restricting street discussion of religious affairs weighed heavily in reversal of defendant's conviction).
70. 314 U.S. at 260 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 29,.307-08 (1940)).
71. 314 U.S. at 272-73.
72. Id. at 263.
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kamp v. Florida,73 Justice Reed recognized the vagueness of the
Bridges standard and reiterated the Court's belief that clarity and definiteness would somehow emerge in subsequent cases. 4 The
Pennekamp decision did not fulfill this expectation, however, only adding to the Bridges standard the requirement of "a solidarity of evidence. '' 75 The Pennekamp Court's major contribution to the clear and
present danger test was not this addition to the guidelines but rather the
instructions on how the required evidence is to be obtained. The
Pennekamp Court noted that it was "compelled to examine for [itself]
the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were
made to see whether or not they do carry a threat of clear and present
danger ....
"76 The Virginia Supreme Court's failure to carry out this
investigative process was a major factor underlying the Supreme
Court's rejection of its analysis in Landmark. The Virginia court's reliance solely on the legislative determination was deemed insufficient,7 7

and Chief Justice Burger reiterated the importance of undertaking an
independent judicial investigation. 78 He concluded by asserting that if
the Virginia court had undertaken such an inquiry it would have realized that Landmark's article did not present a clear and present danger
to the administration of justice.7 9
Applying the guidelines established in Bridges and Pennekamp to
the Court's decision in Landmark,"° it appears that the latter decision is
73. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
74. Id. at 334.
75. Id. at 347. The only other suggestion of a guideline for determining the existence of
a clear and present danger appears in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion: "It is the
focused attempt to influence a particular decision that may have a corroding effect on the
process of justice, and it is such comment that justifies the corrective process." Id. at 366
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). Yet even this statement provides little guidance since the nature and extent of the "focused attempt" were not defined.
76. Id. at 335.
77. 435 U.S. at 844. The Court stated: "It was.. . incumbent upon the Supreme Court
of Virginia to go behind the legislative determination and examine for itself 'the particular
utteranc[e] here in question and the circumstances of [its] publication to determine to what
extent the substantive evil of unfair administration of justice was a likely consequence, and
whether the degree of likelihood was sufficient to justify [subsequent] punishment.'" Id.
(quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941)).
78. 435 U.S. at 844: "A legislature appropriately inquires into and may declare the
reasons impelling legislative action but the judicial function commands analysis of whether
the specific conduct charged falls within the reach of the statute and if so whether the legislation is consonant with the Constitution."
79. Id. at 844-45. See note 90 infra.
80. Bridges and Pennekamp having established the basic, albeit vague, guidelines for
applying the clear and present danger test, the primary significance of the two subsequent
press cases, Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), and Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375
(1962), is their reaffirmation of the requirement of an independent judicial investigation of

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 6:19

consistent with its predecessors insofar as it represents the continuation
of the Court's policy of reversing the use by lower courts of the contempt power to restrain out-of-court commentary by the media concerning pending proceedings or investigations. Where the Landmark
decision appears to break with precedent is in the Court's suggestion
that the clear and present danger test is not applicable to cases like
Landmark,8 a suggestion whose effect would be virtually to eliminate
the test from the active lexicon of constitutional adjudication.
b.

The Future of the Clear and PresentDanger Test

(1) The Question of Relevancy
The Landmark decision significantly diminishes the usefulness of
the clear and present danger standard in contempt of court prosecutions of the news media. By questioning whether the test was relevant
to the situation presented in Landmark,8 2 the Court may have eliminated the last area in which it had been actively applied-the administration of justice cases. 83
The Court began its discussion of the applicability of the standard
by noting that the Virginia Supreme Court had relied on the test in
rejecting Landmark's constitutional challenge to its conviction.8 4 Disapproving this reliance, the Court criticized the use of the clear and
present danger test in Landmark on two grounds: it questioned the
relevancy of the test to the Landmark situation, and particularly rejected what it termed the "mechanical application" of the test by the
state court.85 Although the Court did not set forth specific support for
its contention that the test was not relevant to the question presented in
the alleged threat to the administration ofjustice. The only additional guidelines these cases
provided were as follows: 1) The Court in Craig asserted that the danger "must not be
remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil." 331 U.S. at 376. Craig also indicated that publications which were merely in bad taste could not be considered dangerous.
Id. at 377. 2) In Wood, the Court overturned a contempt citation for criticizing the charging
of a grand jury and interfering with its investigation. Relying on the Bridges-Pennekamp
standard, the Court based its reversal on the failure of the lower court to adduce evidence
demonstrating an actual interference with justice, 370 U.S. at 386-88, and the failure to
adhere to legislative limitations on the use of the contempt power. Id. at 385-86 & n.10. In
making this latter ground an explicit basis for its decision, see id., the Court reaffirmed the
prior legislative deliberation doctrine of Bridges. See notes 67-68 and accompanying text
supra.
81. See notes 49-55 and accompanying text supra.
82. 435 U.S. at 842.

83. T. EMERSON, supra note 16, at 456.
84. 435 U.S. at 842.
85. Id. Quoting from Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (194o) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring), the Landmark Court noted that the test had never been intended to provide a
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Landmark, it substantiated this view by measuring the evidence

presented by the Commonwealth of Virginia against the requirements
established in Bridges and Pennekamp. 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia had conceded that the record was devoid of actual facts demonstrating a clear and present danger to the administration ofjustice.8 7 It
nonetheless held that the legislative declaration that such a danger
would exist, coupled with the stipulated fact that Landmark published
the article, was sufficient to warrant the imposition of a criminal sanction. s8 The propriety of the Virginia court's reliance on this legislative
determination was emphatically rejected by the Supreme Court: "Def-

erence to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First
Amendment rights are at stake." 89 In Chief Justice Burger's view, if the

Supreme Court of Virginia had looked behind the legislative declaration and examined the particular facts surrounding the speech at issue,

it would not have found any threat to the administration of justice sufficiently serious to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions. 90 Thus,

the absence of an adequate factual basis for Landmark's conviction
seems to have been one ground for the Court's view that the clear and
present danger test was inapplicable in that context. 91

A second basis for regarding this test as unnecessary to the disposition of Landmark is the Court's characterization of the speech at issue
as lying "near the core of the First Amendment."9' 2 Citing as an example its ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, 93 the Court concluded that the Commonwealth's asserted interests were insufficient to justify the
encroachment on freedom of speech and of the press that follow from
the imposition of criminal sanctions. 94 The Court's subsequent analyformula or technical legal doctrine for adjudicating free speech cases. 435 U.S. at 842. See
note 49 supra.
86. See notes 66-76 and accompanying text supra.
87. 217 Va. at 707, 233 S.E.2d at 126.
88. Id. at 708-09, 233 S.E.2d at 126-27.
89. 435 U.S. at 843. See note 51 supra.
90. 435 U.S. at 844-45. The Court noted that the threat to the administration of justice
posed in Landmark was less direct and substantial than that claimed to arise in Bridges,
Pennekamp, Craigand Wood. It concluded that if the requirements of the clear and present
danger test could not be satisfied in those cases, they could not be met in Landmark. Id. at
845.
91. The decision in Landmark brings the Court closer to acceptance of the "full protection rule." As discussed by T. EMERSON, supra note 16, at 457: "Under that doctrine a
communication critical of the court could be punished or suppressed only if it amounted to
'action' rather than 'expression.'" The author suggests that threats of physical violence or
an employer's threats to employees would be examples of such "action."
92. 435 U.S. at 838.
93. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
94. 435 U.S. at 838. In Buckley, the Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality
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sis focused on the public interest in the operation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. Landmark's article was found to have

accurately reported on its proceedings, a function which promoted val-

ues central to the First Amendment.9 5 The Court relied on its prior
decisions which had underscored the amenability of judges and the judiciary to criticism voiced in the press.9 6 The subsequent discussion of
the clear and present danger test was therefore a response to the Vir-

ginia Supreme Court's analysis rather than a basis for the decision in
Landmark.
(2) The Alternative Means Analysis

As noted earlier,97 the administration of justice cases constitute
one of the last areas in which the Court, prior to Landmark, had utilized the clear and present danger test. One factor the Court appar-

ently considered in striking down the criminal conviction in Landmark
was that the Virginia statute, with its imposition of criminal sanctions,
was out of step with the laws of over forty states, none of which "found
it necessary to enforce confidentiality by use of criminal sanctions
against nonparticipants."9 8 The Court noted that these other states

only punish breaches of confidentiality by commission members and
staff, and that such breaches are punishable as civil contempt rather
than criminal violations.9 9 The Court also noted that some states re-

quire witnesses as well as staff and commission members to take an
oath of secrecy. A violation of this requirement is similarly treated as

contempt." ° While the Court did not consider these sister state approaches to ensuring confidentiality dispositive of the issue before it,' 0 '
of the disclosure provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. Responding to
the argument that compelled disclosure of the identity of campaign contributors infringed
the right of associational privacy, the Court conceded that a "mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest" would be insufficient to justify such an encroachment upon
First Amendment values. The appropriate analysis, the Court held, involves strict scrutiny
of the asserted state interests to determine whether there is a "relevant correlation" or "substantial relation" between the governmental interest and the information to be disclosed.
424 U.S. at 64.
95. 435 U.S. at 839 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70
(1964)).
96. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 272-73 (1964); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941); id. at 289,
291-92 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
97. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
98. 435 U.S. at 841 (footnote omitted).
99. Id. at 841 n.12.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 841.
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it seems reasonable to assume that the existence and widespread use of
non-criminal alternative means for protecting the asserted state inter-

ests was a significant factor in the Court's resolution of Landmark.1°2
The widespread use of civil contempt sanctions and other non-criminal

approaches to ensuring confidentiality points to another reason for the
inapplicability of the clear and present danger test in situations such as
that presented in Landmark. Legislatures are now cognizant of the fact
that when the news media criticizes the functioning of the judiciary,

courts should hold such criticism fully protected by the First Amendment unless it goes so far as to amount to "action" instead of expression. 10 3 Consequently, most state legislatures now protect the

confidentiality of their judicial review commission proceedings through
non-criminal sanctions aimed primarily at participants. 0 4 The effect of
this trend is to limit the use of the clear and present danger test to those
in which the speech at issue creates an imminent danger
rare situations
05
of harm.1
c.

The Publicationof Legally ConfidentialInformation

One further aspect of the Landmark decision merits discussion in
this review, although it is not related to the clear and present danger
analysis previously discussed. The Commonwealth had argued in
Landmark that the First Amendment right of a free press to report on
and criticize judicial conduct did not extend to the publication of infor-

mation "'which by Constitutional mandate is to be confidential.'

"106

The Commonwealth relied on the Court's decision in Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn'0 7 to support this contention. In Cox the Court held that
102. The Court noted that its prior decisions had struck down the suppression of speech
claimed necessary by a state to protect the reputations of its judges or to maintain the institutional integrity of its courts. Id. at 841-42 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 272-73 (1964); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1941)). These principles
were deemed controlling and dispositive of the criminal punishment issue in Landmark. 435
U.S. at 842.
103. See note 91 supra.
104. The Court did not indicate whether it would consider these non-criminal approaches constitutionally valid in a fact situation similar to that presented in Landmark.
The Court pointed out that the scope of other states' non-criminal sanctions is limited by
their application solely to participants to the proceedings, as opposed to the Virginia statute's broad prohibition against disclosure by "any person." 435 U.S. at 841 & n.12. Thus it
remains possible that a legislative enactment prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information by a non-participant (ie., a newspaper) might be found unconstitutional by the
Court irrespective of the nature of the punishment imposed.
105. See note 91 supra.
106. 435 U.S. at 840 (citing Brief for Appellee at 17).
107. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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a civil action would not lie against a television station for invasion of
privacy based on the broadcast of the name of a deceased rape victim
obtained from public records." 8 The Landmark Court rejected the
Commonwealth's reliance on Cox since that decision had explicitly reserved the broader question of "whether the publication of truthful information withheld by law from the public domain is similarly
privileged."' 1 9 The Court in Landmark also refused to deal fully with
the question left open in Cox. Noting its belief that Co.r did not provide a dispositive answer to the question presented in Landmark, the
Court concluded: "We need not address all the implications of that
question here, but only whether in the circumstances of this case
Landmark's publication is protected by the First Amendment.""10
Since the Court proceeded to hold that the publication could not be
criminally punished,"' it can be inferred that the Court answered the
Cox question in the affirmative. In the wake of Landmark, newspapers
would appear to be free to publish truthful information withheld from
the public domain, insofar as that information pertains to judicial review commission proceedings in which the newspaper isnot a participant. A more general grant of privilege cannot fairly be inferred from
Landmark given the intent of the Court to limit their resolution of the
Cox question to the facts in Landmark.
B. Searches of Newspaper Offices. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily
In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,"I2 the Supreme Court addressed a
controversy regarding a different facet of the non-participant observer
role of the news media than was confronted in the Landmark 3 case.
The issue in Zurcher was how the terms of the Fourth Amendment, 114
applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment,"I 5 should be
construed in the context of a third-party search' 16 of a newspaper of108. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
109. 435 U.S. at 840 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 497 n.27). See
note 40 and accompanying text supra.
110. 435 U.S. at 840.
111. Id. at 841-42.
112. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).

113. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). For a discussion
of Landmark, see notes 1-111 and accompanying text supra.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides that: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
115. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
116. The Supreme Court characterized a third-party search as "the recurring situation
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fice. The object of the search in Zurcher was evidence pertaining to
criminal activity which a member of the newspaper staff may have photographed and written about, but in which he did not participate. The
crucial question in the case was procedural: whether such evidence can
properly be obtained by means of a search warrant or whether its production must be compelled by service of a subpoena duces tecum.
A federal district court ruled that the First Amendment protects
newspapers from being subjected to searches pursuant to a warrant,
except where a clear showing could be made that upon service of a
subpoena the evidence sought would be removed from the jurisdiction
or destroyed, notwithstanding the issuance of a restraining order in
conjunction with the subpoena.1 7 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed per curiam, adopting the opinion of the district
court.118 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 119 and subsequently reversed the lower court decisions.
1. The Decision
The fact situation underlying the Zurcher litigation is uncomplicated.'2 0 On Friday, April 9, 1971, demonstrators then occupying the
administrative offices of the Stanford University Hospital engaged in a
violent altercation with nine police officers in a hallway of the occupied
building. The officers were part of a joint force comprised of officers
from the Santa Clara County Sheriff's and Palo Alto Police Departments, who had been called to the scene by the hospital director to oust
the demonstrators. The latter had barricaded the doors to both ends of
a hallway next to the administrative offices. After peaceful means
failed to persuade the demonstrators to leave, the police forced their
way in through the west end of the hallway. Simultaneously, the demonstrators, armed with sticks and clubs, burst through the east end of
the hallway, attacking and injuring the nine officers stationed there.
Since the police photographer and most other bystanders had congregated at the west end of the hall, few of the assailants were identified;
where state authorities have probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or other
evidence of crime is located on identified property but do not then have probable cause to
believe that the owner or possessor of the property is himself implicated in the crime that has
occurred or is occurring." 436 U.S. at 553.
117. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), afi d, 550 F.2d 464
(9th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
118. 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd,436 U.S. 547 (1978).
119. 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
120. The summary of the facts of the case is taken from the Supreme Court opinion. 436
U.S. at 550-52.
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however, the officers did see someone photographing the fight from the
east end of the hall.
In a special edition published the following Sunday, the Stanford
Daily, the student newspaper of Stanford University, carried articles
and photographs concerning the hospital demonstration and the hallway incident. The photographs carried the byline of a Daily staff member and indicated that he had been present at the east end of the
hallway, giving rise to the inference that he might have photographed
the assault on the nine officers. Accordingly, on the following day the
Santa Clara County District Attorney's Office requested a warrant
from the municipal court authorizing an immediate search of the
Daily's offices for any evidence the newspaper may have obtained regarding the hospital fight. The warrant was issued based on the municipal court's findings of "'just, probable and reasonable cause for
believing that: Negatives and photographs and films, evidence material
and relevant to the identity of the perpetrators of felonies, to wit, Battery on a Peace Officer, and Assault with a Deadly Weapon, will be
located [on the premises of the Daily].' ""2 The affidavit supporting
the request for the search warrant did not link any Daih' staff members
with the unlawful activity.
Later that same day four policemen searched the Daily's offices,
accompanied by several Daily staff members. The officers inspected
photographic laboratories, filing cabinets, desks and wastepaper baskets; locked rooms and drawers were not searched. The search yielded
only those photographs which had already been published; no new evidence was discovered. Approximately one month later, the Daily and
members of its staff instituted a civil action in federal court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against all law enforcement agents responsible for the issuance and execution of the warrant. 22 The complaint alleged that the search of the Daily's offices under color of law
had denied the newspaper and its staff of rights guaranteed to them by
the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution.
The district court refused to issue an injunction but did grant the
121. 436 U.S. at 551 (quoting language from the search warrant, app. 31-32, issued Apr.
12, 1971, Santa Clara County Municipal Court).
122. The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), Nxhich provides that,
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
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Daiy's request for declaratory relief.'2 3 Although acknowledging the
existence of probable cause to believe that relevant evidence regarding
the criminal activity would be found in the Daily's office, the court
nonetheless held that under the circumstances a search warrant was a

constitutionally impermissible means of obtaining such evidence. 124

Rather, the use of a subpoena duces tecum, unless made impracticable

by the circumstances, was regarded by the district court as the approwhere the possessor of the evipriate procedure for third-party searches
25

dence is not suspected of any crime.'

First Amendment considerations played a significant role in the
district court decision. The defendants' contention that newspapers, reporters and photographers have no greater Fourth Amendment protections than other citizens was held to be without merit. 126 Judge

Peckham reasoned that "[t]he First Amendment is not superfluous.
Numerous cases have held that the First Amendment 'modifies' the
Fourth Amendment to the extent that extra protections may be required when First Amendment interests are involved."' 2 7 The court
examined the threats to freedom of the press said to arise more readily
from the use of a search warrant than from employing a subpoena: 1)
police officers executing such warrants would, owing to the generally
disorganized nature of newspaper offices, have the opportunity to rummage through drawers and cabinets, thus endangering confidential
materials and relationships; 2 2) unlike a subpoena duces tecum,
search warrants are issued and executed exparte, which deprives the

newspaper and its staff of the protections afforded by "judicial control"; 129 and 3) police searches might also jeopardize the newspaper's
123. 353 F. Supp. at 136.
124. Id. at 127.
125. Id. The court noted that impracticability could be established by a showing that the
materials sought would be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction despite a restraining
order. Id. at 133.
126. Id. at 134.
127. Id. (emphasis in the original) (citing A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205
(1964) (seizure of allegedly obscene books); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961)
(seizure of allegedly obscene magazines); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (seizure
of organization's membership lists); Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon, 426 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1960)
(seizure of allegedly obscene motion picture film), vacatedand remandedon othergrounds,
401 U.S. 990 (1971); Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Calm, 416 F.2d 410 (2nd Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (seizure of allegedly obscene motion picture film)). None of
these cases dealt specifically with warrantless searches of newspaper offices.
128. 353 F. Supp. at 134-35. Such incursions by law enforcement agencies were thought
to have the potential for chilling the exchange of information these confidential relationships
foster, ultimately affecting the ability of the press to gather news. Id.
129. Id. at 135. In support of the need for such "judicial control" over searches of newspapers, the court cited Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (majority opinion), 710 (Pow-
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30
credibility and create a risk of self-censorship.
In the view of the district court, a police search of a newspaper
office creates an "overwhelming threat" to the proper functioning of
the press, especially where less drastic means can be employed to secure the needed information. 13 The court therefore held that thirdparty searches of newspapers are constitutionally impermissible except
where there is a clear showing before a magistrate that the materials
sought will be destroyed or removed and that a restraining order would
be futile.' 31 Since the defendants had not made such a showing, the
court declared the search of the Daiy's offices to have been

unlawful.

133

On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 31 Writing
for the majority, 13 Justice White characterized the district court deci-

sion as placing such a severe burden on the state to justify the use of a
search warrant that "the effect of the rule is that fruits, instrumentalities, and evidence of crime may be recovered from third parties only by
subpoena, not by search warrant."' 13 6 The Court contrasted this

"sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment" by the district court
with the language of the Amendment and its subsequent interpretation

in the federal judicial system, concluding that there was no direct authority for the rule propounded by the lower court. 137 Justice White
ell, J., concurring). Branzburg involved a newspaper reporter subpoenaed to testify before a
grand jury regarding the sources for one of his stories.
130. 353 F. Supp. at 135.
131. Id.
132. Id. Judge Peckham underscored his concern for First Amendment values by adding: "To stop short of this standard would be to sneer at all the First Amendment has come
to represent in our society." Id.
133. Id. The court also dismissed defendants' contentions that the D,2il and members of
its staff lacked standing to question the legality of the search and that this question was
moot. Id. at 135-36.
134. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
135. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell
and Rehnquist. Two dissenting opinions were filed, one by Justice Ste%art, who was joined
by Justice Marshall, and a second by Justice Stevens. Justice Powell %rote a separate concurring opinion in which he addressed the issues raised in Justice Stewart's dissent. Justice
Brennan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
136. 436 U.S. at 553.
137. Id. at 554: "It is an understatement to say that there is no direct authority in this or
any other federal court for the District Court's sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment." (footnote omitted).
The district court had focused upon the Fourth Amendment rights of third parties,
noting that few reported cases touched even generally upon the issue. 353 F. Supp. at 127.
The district court was unable to cite any cases dealing specifically with whether or when a
subpoena duces tecum should be used in lieu of a search warrant. Observing that the Fourth
Amendment rights of third parties had previously been considered only in the context of
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began his examination of the prior cases construing and applying the
Fourth Amendment by quoting from the Court's recent decision in
Fisherv. UnitedStates.'3 8 In Fisher the Framers' approach to personal
privacy was interpreted to mean that "when the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great,

the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a warrant to search and
seize will issue."' 13 9 Justice White also referred to the Court's decision
in Camara v. Municipal Court.4 ' In Camara the question of whether
or not an administrative search warrant should issue under the stan-

dard of probable cause was said to turn on a balancing of the governmental interest justifying the intrusion against the constitutional
standard of reasonableness.' 4 ' Finally, Justice White observed that a
recent decision of the Court'4 2 established that search warrants are not

directed at persons but rather at "places" and "things," so that a warrant need not even name the person from whom the property will be
seized. 143
Based on this analysis of Fourth Amendment precedent, the Court
standing to challenge the legality of a search, see, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165 (1969), the district court went on to examine state court cases dealing with what it believed to be an analogous situation to that presented in the instant case-the rights of third
parties in the face of a warrantless seizure of property by the police. See Owens v. Way, 141
Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914); Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567, 65 N.W. 530 (1895);
Commodity Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 198 N.Y.S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923). In Commodity Mfg., the
New York Supreme Court came closest to anticipating the district court's position: "No case
has been cited where the court has gone so far as to say that property, not an instrument of a
crime, but only evidence of its commission, and which was the property of someone besides
the defendant, could be seized either under a search warrant or as an incident of an arrest of
defendant.
"I can well believe that property used in the commission of a crime, even though belonging to a third party, might properly be seized, and also that property not used in the
commission of the crime, but containing evidence of the commission of the crime, might
properly be seized, where it is the property of the accused; but to sanction the seizure of the
property of innocentpersons, orpersonsnot accused, not used in the commission of the crime,
but merely because they containedevidence ofthe crime, would open the doorto grave abusesof
invasion ofproperty rights." 198 N.Y.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
Justice White rejected as inapposite the district court's reliance upon these cases, as well
as its reliance on Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971) (a showing of probable cause to believe that a subpoena would be an impracticable alternative is required before
a court can issue a warrant for the arrest of a material witness). Zurcher v. Stanford Dailey,
436 U.S. at 554 n.5. For a discussion of the lower court's analysis of the applicability of
Bacon, see notes 206-10 and accompanying text infra.
138. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
139. Id. at 400, quoted in 436 U.S. at 554.
140. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
141. Id. at 534-35.
142. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
143. See id. at 155 n.15.
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concluded that the state's interest in enforcing its criminal laws and in
recovering evidence of violations of those laws is the same regardless of
the degree of culpability attributable to the person occupying the premises to be searched or in possession of the evidence to be seized.'" The
Court thus rejected the premise underlying the district court holding,
which Justice White found to be "that State entitlement to a search
warrant depends on the culpability of the owner or possessor of the
place to be searched and on the State's right to arrest him."' 145 In support of this rejection of the lower court's position, the Court cited both
Camara and See v. City of Seattle14 6 for the proposition that the state
need not rely on an individual's culpability as a prerequisite to the issuance of a search warrant. Camara and See were challenges to convictions for refusal to permit warrantless searches of commercial
property. 147 The search in each instance was to have been conducted
by representatives of municipal administrative agencies (housing and
fire department inspectors), and was intended to ensure compliance
with local housing and fire ordinances. 48 Justice White, writing for the
majority in both Camara and See,' 4 9 refused to follow the Court's earlier decision in Frank v. Maryland'50 and held that in civil as well as
criminal cases, the Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be
issued before officials enter a private citizen's home or business premises. 15 ' Since the culpability of the individual property holders in
Camara and See was deemed irrelevant to the state's right to conduct
searches of their property, the Zurcher Court reasoned that culpability
on the part of the Daily or its staff need not be a consideration in the
case before it.' 52 Consequently, the Court concluded that, "[t]he criti144. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 555.
145. Id.
146. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
147. Appellant in Camarahad been charged with violating San Francisco Housing Code
§ 507 and sought a writ of prohibition against his prosecution in state court. Appellant in
See was convicted of violating the City of Seattle Fire Code § 8.01.150. These statutes made
criminal the refusal to permit an inspection by the housing and fire authorities, respectively.
148. The endorsement of these warrantless searches by the lower courts in each case was
based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959). The Court in Frank had ruled that a search warrant was not a necessary prerequisite
to an entry into a citizen's home to investigate sanitary conditions pursuant to a local health
ordinance.
149. Justice White was joined in each case by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black,
Douglas, Brennan and Fortas. A dissenting opinion covering both cases was filed by Justice
Clark, who was joined by Justices Stewart and Harlan.
150. 359 U.S. 360 (1959). See note 148 supra.
151. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 534; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 546.
152. 436 U.S. at 555-56. The validity of this reading of Camara is questionable in light
of the facts underlying that case. The Court's opinion in Camara reveals that appellant
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cal element in a reasonable search is not that the owner of the property
is suspected of crime but that there is reasonable cause to believe that
the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized are located on the
property to which entry is sought." '5 3 In support of this conclusion,
Justice White analyzed a prior case' 5 4 which had challenged the right
of police officers to search a car and seize contraband therefrom when
the occupants were not subject to arrest. The Court there rejected the
claim that the right of police to search was dependent on the right to
arrest. 5 5 Justice White combined this rule with more recent interpretations of the Fourth Amendment, as reflected in Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 6 and found that "it is untenable to conclude that property may not be searched unless its occupant is reasonably suspected of crime and is subject to arrest."' 5 7 In the Zurcher
Court's opinion, the Fourth Amendment had established the proper
balance between privacy interests and public need, and the interpretaby the district court was therefore
tion of that Amendment postulated
58
unnecessary and burdensome.1
In the next section of the majority opinion, the Court examined
the reasons advanced by the district court in support of its decision.
Justice White first questioned whether the lack of culpability on the
part of the property owner requires the use of a subpoena rather than a
search warrant. He noted that the Dai , and its staff had conceded that
if a third party knows that there is contraband on his premises, he is
then sufficiently culpable to justify the issuance of a search warrant.' 59
And once an innocent third party is apprised of the existence of such
evidence on his property, there is no reason why he should then be
Camara was suspected of using the rear portion of his leasehold as a personal residence in
violation of the building's occupancy permit. See 387 U.S. at 526. It was with knowledge of
this possible violation that the housing inspector confronted appellant and requested permission to inspect the premises. Upon appellant's subsequent refusals to permit entry, he was
arrested for violating the municipal housing code. See note 147 supra. It appears, therefore,
that his possible culpability was a factor motivating the request to search the premises. See
387 U.S. at 526-27.
153. 436 U.S. at 556 (footnote omitted).
154. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
155. Id. at 158-59.
156. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 n.1 (1965).
157. 436 U.S. at 559. See United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 536 F.2d 699, 703
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Wingate v. United States, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
158. 436 U.S. at 559. The Court therefore held that, "the courts may not, in the name of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, forbid the States from issuing warrants to search for
evidence simply because the owner or possessor of the place to be searched is not then
reasonably suspected of criminal involvement." Id. at 560.
159. Id.
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allowed to object to the search, withhold
the evidence and insist upon
160
service of a subpoena duces tecum.
The Court also considered the potential impact of a subpoena requirement on the efficiency and success of law enforcement efforts.
The Court posited two difficulties such a requirement would bring
about and characterized them as creating "[serious] hazards to criminal
investigation."' 16 ' The first of these is that the seemingly innocent third
party might not actually be blameless and may in fact be connected
with or sympathetic to those who are culpable. Arguably such an individual could not be relied upon to retain evidence that might implicate
or otherwise harm his friends. Secondly, the Court voiced concern that
any close relationship between the third party and those suspected of
criminal acts would result in the "real culprits [having] access to the
property . . . [which] could easily result in the disappearance of the
evidence, whatever the good faith of the third party."' 6 2 In view of
these potential impediments to the efforts of law enforcement agencies,
the Court concluded that the use of search warrants is necessary to secure and preserve valuable evidence. 63
The final section of the majority opinion addressed the question of
whether and to what extent First Amendment considerations should
modify the application of the Fourth Amendment when the subject of
the search is a newspaper office. Justice White began by reciting the
threats to the due functioning of the press claimed by the Daily to arise
from such searches: 1) physical disruption resulting in publication delays; 2) loss of confidential sources; 3) deterrence of the recording and
preservation of information; 4) chilling of the processing and dissemination of news; and 5) resort to self-censorship on the part of the
press. 64 After acknowledging that the struggle which gave birth to the
Fourth Amendment was largely one "'between the Crown and the
press,' "65 Justice White briefly reviewed the judicial history of the tension between the First and Fourth Amendments. He referred to prior
160. Id. This assertion by the Court seems to ignore the possibility that the innocent
third party may have a valid objection to the search on the ground that it is an unnecessary
and unreasonable invasion of privacy.
161. Id. at 561.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 563. For an analysis of this aspect of the Court's opinion, see notes 232-35
and accompanying text infra.
164. 436 U.S. at 563-64.
165. Id. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965)). The Court also
noted that "[w]here the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude."' 436 U.S. at 564 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. at 485).
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decisions of the Court which had invalidated as too broad a warrant
authorizing the search of a private home for materials relating to the
Communist Party,'6 6 and which rejected as unconstitutional searches
pursuant to a warrant where the required showing of probable cause
was not made before a neutral and disinterested magistrate. 167 But in
contrast to the district court's view that these First Amendment considerations require the use of a subpoena rather than a search warrant,' 6 8
the Court concluded:
[T]he prior cases do no more than insist that the courts apply the
warrant requirements with particular exactitude when First
Amendment interests would be endangered by the search. As we
see it, no more than this is required where the warrant requested
believed to be
is for the seizure of criminal evidence reasonably
169
on the premises occupied by a newspaper.
Having articulated this standard for the issuance of warrants authorizing searches of newspaper offices, the Court examined the specific
harms cited by the district court in support of its rule requiring the use
of subpoenas. Justice White first stated his confidence in the ability of
local magistrates to guard against searches of the type and scope that
would actually interfere with the timely publication of a newspaper.170
He further emphasized that if the requirement of reasonableness and
specificity were properly applied to the issuance of search warrants,
there would be no opportunity for police to rummage at large through
newspaper offices; a search would therefore not inhibit editorial or publication decisions. 17 1 Finally, citing Branzburg v. Hayes,172Justice
White underscored the Court's doubts that confidential sources would
166. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965). The search warrant issued in Stanford was
held to be the functional equivalent of a general warrant, the use of which it was the purpose
of the Fourth Amendment to forbid. Id. at 480. Cf. note 165 supra (terms of the Fourth
Amendment must be applied with "scrupulous exactitude" when First Amendment values
are at stake).
167. See, e.g., Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968) (obscene films);
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961) (obscene publications). The search
warrants in these cases were held defective because their issuance was based solely on the
conclusory allegations of police officers, without any independent inquiry by the magistrates.
See 392 U.S. at 637; 367 U.S. at 732.
168. See notes 123-30 and accompanying text supr-a.
169. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 565.
170. Id. at 566.
171. Id See also id. at 565: "Properly administered, the preconditions for a warrant-probable cause, specificity with respect to the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, and overall reasonableness-should afford sufficient protection against the harms
that are assertedly threatened by warrants for searching newspaper offices."
172. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg held that the First Amendment does not afford a
newspaper reporter a constitutional privilege against testifying before a grand jury regarding
criminal activity he observed while performing his newsgathering function. Claims that
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disappear or that the press would engage in self-censorship if searches
of newspaper offices could be authorized by the issuance of warrants.
Whatever marginal effect such searches might have on newsgathering,

he noted, "does not make a constitutional difference in our
judgment."' 7 3
The majority opinion concluded by pointing out that since the
date of the search which gave rise to the instant action, there had been
very few third-party searches of newspaper offices. 174 From this the

Court inferred that law enforcement agencies were not abusing their
power under the Fourth Amendment.' 75 Any such abuses could be
dealt with as they arose, an unlikely occurrence in the Court's view
given the power of the press. 176 The Court also rejected the Daily's
claim that it should have been afforded an opportunity to litigate the
177
state's right to obtain the materials sought before they, were seized.

A subpoena requirement was not regarded as providing the press any
greater protection than permitting searches pursuant to a warrant, since
a showing of relevancy sufficient to support a finding of probable cause
178
would, in the Court's view, also justify the issuance of a subpoena.
The Court did leave open the possibility of legislative or executive ac-

tion "to establish nonconstitutional protections against possible abuses
forced disclosure by newspersons of confidential information or sources relating to criminal
activity would greatly damage their effectiveness were rejected by the court. Id. at 693-99.
173. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 566.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.: "The press is not only an importaht, critical, and valuable asset to society, but it
is not easily intimidated. ...
177. Id. The majority opinion stated that "presumptively protected materials are not
necessarily immune from seizure under warrant for use at a criminal trial." Id. at 567. The
Court found that most such seizures would not impose an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Id. (citing Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973)).
178. 436 U.S. at 567. It should be noted, however, that with a warrant, the determination
as to the existence of probable cause to search is made in an exparte proceeding, whereas if
a subpoena duces tecum is issued, the person or entity at whom it is directed will have an
opportunity to litigate the issue of the state's entitlement to the material before it is seized.
Thus, the opportunity to contest allegations of such entitlement may result in the quashing
of the subpoena and the consequent preservation of the confidentiality of the material. In
contrast, even if the validity of a search warrant can be successfully challenged, such a ruling
can only be obtained after the material has been seized, when the harms arising from its
disclosure will have already occurred. See id. at 575-76 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J.
dissenting). See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
In addition, the Court noted that certain privileges against compl) ing with a subpoena,
such as those based on the Fifth Amendment or a state shield law, "are largely irrelevant to
determining the legality of a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment." 436 U.S. at
567. Utilization of the warrant procedure therefore permits the circumvention of important
statutory and constitutional rights.
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179
of the search warrant procedure."'
In addition to reiterating the contentions advanced and relied
upon by the district court and adopted by the court of appeals, 180 Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion made two significant observations.
Addressing the specific facts of the case, he pointed out that no showing
had been made by the police that there was an existing emergency situation at the time the warrant was issued, nor was the evidence sought
contraband or any other illegal instrumentality.' 8 ' Moreover, there
was no indication at the time the warrant was obtained that the Daily
would not comply with a subpoena.18 2 Given this situation, Justice
Stewart argued that the police should have been required to establish
the impracticability of a subpoena before the magistrate authorized the
intrusion resulting from a search pursuant to a warrant.8 3 The second
important observation is Justice Stewart's contention that the First
Amendment's specific guarantee of freedom of the press compels the
conclusion that there is a significant difference between a search of a
newspaper office and that of any other type of premises.' 8 4 He found
that the explicit constitutional protection for a free press justifies the
rule prohibiting searches of newspaper offices pursuant to a warrant
fashioned by the lower court.' 85
A separate dissent was filed by Justice Stevens, '8 6wherein he argued that the Court had erred in its application of the doctrine of War-

179. Id.
180. Id. at 570-74 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 574-75.

182. Id. at 575 & n.9.
183. Id. at 575.
184. Id. at 576. In addition to joining the majority opinion, Justice Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he challenged this aspect of Justice Stewart's dissent. Justice Powell pointed out that the Fourth Amendment was largely a response to the struggle
between the Crown and the press. 436 U.S. at 569 (Powell, J., concurring). Given this history, Justice Powell stated that if the Framers had wished to accord the press special protection against searches otherwise authorized by the Fourth Amendment, they would have
formulated that Amendment explicitly to reflect that desire. Id. As Justice Stevens pointed
out in his dissenting opinion, however, searches of the type carried out in the Daily's offices--those for documentary evidence-were not permitted until the Court's decision in
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 436 U.S. at 577-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
notes 187-89 and accompanying text infra. In Justice Powell's view, First Amendment values can adequately be vindicated by a magistrate's consideration of the rights of the free
press in connection with his determination of the reasonableness of the requested warrant.
436 U.S. at 570 & n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
185. Id. at 576 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.). Justice Stewart endorsed
the district court decision only insofar as it granted special protection to newspapers. He
agreed with the majority that the Fourth Amendment does not generally forbid third-party
searches. Id. at 571 n. I.
186. Id. at 577 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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den v. Hayden.'87 The Court in Hayden extended the permissible scope
of searches to include the seizure of "mere evidence," generally defined
as documentary materials, in addition to that of the traditional objects
of a search: contraband, weapons and plunder. 88 Justice Stevens
noted that the pre-Hayden limitation on the permissible objects of a
search had had the effect of restricting the category of persons who
could properly be subjected to a search. 189 By permitting the seizure of
documentary evidence of crime, the Hayden decision greatly expanded
the number of persons whose privacy interests could be infringed by
such searches. Where the object of the search is contraband or the
fruits of crime, Justice Stevens found it reasonable to infer that the possessor is involved in criminal activity and that if given prior notice of
the search will dispose of the evidence.'9 0 In such cases a showing of
probable cause to believe that the individual is in fact in possession of
such objects justifies the invasion of privacy. 19 1 But where mere documentary evidence, such as that sought from the Stanford Daily, is involved, the custodian is much less likely to be guilty of criminal
wrongdoing and is more likely to honor a subpoena or informal request
to produce the material.' 9 2 In such cases, Justice Stevens contended
that the probable cause standard can only be satisfied bV a showing that
the subject of the search is involved in criminal activity or, if given
notice, will conceal or destroy the evidence. 9 3 Since no such showing
was made in the warrant application in Zurcher, Justice Stevens would
have held that the search of the Daily offices was unreasonable and
94
therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment.
2. Analysis
In order better to analyze the Court's decision in Zurcher, consideration of the case will be trisected. The first section w ill examine the
validity of the Court's holding that the Fourth Amendment does not
grant special protection to non-culpable third-party possessors of evidence sought by law enforcement agencies. The second section will
evaluate the necessity of using search warrants rather than subpoenas.
The third section will scrutinize the possible harm to the press that may
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

387 U.S. 294 (1967).
Id. at 300-10.
436 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 581.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 582-83.
Id. at 583.
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arise in the wake of Zurcher. The potential for legislative or executive
action to bolster the First Amendment guarantees potentially
threatened by the decision will also be discussed.
Before embarking on this specific analysis, however, it is important
to make one general observation regarding the contrast between the
approach taken by a majority of the Supreme Court in Zurcher and
that adopted by the district court and echoed by several justices who
dissented from the Court's decision. The crucial difference is that a
majority of the Supreme Court treated Zurcher essentially as a case
posing issues relating to the construction and application of the Fourth
Amendment. Consequently, the First Amendment issues were given
secondary importance by the Court. In contrast, the district court and
several dissenters on the Supreme Court focused directly on the First
Amendment implications of a search of a newspaper office. The
Zurcher majority first inquired whether or not the state had a valid
interest in and probable cause to conduct the search. Once that was
established, the Court required only that the warrant requirements be
applied with "scrupulous exactitude" when the premises to be searched
are a newspaper office.' 9 5 Conversely, the district court and Justices
Stewart and Marshall looked first to the Stanford Daiy's rights under
the First Amendment and then sought to weigh those rights against the
state's interest in obtaining the materials. Finding that the state had
failed to show that the evidence sought could not be obtained in a less
intrusive manner than by a search pursuant to a warrant, the district
court and these dissenters urged that an appropriate balancing of interests could best be struck by limiting the use of search warrants against
newspapers to those instances where a subpoena duces tecuni would be
impracticable.' 9 6
a. The Court's Interpretationof the Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court based its rejection of the district court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment on a number of grounds, each of
which merits examination. The first was that nothing in the language
of the Fourth Amendment precludes the issuance of third-party search
warrants. The Court rejected as inapposite the authorities relied upon
by the district court197 and founded its own view on language in United
States v. Kahn 98 which suggested that search warrants are not directed
195. Id. at 564 (majority opinion). See text accompanying note 169 supra.
196. 436 U.S. at 575 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 554. See note 137 and accompanying text supra.

198. 415 U.S. 143 (1974).
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at persons but rather at "places" and "things." 199 The inference the
Court appeared to draw from Kahn was that the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment are satisfied, even where the person or persons at
whom the search is directed are not specified, when probable cause for
the search is demonstrated.2 °° Although the Court's reliance on Kahn

may not have been well founded,2"' it is the summary rejection of the
authorities cited by the district court that requires closer examination.
The Court's rejection of the four state cases cited in the district
court opinion2 °2 is understandable in light of its ruling in Warden v.
Hayden20 3 that "mere evidence" can properly be the object of a
search."
Since the cases relied upon by the lower court were preHayden decisions which did not address the specific question of
whether the issuance of a subpoena is a preferable alternative to the use

of a search warrant, they were properly held inapposite by the Supreme
Court. The same cannot be said for the Court's rejection of the district
court's argument by analogy to Bacon v. UnitedStates.215 In Bacon the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the issuance of a warrant for the

arrest of a material witness invalid for failure to establish probable
cause to believe that securing the witness's presence by means of subpoena would be impractical.2 0 6 The district court in Zurcher accepted
the Daiy's argument that "if one not suspected of a crime cannot be
arrested unless there is a showing that subpoena is impracticable, one

not suspected of a crime cannot be searched unless there is a showing
199. Id. at 155 n.15.
200. 436 U.S. at 555.
201. A careful reading of the cited footnote in Kahn makes the Court's reliance on it
questionable. Kahn dealt with the question of whether the wiretapped conversations of a
person not named in the application seeking authorization for the wiretap could subsequently be used as evidence to prosecute the subject of the tap. But the basis for the decision
in Kahn was the Court's construction of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976); it did not rest upon constitutional
grounds. See 415 U.S. at 150, 152-55. The footnote cited by the Court in Zurcher was
therefore merely dicta. Further, the Kahn Court stated in the same footnote that "even a
warrant failing to name the owner of the premises at which a search is directed, while not the
bestpractice,has been held to pass muster under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 155 n.15
(emphasis added). It thus appears that while search warrants which do not specify the person from whom the material is to be seized are permissible, the Court in Kahn did attach
some importance to naming the party whose premises are to be searched, an emphasis not
reflected in the Zurcher Court's reference to Kahn.
202. Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914); Newberry v. Carpenter, 107 Mich.
567, 65 N.W. 530 (1895); People v. Carver, 172 Misc. 820, 16 N.Y.S.2d 268 (County Ct.
1939); Commodity Mfg. Co. v. Moore, 198 N.Y.S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
203. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
204. Id. at 301-02.
205. 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
206. Id. at 943.
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that a subpoena duces tecum is impracticable."2 7 In response to the
argument that Bacon dealt only with the issue of permissible grounds
for an arrest and was not a search and seizure case, the district court
replied: "But historically the right against unlawful seizures has if anything been more protected, not less protected, than the right against
unlawful arrests."2" 8 The argument by analogy to Bacon was deemed
strong enough by the district court, and subsequently by the court of
appeals, to compel the conclusion that no search warrant can issue
against a third party unless the state shows that resort to a subpoena is
impractical. 9 Given this heavy reliance on Bacon, it would appear
that the case merited greater attention from the Supreme Court than its
summary treatment in a footnote. 210
The second ground relied upon by the Supreme Court in reversing
the district court decision was that the culpability of the third-party
property holder is immaterial to the state's interest in enforcing its
criminal law and recovering evidence of crime. 21 ' The Court bolstered
this contention by reference to Camarav. MunicipalCourt212 and See v.
City of Seattle.2" 3 The applicability of Camara and See in the factual
context of Zurcher is questionable for several reasons. First, at least
insofar as Camara is concerned, it is not at all clear that the culpability
of the property holder was not a factor in the Court's decision.2" 4 Secondly, neither of these cases arose initially out of situations involving
the issuance of search warrants. The common issue in Camara and See
was whether city health and fire inspectors could enter private premises
without judicial authorization for the purpose of conducting inspections to determine compliance with municipal ordinances. Petitioners
207. 353 F. Supp. at 129 (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted).
208. Id. at 130 (emphasis in the original) (citing Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A NoManr Land in CriminalLaw, 49 CAL. L. REV. 474 (1961); Orfield, Warrant of Arrest in
Summons upon Complaint in FederalCriminalProcedure,27 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1958)). Defendants had also attempted to distinguish Bacon on the ground that it was based on 18
U.S.C. § 3149 (1976) and Rule 46(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than
the Fourth Amendment. See 353 F. Supp. at 129. The district court ruled, however, that the
procedures set out in the Federal Rules are mandated by the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480

(1958)).
209. 353 F. Supp. at 130.
210. Justice White rejected the applicability of Bacon because "that case dealt with arrest
of a material witness and is unpersuasive with respect to the search for criminal evidence."
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 554 n.5.
211. Id. at 555.
212. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
213. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
214. See note 152 supra.
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in both cases insisted that the inspectors obtain search warrants before
they would grant them permission to enter. The Supreme Court subsequently vindicated their claims, holding that a search warrant is required for such inspections.
Since search warrants were required in Camara and See regardless
of the culpability of the property-holders there, the Zurcher Court
seemed to infer that the same rule should hold true in the case before it.
The difficulty with this analysis is that in Camaraand See there existed
no less burdensome alternative to the use of a search warrant, while
there was such an alternative in Zurcher. The only viable method for
inspecting a personal residence or business premises is by a search.
The same is not true in situations such as that presented in Zurcher,
where the magistrate could have issued a subpoena for the desired
materials and thereby accomplished their acquisition. In view of the
Court's apparent unwillingness to consider the district court's analysis
based on its analogy to Bacon,2" 5 it seems inconsistent for the Court to
have relied on such distinguishable cases as Camara and See.
An additional problem with the majority's discussion of the culpability question is its failure to squarely address two arguments made by
the lower court. The district court stated that "as a historical matter the
notion of search warrants has involved only those suspected of a
crime." ' 6 It was perhaps in response to this observation that the
Supreme Court presented its analysis of Rule 41 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to show that considerations relating to searches
and seizures are separate and distinct from arrest procedures.2 1 7 If so,
the Court missed the thrust of the district court's argument. The lower
court only felt that in light of the historical limitation on the use of
search warrants to those suspected of crime, a less burdensome alternative that could achieve the same results should be utilized to obtain
2 18
evidence from innocent third parties.
The district court also noted that the practice of issuing search
215. See notes 205-10 and accompanying text supra.
216. 353 F. Supp. at 131. In support of this contention, the district court cited Henry v.
United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959); United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir.
1930) (opinion of Learned Hand, J.); Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-AMan's Land in
CriminalLaw, 49 CAL. L. REv. 474, 475-77 (1961).
217. See 436 U.S. at 558-59 (citing ALI, A MODEL CODE OF RE-ARR IGNMENT PROCEDURE, COMMENTARY 491 (Proposed Off. Draft 1975)). See also United States v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 536 F.2d 699, 703 (1976), cert.deniedsub nom. Wingate v. United States,
429 U.S. 1039 (1977). See text accompanying note 157 supra.

218. Cf.436 U.S. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (where the object of a search is an
innocent third party, probable cause can only be established by a showing that if notice were
given, he would conceal or destroy the evidence sought).
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warrants without regard to the culpability of the person at whom the
search is directed results in the inequitable treatment of innocent third
parties. Whereas the exclusionary rule is available to vindicate the
rights of criminal defendants, "[a] third-party . . .does not have the
protection or deterrent of the exclusionary rule, for by definition he is
not about to be tried for a crime. ' 2 19 Consequently, the district court
held that in the case of an innocent third party, "an additional safeguard is necessary to assure that his Fourth Amendment rights are not
trampled. That protection is the obligation of law enforcement to use a

subpoena duces tecum unless it is shown, through sworn affidavits, that
it is impractical to do so. ''22°
Justice White was unpersuaded as to the necessity of this additional requirement. He asserted that the existing provisions and interpretations of the Fourth Amendment constitute an adequate balancing

of the individual's right of privacy against the public need, regardless
22
of whether a subpoena duces tecum is a less intrusive alternative. '
The majority went further in rejecting the need for additional Fourth

Amendment protections, relying on the reasoning of the Court's opinion in Alderman v. United States121 to conclude that "the interest in
deterring illegal third-party searches does not justify a rule such as that

adopted by the District Court. 22 3 The majority also stated that "it
would be placing the cart before the horse to prohibit searches otherwise conforming to the Fourth Amendment because of a perception

that the deterrence provided by the existing rules of standing is insufficient to discourage illegal searches. 22 4 Finally, the district court was
chastised for having overlooked the California Supreme Court's previ219. 353 F. Supp. at 132.
220. Id. (footnote omitted).
221. 436 U.S. at 559.
222. 394 U.S. 165 (1969). In Alderman, Justice White, writing for a majority of the
Court, noted that "[t]he established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth
Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by
the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging
evidence." Id. at 171-72. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963);
Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114, 121 (1942). He went on to state that "[w]e adhere
to.. .the general rule that Fourth Amendment right3 are personal rights which, like some
other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." 394 U.S. at 174. See Simmons
v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260-61
(1960).
223. 436 U.S. at 562 n.9. The Court in Alderman had ruled that the additional deterrent
effect of extending the exclusionary rule did not 'Justify further encroachment upon the
public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted
on .hebasis of all the evidence which exposes the truth." 394 U.S. at 175.
224. 436 U.S. at 562-63 n.9 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309 (1967)).
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ous ruling in Kaplan v. Superior Court22 5 that the legality of a search
and seizure can be challenged by anyone against whom the evidence
obtained is used, regardless of whether his own Fourth Amendment
rights were violated. In this vein, however, the Zurcher Court failed to
recognize the apparent inconsistency between its views and the reasoning underlying Kaplan. In extending the applicability of the exclusionary rule beyond the parameters delineated in Alderman, the California
Supreme Court in Kaplan reaffirmed its position that 'if law enforcement officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by obtaining
evidence in violation of the rights of third parties, its deterrent effect is
to that extent nullified. Moreover, such a limitation virtually invites
law enforcement officers to violate the rights of third parties . ... ' "226
But it was left unclear by the Supreme Court in Zurcher how California law would provide any protection for the rights of the Stanford
Daily and its staff in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
brought in federal court under a federal statute.2 27 If Aaplan grants the
Daily no substantive rights, its very inapplicability together with its rationale would seem to support the district court's perception that additional Fourth Amendment protections are required for third-party
searches. Thus, the Zurcher majority's reference to Kaplan does not
resolve the question of the need for additional protections, but rather
serves to call attention to the differing views of the United States and
California Supreme Courts.
b. The State's Interest-The Necessity of Search Warrants
One basis for the district court's holding was its belief that requiring a subpoena for most third-party searches would not substantially
impede criminal investigations. A majority of the Supreme Court
found, however, that the state's interest in efficient and successful law
enforcement would be seriously disserved if the use of search warrants
was limited as provided under the lower court opinion. Two hypothetical examples of this undermining influence were advanced in the body
of the majority opinion, with a third possibility discussed in a footnote. 2 8 Because search warrants are frequently employed early in an
investigation, the Court suggested that the "seemingly blameless" third
party who possesses the evidence may not turn out to be innocent after
225. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
226. 6 Cal. at 157, 491 P.2d at 8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (quoting People v. Martin, 45 Cal.
2d 755, 760, 290 P.2d 855, 860 (1955)).
227. The action in Zurcher was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note
122 supra. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
228. 436 U.S. at 561 & n.8.
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all-and even if not directly culpable might still not be relied upon to
surrender evidence which implicates his friends.2 29 As a corollary to
this possibility, Justice White stated that "it is likely that the real culprits will have access to the property, and the delay involved in employing the subpoena duces tecum . . . could easily result in the
disappearance of the evidence." 2 0 Finally, it was suggested in a footnote that the use of a subpoena would allow the recipient to interpose a
litigaFifth Amendment challenge to the request, and that the23resultant
1
tion could "seriously impede criminal investigations."
The Court's concern regarding the first two problems is unsupported either by authority or specific examples indicating the extent to
which such problems have occurred in the past. As Justice Stevens
pointed out in his dissenting opinion, prior to the change brought about
by the Court's decision in Warden v. Hayden,2 32 documentary evidence
was routinely obtained by subpoena.23 3 This procedure assumed that
the person in possession of the evidence would honor the subpoena,
and the Zurcher majority did not question its effectiveness. Moreover,
the Court's assertion that problems of preserving evidence would occur
and thereby hamper law enforcement efforts is not supported by the
facts in Zurcher. As the district court pointed out, "[t]here was no hint
whatsoever that the sought after materials would be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction. 2 3 4 Although the Daiy apparently had
announced a policy of destroying any photographs that might implicate
the protesters,2 5 there is no evidence that such a destruction took place
and the majority did not cite this policy in support of its holding. Even
if it could be assumed that the Daily would not have preserved evidence of the assault on the police, it is unlikely that the same problem
would arise in other factual contexts. It is difficult to believe, for example, that when a member of a newspaper staff photographs a bank robbery, he will return the incriminating photographs to the bank robbers.
And it can be assumed that third parties will generally not act so as to
impede criminal investigations. Yet this is what the unqualified language in Zurcher appears to suggest.
The third impediment to law enforcement efforts said to arise from
the enforced use of the subpoena procedure-that challenges to the va229. Id. at 561.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 561-62 n.8.
232. 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See notes 187-89 and accompanying text supra.

23,3. 436 U.S. at 581 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234. 353 F. Supp. at 129 n.2.

235. 436 U.S. at 568 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring).
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lidity of subpoenas on Fifth Amendment grounds could be interposed
and would slow investigations-is similarly based on conjecture and
unsupported by authority. It seems doubtful that a third party would
object to a subpoena merely out of a desire not to cooperate with the
authorities. After all, such a course of conduct might result in the police focusing their attention on an individual previously believed innocent of any wrongdoing. And if the possessor of the evidence does have
a valid Fifth Amendment claim, there is no reason why he should not
be given an opportunity to assert it. Given the speculative nature of the
other problems cited by the Court, it is questionable whether this additional concern justifies the Court's endorsement of the belief that "the
warranted search is necessary to secure and to avoid the destruction of
evidence." 23' 6
c. The Impact of Zurcher on FirstAmendment Guarantees
At the root of the decision in Zurcher is the belief on the part of
the majority that searches authorized by warrants, when properly conducted, will not significantly impinge on the functioning of a free
press.23 7 This belief and the specific conclusions derived therefrom by
the Court were challenged in Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion, in
which Justice Marshall joined. Although he agreed with the majority's
conclusion as to the permissibility of third-party searches under the
Fourth Amendment,23 Justice Stewart argued that the First Amendment's express grant of protection to the press justifies requiring the use
of a subpoena rather than a search warrant when the possessor of the
evidence is a newspaper. He found it "self-evident that police searches
of newspaper offices burden the freedom of the press,'' 2 39 pointing out
that such searches can be lengthy and disruptive 4 ° and would necessarily entail police examination of materials obtained from informers
and other confidential sources-a prospect which could compel the
newspaper to engage in self-censorship.2 4 '
Regarding the detrimental effect such searches would have on the
vital confidential relationships developed by reporters, Justice Stewart
236. Id. at 563 (footnote omitted).
237. See notes 164-73 and accompanying text supra.
238. 436 U.S. at 571 n.l (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 571.
240. See, e.g., Note, Search and Seizure of the Media. A Statutory FourthAmendment
and FirstAmendment Anaysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957-59 (1976) (describing one search
of a Los Angeles radio station that lasted over eight hours).
241. 436 U.S. at 573 n.6 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
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distinguished the ruling in Branzburg v. Hayes,2 42 relied on by the majority, 243 from the instant case. He pointed out that whereas Branzburg
dealt with "the more limited disclosure of a journalist's sources caused
by compelling him to testify," 2" the question in Zurcher was not
whether there is an absolute First Amendment privilege against disclosure, but rather what is the most appropriate and least burdensome
means of acquiring relevant evidence from a newspaper. 245 After reviewing the circumstances leading to the issuance of the search warrant,2 4 6 he concluded that no impediment to law enforcement had been
demonstrated in Zurcher, but that there was a great potential for harm
in the wake of the majority's decision.24 7
Media concern over the impact of the Zurcher decision may be
lessened if the legislature or the executive branch acts on the invitation
extended by the majority to enact suitable safeguards against abuses of
24 8
discretion in the issuance of search warrants directed at newspapers.
II. The Broadcast Media and the First Amendment: Federal
Communications Commission v. PacificaFoundation
In FederalCommunications Commission v. PacificaFoundation,2 4 9
the United States Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has statutory and
constitutional authority to impose sanctions for the broadcasting of language which, although not obscene, can be characterized as "indecent"
and "patently offensive" when broadcast at a time when children are
likely to be in the listening audience.2 5 0 In resolving this question, the
Court considered whether non-obscene speech can properly be re242. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
243. See note 172 and accompanying text supra.
244. 436 U.S. at 574 (Stewart, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
245. Id.

246. See notes 181 & 182 and accompanying text supra.
247. 436 U.S. at 572-74 & n.8. Justice Stewart's concern over the effect the Zurcher decision will have on the press has been echoed by representatives of the mass media since the
decision was handed down. See, e.g., Javoslovsky, Police in the Newsroom: The Stanford
Case, Wall St. J., June 20, 1978, at 20, cols. 4-6; Wall St. J., June 13, 1978, at 24, cols. 1-2;
S.F. Chronicle, June 27, 1978, at 11, cols. 2-5.
248. See note 179 and accompanying text supra.
249. 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978).
250. For discussions of the FCC's power to regulate obscene language, see generally,
Comment, Broadcasting Obscene Language: The Federal Communications Commission and
Section 1464 Violations, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 457 (1974); Note, Morality and the Broadcast

Media: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of FCC Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. L. REV. 664
(1971); Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment: Regulating Broadcast
Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 579 (1975); Note, Offensive Speech and the FCC,79 YALE L.J.

1343 (1970).
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stricted as to the time, place and manner of its dissemination, and also
whether a distinction can constitutionally be drawn betw een "indecent"
and "obscene" language.
A.

The Decision

In the early afternoon of October 30, 1973, a man and his young
son were driving in New York City and listening to Station WBAI,
licensed to the Pacifica Foundation. A comedy monologue by satirist
George Carlin was being broadcast as part of a regularly scheduled live
program, "Lunchpail," whose subject that day was an analysis of attitudes towards language held by contemporary society. The monologue, entitled "Filthy Words," was originally delivered before a live
theatre audience, and sought to ridicule societal restrictions on the use
of certain words, especially over the airways. 2 ' The father subsequently filed a complaint with the FCC stating that the airing of the monologue during a time when children were likely to be listening should
not have been permitted.
On February 21, 1975, the Commission responded to the complaint by issuing a Memorandum Opinion and Declaratory Order
granting the complaint and holding that Pacifica "could have been the
subject of administrative sanctions" for the broadcast. 25 2 The Commission derived its authority to regulate indecent broadcasting from 18
U.S.C. § 1464, which specifically prohibits "obscene, indecent or pro251. "Filthy Words" is a monologue from the live album "George Carlin, Occupation:
Foole," by Little David Records. A transcript of the monologue is appended to the decision
of the Supreme Court, 98 S. Ct. at 3041-43. The words identified by the satirist were "shit,"
"piss," "fuck," "cunt," "cocksucker," "motherfucker" and "tits." The 5 were not meant by
him to comprise an exhaustive list; to the "original seven" words, Carlin would add "fart,
turd, and twat." 98 S. Ct. at 3043. Although the FCC did not consider these additions to the
list in its opinion, holding only that the broadcast of the "original seven" was indecent, 56
F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), sanctions presumably could be imposed by the Commission in the
future should it be determined that "fart, turd, and twat" are indecent as well. Other words
might well be considered. For example, Georgia state Senator Julian Bond and the NAACP
have filed suit with the FCC seeking to have the word "nigger" added to the list. S.F.
Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, Aug. 20, 1978 (World), at 27.
252. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975). The Commission declined to impose formal sanctions on
Pacifica, noting instead that the Order would be "associated with the station's license file,"
id., and would be considered in the event subsequent complaints were filed. Under 47
U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (1970), the Commission is empowered to impose forfeitures for violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976). See note 253 infra. Specifically: "(1) Any licensee or permittee
of a broadcast station who. . .(E) violates section. . . 1464 of Title 1 ,.shall forfeit to the
tolation occurs shall
United States a sum not to exceed $1000. Each day during which such %
constitute a separate offense. Such forfeiture shall be in addition to anN other penalty provided by this chapter." 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (1970).
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fane language,"2'5 3 and from 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) which generally requires the Commission to "encourage the larger and more effective use
of radio in the public interest. 25 4 In reaching its determination that
the Carlin monologue was indecent, the Commission first observed that
the broadcast medium has special qualities of intrusiveness which re-

quire a different standard of analysis than is normally applied to other,
less intrusive forms of expression.255 Particularly important to the
Commission was the possibility, recognized by the Supreme Court in
Miller v. Cai~fornia,2 56 that inherent in the broadcasting medium is "'a
significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients

or of exposure to juveniles.'

"257

Turning to the definition of "indecent," the Commission explained
that, in its view, the term was not subsumed under the concept of obscenity, but was instead subject to an independent definition.25 8 In reformulating the definition of "indecent" under section 1464,259 the
253. 56 F.C.C.2d at 94 n.l. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976) provides in full: "Whoever utters
any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." The Commission
had previously defined "indecent" to mean material that is "(a) patently offensive by contemporary community standards; and (b) is utterly without redeeming social value." Eastern Educ. Radio (WUHY), 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 412 (1970).
254. 56 F.C.C.2d at 94 n.l. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1970) outlines the general powers and
duties of the Commission.
255. 56 F.C.C.2d at 96-97. The Commission advanced four considerations in support of
its view that a different standard of analysis is required for the broadcast media: "(1)
[C]hildren have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised by parents; (2) radio
receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy interest is entitled to extra deference, see Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970); (3) unconsenting adults may tune
in a station without any warning that offensive language is being or will be broadcast; and
(4) there is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the government must therefore
license in the public interest." Id. at 97.
256. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See note 278 infra.
257. 56 F.C.C.2d at 97 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 19).
258. 56 F.C.C.3d at 97. The Commission cited three federal circuit court of appeals decisions in support of its position: United States v. Smith, 467 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1972) (term
"indecent" not necessarily included within definition of "obscene" and should be defined on
retrial); Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1972) ("indecent" not defined by
court, but no prejudice to defendant where he was prosecuted only for using "obscene"
language); Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966) (held reversible error
where trial court did not issue jury instructions defining the term "indecent").
Although no court had previously defined "indecent" under § 1464, the Commission
itself had, prior to Miller v. California, defined the term to mean that "the material broadcast is (a) patently offensive by contemporary standards; and (b) is utterly without redeeming social value." Eastern Educ. Radio (WUHY), 24 F.C.C.2d 408,412 (1970). Inasmuch as
this definition was tied to the then existing obscenity standard, Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966), the Supreme Court's adoption of a new obscenity test in Miller
required the Commission to update its definition of "indecent."
259. See note 258 supra.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 6:19

Commission drew from the law of public nuisance.260 Under nuisance
law, behavior is generally channelled rather than prohibited. Thus, the
Commission defined "indecent" to mean "language that describes, in

terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretorn activities and
organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonablerisk that children
may be in the audience."'26 1 Although the Commission did not impose
sanctions on the Pacifica Foundation, this new definition of "indecent"

would, in future cases, allow the Commission to enforce its conviction
that "such words [as the seven in the Carlin broadcast] are indecent
within the meaning of the statute and have no place on radio when
262
children are in the audience.

In addition to the majority opinion, three concurring statements
were filed. Commissioner Reid approved of the majority viewpoint but
felt that it did not go far enough. In her opinion the indecent language
of the monologue was inappropriate for broadcast at any time, whether
night or day.26 3 Whereas the Commission sought to channel broad-

casts so as to limit possible exposure to children, Commissioner Reid
would have prohibited indecent language from being broadcast at any
time.2 64 This view was shared by Commissioner Quello, who noted his
support succinctly: "Garbage is garbage.. . . I believe such words are
'265
reprehensive no matter what the broadcast hour.
260. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98. The Commission cited two federal decisions dealing with public
nuisance statutes as examples of the principles supporting its new contextual definition of
"indecent." See Von Sleichter v. United States, 472 F.2d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Williams v.
District of Columbia, 419 F.2d 638 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (en banc). For criticism of the Commission's "nuisance" theory, see Chief Judge Bazelon's statement in favor of granting a rehearing en banc in Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broadcast v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 418-19 n.48
(D.C. Cir. 1975). See also, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 19 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Bazelon, C.J., concurring). On the use of nuisance analysis as a method of regulating obscenity, see generally,Note, PornoNon Est Pro Bono Publico. Obscenity as a PublicNuisance
in California,4 HASTINoS CONST. L.Q. 385 (1977); Note, Restricting th.- Public Display of
Offensive Materials. The Use and Effectiveness of Public and Private AN isance Actions, 10
U.S.F. L. Rev. 232 (1975).
261. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (emphasis added).
262. Id. The Commission noted that a different standard for defining "indecent" might
conceivably be used in the late evening hours when few children are in the audience. The
definition would remain the same insofar as the language was concerned. i:e., words which
are patently offensive as measured by the contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium would remain prohibited. However, the Commission w'ould also consider
whether these late-evening expressions had serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value. 56 F.C.C.2d at 98 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
263. 56 F.C.C.2d at 102 (Reid, Comm'r., concurring).
264. Id. See notes 260-61 and accompanying text supra.
265. 56 F.C.C.2d at 103 (Quello, Comm'r., concurring).
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Commissioner Robinson, joined by Commissioner Hook, concurred in the issuance of the order, but offered a more extensive review
of the problems courts have faced in attempting to define the terms
"obscene" and "indecent. '2 66 He noted that the "'core prob-

lem'-what constitutes obscenity-has never been satisfactorily unraveled.12 67 He noted as well that "people do not have an unlimited right

to avoid exposure to [obscenity].

268

In the view of Commissioners

Robinson and Hook, the Commission's decision, embracing a "nui-

sance" analysis, adopted a limited but pragmatic approach to accommodating the interests protected by the First Amendment and the
interests of the public in having the young protected from exposure to

inappropriate language.
Shortly after the issuance of the order, the Radio Television News
Directors Association (RTNDA) petitioned the Commission for clarifi-

cation of the standards for determining indecency.2 69 The RTNDA
was concerned that the order would expose its members to the threat of
sanctions when "indecent" words were uttered in the context of bona

fide news or public affairs programs. The Commission reaffirmed its
earlier decision, however, stressing that the order was issued in a specific factual context and was based primarily on the need to protect
young children from sexually explicit language.27 ° The Commission
refused to comment on the hypothetical situations posed by the

RTNDA and reiterated its conclusion that such language could only be
broadcast, if at all, during the late evening hours.27 1
Following an appeal by the Pacifica Foundation, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the Commission. 27 2 Circuit
Judge Tamm held that the order was issued in violation of the prohibi-

tion against censorship contained in 47 U.S.C. § 326,273 and that even if
266. Id. at 103 (Robinson, Comm'r., joined by Hook, Comm'r., concurring).
267. Id. at 104 (citing Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional Issue-What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REv. 289 (1961)).
268. 56 F.C.C.2d at 106 (Robinson, Comm'r., joined by Hook, Comm'r., concurring).
269. 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976).
270. Id. at 893.
271. Id.
272. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Chief Judge Bazelon and
Circuit Judge Tanm filed separate opinions in favor of reversal; a dissenting opinion was
entered by Circuit Judge Leventhal. For discussions of the Court of Appeals decision, see
Note, Pacofca Foundation v. FCC. 'TiIthy Words "the FirstAmendment and the Broadcast
Media, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 164 (1978); Note, ConstitutionalLaw-Pacoca Foundation v.
FCC- First Amendment Limitationson FCCRegulation of Offensive Broadcasts,56 N.C.L.
REv. 584 (1978).

273. 556 F.2d at 18. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be
understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio
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the Commission had the authority to regulate non-obscene speech, the
text of its order would have been subject to reversal on the grounds of
vagueness and overbreadthY7 4 The court of appeals was thus able to
reverse the Commission on grounds which circumvented the need to
define "indecent" under section 1464.
Chief Judge Bazelon concurred with the result reached by Judge
Tamm, but felt that the protections against censorship provided by section 326 were not absolute because the terms of section 1464 authorized

criminal punishment for anyone uttering "obscene, indecent, or profane" language over the radio. 5 Whereas Judge Tamm believed section 326 to be dispositive, Chief Judge Bazelon reformulated the issues
to focus first on whether the Carlin monlogue would be protected by

the First Amendment if disseminated by any other medium, and second whether the unique characteristics of broadcasting justified an expansion of governmental regulation of speech. 6 He concluded that
the Commission's definition of "indecency" was prima facie unconstitutional. 7 Citing the strict standard for obscenity set forth by the
2 78 Chief Judge Bazelon found
Supreme Court in Miller v. California,
the order to be an overbroad, distorted interpretation of those
guidelines. 9
Examining the four circumstances claimed by the Commission to
justify special regulation of speech disseminated over the broadcast medium,2 8 ° Chief Judge Bazelon rejected the contention that the broad-

communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere A'ith the right of free
speech by means of radio communication."
In reversing the Commission, Judge Tamm stated his view that "[amny examination of
thought or expression in order to prevent publication of objectionable material is censorship." 556 F.2d at 14.
274. Judge Tamm found the order to be vague because it lacked a detinition of children,
id. at 17, and that it was overbroad in that it prohibited the use of the sex on indecent words
in any context. Id.
275. See note 253 and accompanying text supra.
276. 556 F.2d at 20 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
277. Id. at 23.
278. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In rejecting as the constitutional standard the "utterly without redeeming social value" test articulated in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 419
(1966) (emphasis in original), the Court in Miller set forth the following basic guidelines:
"(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find
that the work, taken as a whole; appeals to the prurient interest. . .; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted).
279. 556 F.2d at 23 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
280. See note 255 supra.
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casting of offensive speech may offend the privacy interests of
nonconsenting adults in their homes. Relying on the Supreme Court
282
281
decisions in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, Cohen v. California,
283 he reasoned that the radio lisand Rowan v. Post Office Department,
tener "can avert his attention by changing channels or turning off the
set."'284 The Commission's argument that the presence of children in
the listening audience justifies increased government regulation of
broadcast speech was also rejected on the ground that individual parental control is preferable to state action in loco parentis8 5 Chief
Judge Bazelon concluded his concurring opinion by expressing disagreement with the contention that the scarcity of broadcasting frequencies and other considerations warranted the order promulgated by the
Commission. 8 6

Circuit Judge Leventhal dissented and expressed his support for
the order. He argued that its definition of "indecent" was "a functional
equivalent to the Supreme Court's current 'obscenity' ruling
(Miller),"287 and that the time and place restrictions of the order were a
reasonable "constitutional trade-off. ' 28 8 Unlike Judge Tamm 289 and
Chief Judge Bazelon,29 ° Judge Leventhal did not find the order overbroad since, in his view, it was carefully limited by the Commission to
prohibit only the broadcasting of indecent language during the afterapproach," did
noon.29 1 Nor, despite "some inexactness in the agency's
292
vagueness.
for
void
order
the
Judge Leventhal find
281. 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (limited privacy interests of persons on public street cannot
justify censorship of otherwise protected speech).
282. 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (absent particularized and compelling reasons, state may not
make public display of four-letter expletive a criminal offense).
283. 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (approval given to statutory scheme permitting addressee to
give notice that he wishes no further mailings from specific sender of erotic or sexually
provocative matter).
284. 556 F.2d at 26 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Bazelon also found that
people's privacy interests in their homes are reduced when they open up their home by
turning on the radio. Id. at 27.
285. Id. at 27-29.
286. Id. at 29. Chief Judge Bazelon believed that Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969), did not support the Commission's spectrum space arguments since unlike RedLion, where the FCC's fairness doctrine raised questions of broadcast freedom and
public access to varied viewpoints, the instant case presented no divergence of First Amendment interests.
287. 556 F.2d at 32 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 37.
289. Id. at 16-17.
290. Id. at 21 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
291. Id. at 36 (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
292. Id. at 35.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari,2 93 and in a five-four decireversed the court of appeals on both statutory and constitu-

sion 294

tional grounds.

Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens first

determined that in issuing its order, the Commission had not engaged

in formal rulemaking or the promulgation of regulations. Rather, the
Commission had simply adjudicated a dispute limited to the monologue "as broadcast" under 5 U.S.C. § 554(C).

295

This initial determi-

nation not only permitted the Court to avoid issuing an advisory
opinion, but also served to focus attention on the precise factual context
underlying the Pacfica litigation.
The Court analyzed the legislative purpose underlying section
326296

and section 1464,297 and concluded that the prohibition against

censorship contained in section 326 does not so limit section 1464 as to

prevent the Commission from applying administrative sanctions
against licensees who "engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting. '2 98 Justice Stevens next addressed the question of whether the
afternoon broadcast of the Carlin monologue was indecent within the
meaning of section 1464. Examining the language of the statute, he
reasoned that the words "obscene, indecent, or profane," are used in
the disjunctive and inferred that each word was intended to have a
separate and distinct meaning. Thus, the fact that the Carlin monologue lacked prurient appeal and was therefore not obscene under
Miller29 9 did not preclude its being indecent under section 1464.
The Court rejected Pacifica's contention that the term "indecent"
in section 1464 should be interpreted in the same manner as it is under

18 U.S.C. § 1461. Section 1461 prohibits the use of the United States
mails to disseminate, inter alia, obscene and indecent matter. 3°° The
293. 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
294. 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Blackmun, Powell (Parts I, II, III & IV(C)),
and an opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined (Parts IV(A) &
IV(B)). Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Blackmun joined. Justice
Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Stewart filed a separate dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, White and Marshall joined.
295. Id. at 3032. Section 554(e) provides: "The agency, with like effect as in the case of
other orders, and in its sound discretion, may issue a declaratory order to terminate a controversy or remove uncertainty." 5 U.S.C. § 554(e) (1976).
296. See note 273 supra.
297. See note 253 supra.
298. 98 S. Ct. at 3035. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the two sections, now
separate, had together previously formed § 29 of the Radio Act of 1927.
299. See note 278 supra.
300. 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1970). Pacifica argued that the Court's interpretation of§ 1461 in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), which had subsumed "indecent" under the
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two statutes were distinguished on the basis of their subject matter; section 1461 involves printed matter whereas section 1464 relates solely to
broadcasting. Finding no controlling definition of "indecent," Justice
Stevens concluded that there was no basis for disagreeing with the
Commission's determination that the language used in the afternoon
broadcast was indecent and therefore subject to sanction.3 01
Having resolved the statutory issues, Justice Stevens' opinion
turned to the constitutional challenges raised by Pacifica. This section
of the opinion did not command the support of Justices Powell and
Blackmun. 312 In reviewing the claim that the Commission's order was
overbroad and encompassed constitutionally protected speech, Justice
Stevens observed that the Court's scope of review was limited to the
issue of whether the Commission had the authority to prohibit this particular broadcast.0 3 He pointed out that the order was properly limited
to a specific factual situation, and asserted that "indecency is largely a
' '3 4
function of context-it cannot be adequately judged in the abstract. 0
Admitting that the order might lead to some self-censorship by broadcasters and that the particular language of the Carlin monologue might
be protected when used in some other context, Justice Stevens argued
that the seven indecent words "surely lie at the periphery of First
Amendment concern. '3 5 The issues having been narrowed to the
question of whether "the First Amendment prohibits all governmental
regulation that depends on the content of speech," 30 6 Justice Stevens
proceeded to determine that speech of the sort contained in the broadcast "is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances. 30 7 Justices Powell and Blackmun did not share the
concept of obscenity, should be controlling. Without disputing that interpretation of
Hamling,Justice Stevens found it inapplicable to the present case. 98 S. Ct. at 3035-36.
301. Id. at 3036.
302. In failing to receive the support of Justices Powell and Blackmun, who did not join
Parts IV (A) and (B) of the opinion, Justice Stevens spoke only for a plurality of the Court in
his discussion of the constitutional issues. Part IV (C) of Justice Stevens' opinion, which
Justices Powell and Blackmun did join, emphasized that "of all forms of communication, it
is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection." Id. at
3040.
303. Id. at 3037.
304. Id.
305. Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (commercial speech);
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult films)).
306. 98 S. Ct. at 3038.
307. Id. at 3039. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (commercial speech); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult films); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel of private citizen); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973) (obscenity); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel of
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plurality view that content can be used to determine which speech is
more "valuable" and therefore more deserving of First Amendment
result in Pacjifca
protection.30 8 They did agree, however, that the
30 9
issue.
at
speech
the
of
context
the
on
turn
should
Justice Stevens, again writing for a majority of the Court, examined the basis for the Commission's conclusion that the special characteristics of the broadcast medium permit the imposition of
restrictions on the use of language such as that contained in the Carlin
monologue. 310 He agreed with the Commission that broadcasting has a
pervasive influence on American life and observed that the listeners'
ability to turn off broadcasts of objectionable material is an insufficient
means of protecting the privacy of the home from unwanted and objectionable programing. 3 1I He characterized this answer to the problem as
being akin to "saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after
the first blow. ' 31 z In reversing the court of appeals, the majority also
relied on the unique accessibility of broadcasts to children. This ease
to "amply justify special treatment of indecent
of access was 3found
13
broadcasting.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a stronglyworded dissent in which he argued that the Court's decision validates a
process "of governmental homogenization of radio communications" 3 14 and "permits majoritarian tastes completely to preclude a protected message from entering the homes of a receptive, unoffended
minority. ' 3 15 Reiterating Chief Judge Bazelon's argument,3 16 Justice
Brennan contended that listeners who find such language offensive can
turn the radio off with a minimum amount of effort.3 17 He argued that
public official); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (clear and present danger).
308. 98 S. Ct. at 3046 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring).
309. Id. at 3047. See note 313 infra.
310. See note 255 and accompanying text supra.
311. 98 S. Ct. at 3040.
312. Id.
313. Id.at 3040-41. In agreeing with the majority's conclusion, Justice Powell stated:
"The result turns. . . on the unique characteristics of the broadcast media, combined with
society's right to protect its children from speech generally agreed to be inappropriate for
their years, and with the interest of unwilling adults in not being assaulted by such offensive
speech in their homes." Id. at 3047 (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Blackmun, J.).
314. Id. at 3048 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
315. Id. at 3049.
316. See notes 280-86 and accompanying text supra.
317. 98 S.Ct. at 3049 (Brennan, J., dissenting): Although agreeing that the individual's
privacy interests in his home are substantial, Justice Brennan stated that "an individual's
actions in switching on and listening to communications transmitted over the public airways
and directed to the public at-large do not implicate fundamental privacy interests, even
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the availability of this alternative justifies preserving the broadcaster's

right to disseminate and its listeners' right to receive offensive but
nonetheless constitutionally protected messages, especially since the effect of the Court's decision is to replace individual choice as to what is
heard with governmental regulation of program content.31 8
Justice Brennan found the majority's reliance on the unique accessibility of broadcasts to children3 1 9 equally unpersuasive. In his view,
the Carlin monologue could not be considered obscene even as to the
children.3 2 ° The majority decision could therefore result in the screening from adults of material which could not constitutionally be kept
from children. 2 ' And even conceding that most parents would not
want their children to hear language such as that contained in the
broadcast at issue, Justice Brennan observed that this decision properly
resides with the parents and not in the government acting in loco
parentis.322 Addressing the majority's contention that the ideas embodied in the Carlin monologue could just as well have been expressed
with less offensive language,32 3 Justice Brennan cited Justice Harlan's
opinion for the Court in Cohen v. Cai~fornia324 for the proposition that
restricting the use of certain words creates a substantial risk that the
ideas those words convey will concurrently be restricted.3 25
when engaged in within the home. Instead, because the radio is undeniably a public medium, these actions are more properly viewed as a decision to take part, if only as a listener,
in an ongoing public discourse." Id.' at 3048 (citing Note, Filthy Words, the FCC,and the
FirstAmendment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REv. 579, 618 (1975)).
318. 98 S. Ct. at 3049 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
319. See note 313 and accompanying text supra.
320. 98 S. Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,
422 U.S. 205, 213-14 & n.10 (1975).
321. 98 S. Ct. at 3050 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380,
383-84 (1957) (state may not restrict adults to reading only what is appropriate for children).
This fear is valid only insofar as the FCC would fail to limit its prohibition against the
broadcasting of "indecent" language to those hours when children are likely to be in the
listening audience. See notes 261-62 and accompanying text supra.
322. 98 S. Ct. at 3051 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that this substitution of governmental authority for parental discretion distinguished Pacfica from the
Court's prior decisions in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Although the majority stressed the principle that parents have a
right to raise their children as they see fit, see 98 S. Ct. at 3040, Justice Brennan observed
that the majority decision actually deprives parents of that right by giving what would otherwise be a parental responsibility to screen media programming to a government agency. Id.
at 3051 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 3037 n.18.
324. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
325. "[W]ords are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force." Id. at
26. And as Justice Brennan explained: "The idea that the content of a message and its
potential impact on any who might receive it can be divorced from the words that are the
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The concluding portion of Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion
charged the majority with falling victim to an "acute ethnocentric myopia."3' 26 He accused the majority of failing to acknowledge that the
supposedly offensive language at issue in Pac!fica is in fact "the stuff of
everyday conversations" in many of America's subcultures.3 2 7 Thus,
Justice Brennan concluded that when viewed in a broad perspective,
the decision was "another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to
force those groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of
'328
thinking, acting, and speaking.
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan, White and
Marshall, Justice Stewart criticized the majority's resolution of the
question of whether broadcasting is entitled to less First Amendment
protection than other forms of speech.32 9 Justice Stewart would not
have reached the constitutional issues since, in his view, the Court
should not have construed "indecent" as having a broader meaning
than "obscene." 33 He would have followed the Court's decision in
Hamling v.UnitedStates33 1 and held that "Congress intended, by using
the word 'indecent' in section 1464, to prohibit nothing more than obscene speech."3'3 2 In the view of the four dissenting justices, the term
"indecent" should therefore have been construed for purposes of section 1464 as it had been in Hamling, with the result that the Carlin
monologue--concededly not appealing to prurient interests-would
not have been stripped of its First Amendment protections.
B. Analysis
The Court's Pacjica decision can best be analyzed by a two-part
consideration. The sections that follow will examine the reasoning underlying the majority's rejection of both the statutory and constitutional
challenges to the Commission's order. They will also analyze whether
the Court's judgment is consistent with prior decisions concerning the
constitutionally permissible extent of regulation of protected speech.
vehicle for its expression is transparently fallacious. A given word may have a unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up an image."" 98 S.Ct. at 3053
(Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
326. Id. at 3054.
327. Id.
328. Id. (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506-11 (1977)).
329. 98 S.Ct. at 3055-57. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 3056.
331. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). Hamling held that the term "indecent" in ISU.S.C. § 1461 has
the same meaning as "obscene" under the Court's decision in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973). See note 278 supra.
332. 98 S.Ct. at 3056 (Stewart, J.,dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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1. The Statutory Claims
Circuit Judge Tamm, author of the court of appeals decision, construed 47 U.S.C. § 326333 to prohibit the FCC from interfering with
licensee discretion in programming. He cited prior FCC and federal
court cases which he argued established an agency practice of relying
on each licensee's judgment regarding program content.334 This argument is also supported by Jack Straw MemorialFoundation,"' wherein
the Commission held that the decision whether or not to broadcast obscene or indecent language should be left to the licensee. That case
involved the broadcasting of admittedly obscene language which was
part of a recording entitled "Murder at Kent State." The licensee
broadcast the language based on his decision that it was necessary in
the context of the recording. The Commission found this exercise of
licensee discretion to be in conformity with its standards.33 6
Judge Tamm also noted that the section 326 prohibition against
FCC interference with licensee judgement as to programming content
337
had been affirmed by the courts as well as by administrative rulings.
He found additional support for his contention that licensee discretion
should be preserved in the language of the Commission's clarification
memorandum regarding the original order.3 3 He pointed out that the
memorandum acknowledged that (1) some live news coverage of public
events involves broadcasting offensive speech in circumstances which
preclude journalistic editing, and (2) licensees who broadcast such language should not be subject to Commission discipline. 339 The Commission had therefore once again deferred to the judgment of
individual licensees with respect to programming content.
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon noted his agreement with Judge Tamm's section 326 argument and asserted that the
Commission's action in "channeling" broadcasts of indecent language
into certain hours amounted to censorship.3 40 He pointed to repeated
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See note 273 supra.
556 F.2d at 14-15 (1977).
29 F.C.C.2d 334 (1971).
Id. at 354.
556 F.2d at 14. See, e.g., Writers Guild of America, West. Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp.

1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Anti-Defamation League of B'Nai B'Rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169

(1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
338. 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976). See notes 268-71 and accompanying text supra.

339. 556 F.2d at 14-15.
340. Id. at 19 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Chief Judge Bazelon found that the § 326
prohibition is not limited to rules and regulations that totally forbid the broadcasting of
certain matter, but also bars any form of Commission censorship. He argued that "channeling may have substantially the same effect as an absolute ban." Id.
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FCC abuses of its limited authority to regulate constitutionally protected speech as one basis for his opposition to any weakening of section 326. 34 ' In the collective view of Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge
Tamm, the FCC order in Pac~fica violated the prohibition against censorship contained in section 326 by permitting the imposition of sanctions for the broadcasting of the language at issue.
Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens
agreed that section 326 bars the Commission from editing proposed
broadcasts in advance. He asserted, however, that this prohibition had
never operated to deny the Commission power to review the content of
completed broadcasts or to take note of the nature of past programs
when considering license renewal applications.3 4 2 He further noted
that judicial and administrative interpretations of section 326 have developed the view that its anti-censorship provision does not apply to the
broadcasting of obscene, indecent or profane language. 4 3 In analyzing
this point of disagreement between the Supreme Court and the court of
appeals, it should be noted that the Commission's order did not merely
examine the past programming of one radio station. Instead, it established a new standard for determining permissible language and put
broadcasters on notice that the language at issue in Pa ifca was not to
be broadcast during certain hours. While it might be argued that such
a decree does not amount to pre-broadcast censorship, it creates the
possibility of an even more dangerous situation, one in which broadcasters censor themselves by excising protected as well as unprotected
speech due to excessive caution.34
The second statutory issue in Pacbfca concerned the interpretation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1464345 and the question of whether the terms "obscene"
and "indecent" have separate meanings. 346 This problem arises in
many situations involving the regulation of obscene language, due to
the practice of including a string of generic terms in obscenity statutes.
Thus, 18 U.S.C. § 1461 prohibits the mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile" articles and 18 U.S.C. § 1464 prohibits the
broadcasting of "obscene, indecent, or profane language." As a consequence of this practice, the question arose as to whether the terms following "obscene" in these and similar statutes are subsumed under the
341. Id. at 19 n.l.
342. 98 S. Ct. at 3033.
343. Id. at 3034.
344. Justice Stevens admitted that the Commission order created the possibility of selfcensorship. See id. at 3037.
345. See note 253 supra.
346. 98 S.Ct. at 3035-36.
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parameters of that which is obscene or are meant to establish additional limitations.
Pacifica argued that unless the term "indecent" in section 1464 was
held to mean only "obscene," the statute would be unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad. 47 This contention was based on the premise
that the Supreme Court had defined obscenity in Miller v. Calfornia,3' 8
and had subsequently made it clear in Hamling v. UnitedStates349 and
United States v. 12 200-Ft.Reels of Super 8mm Film350 that the use of
the term "indecent" in federal criminal statutes must be construed to
refer only to materials involving the specific types of explicit conduct
set forth in Miller. 5 ' In 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, the Court suggested
that the term "indecent" should be understood as referring only to representations or depictions of "hard core" sexuality:
If and when. . . a "serious doubt" is raised as to the vagueness
of the words "obscene," "lewd," "lascivious," "filthy,"
"indecent," or "immoral" as used to describe regulated material
in . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1462 . . . we arepreparedto construe such
terms as limiting regulatedmaterialto patently offensive representations or descriptions of that specftc "hardcore" sexual conduct
given as examples in Miller v. California .... 352
The Court in Miller had offered the following examples of speech that
could constitutionally be regulated: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual
or simulated; (b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of
masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. 3 53 Pacifica argued that it followed from these standards estabfished by the Court that the Carlin monologue was not obscene, since it
neither appealed to the prurient interest nor lacked literary or political
value.3 54 Consequently, the argument concluded, the monologue was
entitled to constitutional protection and the Commission's order should
be adjudged overbroad. 5 5
In his concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bazelon accepted Pacifica's
overbreadth argument. He noted that the Commission's test for "indecency" did not consider the language at issue in light of the "local com347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

556 F.2d at 12.
413 U.S. 15 (1973). See note 278 supra.
418 U.S. 87 (1974). See note 331 supra.
413 U.S. 123 (1973).
See note 278 supra.
413 U.S. at 130 n.7 (emphasis added).
413 U.S. at 25.
See id. at 24.
556 F.2d at 18.
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munity standards" impliedly required by Miller, but rather used
"contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium" as its
touchstone. 6 Chief Judge Bazelon pointed out that the Commission's
indecency standard also ignored the Miller requirement that a work be
judged as a whole, and that it must appeal to prurient interests to be
considered obscene. 35 7 He noted that the FCC standard would preclude the broadcasting of indecent language despite the fact that the8
35
overall work contained literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
Consequently, Chief Judge Bazelon concluded that the definition of
"indecency" in the Commission's order could be upheld only if "there
exists an additional category of offensive speech that is unprotected
when broadcast. 35 9
Chief Judge Bazelon's conclusion was prophetic, in that the
Supreme Court subsequently did carve out such an additional category
of unprotected speech in Pacflca. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens found that "indecency" was not subsumed under the definition of
"obscene." He refined the appeal to prurient interest standard enunciated in Miller36° by holding that indecency "merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of morality."'36 ' Responding to the
argument that the conclusion in Hamling that section 1461's proscription was limited to language falling within the Miller definition of obscenity 362 was controlling, Justice Stevens distinguished that case on the
basis of the different form of media involved there. Since section 1461
concerns printed matter sent by mail, he reasoned that the construction
placed on it by the Court was inapplicable to a statute such as section
1464, which deals with public broadcasting. 6 3 Pacifica s reliance on 12
200-ft. Reels of Film was dismissed as being based on dicta.36 4
Writing for four members of the Court,3 65 Justice Stewart rejected
the majority's interpretation of section 1464. He argued that this con356. Id. at 22 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring) (citing 51 F.C.C.2d at 433).
357. 556 F.2d at 23 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). See 413 U.S. at 24

358. 556 F.2d at 23 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). All of these criteria were enunciated in
Miller. See note 278 supra.
359. 556 F.2d at 24 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).

360. See 413 U.S. at 24.
361. 98 S. Ct. at 3035 (footnote omitted). The Court's adoption of this definition raises

several questions, such as what constitutes "nonconformance," whose standards of morality
are to be considered "accepted," and how these standards are to bc communicated to
broadcasters.
362. See note 331 supra.

363. 98 S.Ct. at 3036 & nn.16-17.
364. Id. at 3035.

365. Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Brennan, White and Marshall.
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struction of the statute was plausible but "by no means compelled,"
and that "indecent" should be defined to mean "no more than 'obscene.' "366 Justice Stewart agreed with Pacifica that the decision in
Hamling was dispositive of the section 1464 interpretation issue. He
noted that the Hamling Court had limited section 1461 so as to proscribe only those representations or descriptions of hard core sexual
conduct set out in Miller.3 67 Justice Stewart could find no adequate
basis for the majority's conclusion that the term "indecent" had different meanings in each of these statutes. He concluded by noting that
although sections 1461 and 1464 were enacted separately, they were
codified together in the 1948 Criminal Code under the chapter entitled
"Obscenity," which suggested that Congress intended that section 1464,
like section 1461, should prohibit only obscene speech.3 68
2. The Constitutional Claims
The Supreme Court produced a majority decision in resolving the
statutory issues in Pacffica. The constitutional questions, however,
fragmented the Court. Most of Justice Stevens' constitutional discussion did not command the support of a majority of the Court, but was
joined only by Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger. Justice
Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice Blackmun, which set forth his disagreement with certain of the conclusions
reached by Justice Stevens. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, filed a bitter dissenting opinion in which he addressed the constitutional issues.3 69
For Justice Brennan to serve as a spokesman for the dissenters in a
Supreme Court obscenity decision is a significant indication of the
shifting tides of interpretation in this area of constitutional law. Justice
370
Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Roth v. United States,
wherein the Court first promulgated a uniform standard for determining what speech is obscene. He also authored the plurality opinion in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts,3"7 ' which further refined the Roth standard.
By 1973, however, the composition of the Court had changed, and Jus366. 98 S. Ct. at 3056 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
367. Id. See note 353 and accompanying text supra.
368. Id. at 3056 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
369. Justices Stewart and White expressed no opinion regarding the merits of the constitutional issues in Pac/ca. They believed that the construction of § 1464 set out in Justice
Stewart's dissenting opinion, see notes 366-68 and accompanying text supra, made a constitutional analysis unnecessary.
370. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
371. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
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tice Brennan found himself in the minority when Miller was decided.
He also dissented in ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton,37 2 and urged the
Court to abandon its quest for a viable definition of "obscenity," at
least insofar as consenting adults were concerned.3 7 3 Justice Brennan
continued to fill the role of minority spokesman in Pac~fca.
The first of the two constitutional questions considered by Justice
Stevens' plurality opinion was whether the Commission's order was
overbroad in that it permitted the imposition of sanctions on the broadcasting of constitutionally protected speech. Justice Stevens began by
noting that the Court's review of the order was limited to the question
of whether it was appropriate in the specific factual context of the
case.374 Although acknowledging that the order may cause some
broadcasters to engage in self-censorship, he asserted that this will only
occur in situations where the material to be broadcast contains "patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities. ' 375 Such self-censorship, he argued, will not significantly affect
the content of serious communication because "[t]here are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language. 3 76 Justice Stevens therefore concluded that invalidating the
FCC order solely to preserve "the vigor of patently offensive sexual
• . . speech" was unwarranted.37 7
The second constitutional question which the plurality addressed
was whether the First Amendment precludes the government from
punishing the public broadcast of indecent language under any circumstances. Justice Stevens acceded to the principle that the First Amendment requires the government to "remain neutral in the marketplace of
ideas," but he argued that the speech at issue in Pacitica was not an
essential part of that marketplace.3 7 8 In Justice Stevens' view, the question was not whether the Carlin monologue was protected speech under
any circumstances, but rather whether it warranted protection under
the circumstances in which it was broadcast. Thus, although the Commission itself recognized that the monologue had some literary and po372. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
373. Id. at 84-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
374. 98 S. Ct. at 3037 (plurality opinion).
375. Id. (footnote omitted).
376. Id. at n.18.
377. Id. at 3037.
378. Id at 3038-39: "These words offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends."
(Footnote omitted). It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Justice Stevens' attempt to
delineate how the term "indecency" has a separate meaning apart from the concept of "obscenity." See notes 297-98 and accompanying text supra.
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litical value and expressed a point of view, its objection focused on the
manner in which that view was expressed. 379 Justice Stevens concluded
this analysis by noting that since the content of the broadcast at issue
was "vulgar," "offensive" and "shocking," the Court was required to
examine the context of its dissemination to determine whether the
Commission's actions were constitutional.38 °
As previously noted, Justices Powell and Blackmun did not join in
the foregoing constitutional analysis. Justice Powell expressed his disagreement with the plurality because he could not "subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are free generally to decide on the
basis of its content which speech protected by the First Amendment is
most 'valuable' and hence deserving of the most protection, and which
is less 'valuable' and hence deserving of less protection. ' 31 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan also voiced dissatisfaction with the
analysis utilized in Justice Stevens' plurality opinion. He noted that a
majority of the Court had rejected the notion "that the degree of protection the First Amendment affords protected speech varies with the
'382
social value ascribed to that speech by five Members of this Court.
Justice Brennan also took issue with the plurality's assertion that the
FCC order would not chill free expression because language such as
that at issue in Paciffca is unnecessary to serious communication.3 83 He
found it "fallacious" to presume that the content of a message could be
3 84
divorced from the language used to express it.
The only constitutional question on which the Court produced a
majority opinion was whether the unique characteristics of the broadcast medium warranted a lower level of First Amendment protection.
True to Chief Judge Bazelon's suggestion,38 5 the Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative. Writing for a majority on this
issue, Justice Stevens noted that of all forms of communication, broad379. 98 S. Ct. at 3038-39 & n.22 (plurality opinion).
380. Id. at 3039. It is important to note that these constitutional questions were not resolved by a majority of the Court. Justice Stevens' discussion of these issues is therefore of
only limited precedential value.
381. Id. at 3046 (Powell, J., concurring). Justices Powell and Blackmun did concur with
Justice Stevens' resolution of the statutory issues and in the judgment of the Court. See note
313 supra.
382. 98 S. Ct. at 3047 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 3046-47 (Powell, J., concurring)). Accord, Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
383. Id. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 375-76 and accompanying text
supra.
384. Id. at 3053 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 322-25 and accompanying text
supra. Accord, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.).
385. See text accompanying note 359 supra.
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casting has received "the most limited First Amendment protection.

38 6

He advanced two justifications for this disparate treatment: 1) broadcasting has "established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans," jeopardizing individual privacy rights; and 2) broadcasting is "uniquely accessible to children," which implicates the govern-

ment's interest in the "well being of its youth" and warrants greater

regulation of this particular form of communication." 7 Justice Powell's concurring opinion also stressed the effect the broadcast media has

on children and emphasized that this was a significant factor in his
joining Justice Stevens' opinion to create a majority. 3 8" He noted that
and
"[t]he language involved in this case is as potentially degrading
38 9
acts."
erotic
many
of
representations
as
harmful to children
The Supreme Court in Pacifica delineated another category of
speech, broadcasting, that is entitled to only limited First Amendment

protection. 390 Although the majority attempted to limit its holding to a
specific factual context, 391 its reasoning would seem to leave open the
possibility of further expanding the Commission's power to regulate
the broadcasting of "indecent" speech. 3 92 The decision evinces increasing concern for individual privacy rights and the need to shield children from expression viewed as inappropriate for them. 393 If in the
future the Commission finds that "indecent" language was broadcast at
386. 98 S. Ct. at 3040.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 3044-45 (Powell, J., concurring).
389. Id. at 3045. Justice Powell also noted that broadcasting implicates fundamental
privacy interests of the individual in his home. In his view, this factor justifies broadcasting
regulations that would be constitutionally impermissible if imposed upon other forms of
media. See id. at 3045-46. For Justice Brennan's response to the majority's rationale for
extending less First Amendment protection to the broadcast media, see notes 314-22 and
accompanying text supra.
390. 98 S. Ct. at 3040. Justice Stevens argued that "indecent" speech lies "at the periphery of First Amendment concern," id. at 3037, but this part of his opinion was joined only by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. See id. at 3046-47 & n.4 (Powell, J., concurring). The result in Pacifca actually turned on the unique characteristics of the broadcast
media. See id. at 3040-41 (majority opinion), 3047 (Powell, J., concurring). For other categories of speech that are entitled to only limited First Amendment protection, see, e.g., Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (commercial speech); Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult films).
391. See 98 S. Ct. at 3041 (majority opinion), 3047 (Powell, J., concurring).
392. See id. at 3051-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested that the absence of "principled limits" on the Commission's power in this area could lead to "the
cleansing of public radio of any 'four-letter words' whatsoever, regardless of their context."
Id. at 3051. He pointed out that this might result in the banning from radio of noted literary
works, political speech and portions of the Bible. Id. at 3051-52.
393. See id. at 3040-41 (majority opinion), 3044-46 (Powell, J., concurring).
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a time when children were likely to be in the listening audience,39 4 the
Court's rationale in deciding Pacflca would justify the imposition of
criminal sanctions or other punishment on the disseminator.
HI.

The Clergy and the Right to Hold Public Office: McDaniel v. Paty

The Supreme Court in McDaniel v. Paty3 95 considered, but failed
fully to clarify, the scope of religious freedom under the First Amendment.396 The question posed in McDaniel was whether the state of
Tennessee could bar an individual from seeking an elective position
solely because of his status as a practicing minister. The decision in
McDaniel reveals a Court united in agreement that the Tennessee provision was unconstitutional but divided over the legal basis for that
conclusion.
A4.

The Decision
Paul McDaniel, a Baptist minister, was a candidate for a position

as a delegate to the 1977 Tennessee constitutional convention. An opponent, Selma Cash Paty, sued in State Chancery Court for a judgment
declaring McDaniel disqualified from serving as a delegate to the convention. The basis for her claim was a Tennessee statute which barred
ministers from seeking this position.39 7 The Chancery Court held that
the statute violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the

United States Constitution and declared McDaniel an eligible candidate. In the subsequent election, he was elected by a large margin. After the election, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the
394. See note 261 and accompanying text supra.
395. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). Last term the Court also decided another case relating to freedom of religion, New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977). The Court in CathedralAcademy held that a New York statute authorizing reimbursement to parochial schools
for expenses incurred in performing state-required services during the 1971-72 school year
violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. See note 396 infra.
396. The First Amendment provides in part that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting theftee exercise thereof." U.S. CONsT. amend. I
(emphasis added).
397. 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 848, § 4: "Any citizen of the state who can qualify for
membership in the House of Representatives of the General Assembly may become a candidate for delegate to the convention ..
" The requirements for membership in the legislature include a specific constitutional limitation on participation by the clergy. This
limitation was originally contained in article VIII, § I of the 1796 Tennessee Constitution
and is now found in article IX, § I of the present state constitution: "Whereas Ministers of
the Gospel are by their profession, dedicated to God and the care of Souls, and ought not to
be diverted from the great duties of their functions; therefore, no Minister of the Gospel, or
priest of any denomination whatever, shall be eligible to a seat in either House of the
Legislature."
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Chancery Court on the ground that the statute imposed no burden
upon "religious belief' and restricted "religious action . . . [only] in
the law making process of government-where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the establishment clause."3'98 The Tennessee Court
found a sufficient state interest in maintaining a separation between
political and religious activity to warrant the disqualification, 99
notwithstanding the guarantee of the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment. 4" The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction," 1 and subsequently reversed the decision of the Tennessee
Supreme Court.
Chief Justice Burger, writing for a plurality of the Court,40 2 began
his opinion by tracing the history of the practice of disqualifying ministers from legislative office. 40 3 Drawing from the works of Locke, Jefferson and Madison, the Chief Justice reviewed the historical debate over
the necessity of excluding ministers from such positions.40 4 He concluded this review by noting that of the thirteen states which originally
disqualified members of the clergy, only two, Maryland and Tennessee,
continued this ban into the twentieth century.40 5 In 1974, Maryland's
statute was found unconstitutional as an infringement of the free exercise of religion by a federal district court,40 6 leaving Tennessee as the
only state maintaining a bar on clergy holding public office. Despite
this singular position, the Tennessee statute came to the Court with the
full support of the state's legislative and judicial branches, a posture
recognized as supplying a presumption of validity which the Court did
not summarily reject.
Notwithstanding this presumption, the plurality found that by
conditioning McDaniers right to seek public office on the surrender of
his right to perform religious functions, Tennessee had impermissibly
encroached upon his free exercise of religion.40 7 Chief Justice Burger
reached this conclusion by relying on the Court's decision in Sherbert v.
Verner.40 The Court in Sherbert held that a state's refusal to grant
398. Paty v. McDaniel, Tenn., 547 S.W.2d 897, 903 (1977).
399. Id. at 905.
400. See note 396 supra.
401. 432 U.S. 905 (1977) (mem).
402. 435 U.S. 618 (1978). The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist
and Stevens. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
403. See generally I A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1950).
404. 435 U.S. at 622-25.
405. Id. at 625.
406. Kirkley v. Maryland, 381 F. Supp. 327 (D. Md. 1974).
407. 435 U.S. at 626.
408. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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unemployment benefits to an individual who was unable to find work
because her religious beliefs prohibited her from working on Saturdays
40 9
imposed an unconstitutional burden on the free exercise of religion.
The Chief Justice distinguished the instant case from the Court's decision in Torcaso v. Watkins,4 10 reasoning that Torcaso struck down a
requirement limiting religious belief, whereas the Tennessee statute
pertained to religious conduct or activity. 4 1I Focusing on McDaniel's
status as a minister, the plurality concluded that the free exercise
clause's "absolute prohibition of infringements on the 'freedom to believe' [was] inapposite here. 4 12
Because an infringement upon First Amendment values had been
found, Chief Justice Burger scrutinized the state interests claimed to
justify the ban on ministers holding public office.4 13 The state had argued that granting ministers the right to hold office would result in
their exercise of legislative power and influence to promote the interests
of one particular sect, thus pitting one sect against another and adding
destructive religious conflict to the already difficult task of running a
state government.4 14 The plurality was not persuaded by these asserted
justifications and found that Tennessee had failed to establish that the
historically based view of the dangers of clergy participation in the political processes had contemporary validity.41 5 Consequently, the
Court held the Tennessee statute violative of the First Amendment
right to the free exercise of religion.4 16
Justice Brennan filed a lengthy concurring opinion4 17 in which he
argued that the decision in Torcaso418 should be controlling. He re409. Id. at 403-06.
410. 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso the Court invalidated a Maryland constitutional
requirement that applicants for public office declare their belief in God. The Court held that
this test violated the freedom of belief and religion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Id. at 496.
411. 435 U.S. at 627 (footnote omitted).
412. Id.
413. Chief Justice Burger cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972), for the
proposition that "[t]he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." 435 U.S. at 628 & n.8. In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan questioned this reliance. See id. at 635 n.8 (Brennan, J., concurring).
414. Paty v. McDaniel, Tenn., 547 S.W.2d at 904-06. The Tennessee Supreme Court
referred to the religious wars in Ireland and Lebanon as examples "that the human race has
not advanced to a degree of civilization that will permit us to conclude that the fervor of
religion will never again disturb and disrupt secular affairs and government." Id. at 906.
415. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. at 629.
416. Id.
417. Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Marshall.
418. See note 410 supra.
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jected the distinction relied upon by the plurality between religious belief and religious conduct or activity.4 19 Justice Brennan pointed out
that "freedom of belief protected by the Free Exercise Clause embraces
freedom to profess or practice that belief, even including doing so to
earn a livelihood. ' 42 ° In addition to the free exercise violation, Justice
Brennan found that the Tennessee statute violated the establishment
clause. 42 ' He noted that except in a few, limited situations, government
cannot use religion as a basis for imposing "duties, penalties, privileges
or benefits. 4 22 Justice Brennan concluded his opinion by stating his
faith in the self-corrective nature of the political process. He asserted
that all individuals should have an opportunity to present their views in
423
the "marketplace of ideas" for acceptance or rejection at the polls.
Justice Stewart filed a brief concurring opinion in which he voiced
his agreement with Justice Brennan that Torcaso should be controlling.
He found the differences between the two cases to be without constitutional significance.4 24 Justice Stewart rejected the plurality's view that
religious status and religious belief are separable for purposes of free
exercise analysis. 4 25 He argued that the Tennessee statute "penalized
an individual for his religious status-for what he is and believes
in-rather than for any particular act generally deemed harmful to
6
society.

42

Justice White filed a concurring opinion in which he offered a
wholly different rationale for the Court's judgment. He found that the
Tennessee statute which absolutely prohibited members of a particular
class, in this case ministers, from holding public office, to be in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice White adopted this approach because the plurality and concurring
opinions failed to persuade him that McDaniel's free exercise of religion was in any way restricted by the Tennessee statute. 427 Using an
equal protection analysis, however, Justice White concluded that the
state's interests were insufficient to warrant excluding the affected
class. 428 This conclusion was further supported by his finding that the
419. 435 U.S. at 634 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring). See notes 410-12
and accompanying text supra.
420. 435 U.S. at 631 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
421. See note 396 supra.
422. 435 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., concurring) footnote omitted).
423. Id. at 642.
424. Id. at 642-43 (Stewart, J., concurring).
425. See notes 410-12 and accompanying text supra.
426. 435 U.S. at 643 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring).
427. Id. at 643-44 (White, J., concurring).
428. Id. at 645: "All 50 States are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
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Tennessee statute was both underinclusive and overinclusive.42 9
. Analysis
The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court in McDaniel is
not surprising in light of the disappearance of clergy-disqualification
statutes elsewhere in the United States.4 3° The differences in approach,
however, warrant examination. Seven members of the Court4" 3 ' believed that the protection afforded by the free exercise clause of the

First Amendment compelled the reversal of the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court. Beyond this consensus, these justices produced
three different opinions; two favored the interpretation of Torcaso set
forth by Justice Brennan,4 32 while the plurality distinguished Torcaso
and relied on Sherbert.4 33
The issue separating these two segments of the Court is how far
the scope of the free exercise clause can be extended in the face of legitimate state interests.4 34 The view derived from Torcaso, that any statute which compels an individual to eschew protected religious practices

as a condition of office is unconstitutional,435 was rejected by a plurality
of the Court. The plurality instead found that the Tennessee disqualification provision operated against McDaniel because of his status as a
minister.43 6 Stating that the meaning of "minister" or "priest" is a
maintain a separation between church and state, and yet all of the States other than Tennessee are able to achieve this objective without burdening ministers' rights to candidacy. This
suggests that the underlying assumption on which the Tennessee statute is based-that a
minister's duty to the superiors of his church will interfere with his governmental service-is
unfounded."
429. Id. Justice White pointed out that the statute was underinclusive in that its limitations did not apply to executive and judicial office-seekers. He found the statute to be overinclusive since it also applied to ministers whose religious beliefs would not interfere with
the proper discharge of the duties of a delegate to the constitutional convention.
430. See notes 405 & 406 and accompanying text supra. The decision in McDanieltechnically leaves intact the Tennessee Constitution's bar on clergy serving as legislators, since
only the statute relating to constitutional convention delegates was invalidated by the Court.
435 U.S. at 629. The decision in McDanielnonetheless casts serious doubt on the constitutional validity of the underlying constitutional prohibition. See note 397 supra.
431. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, Brennan, Marshall
and Stewart.
432. See notes 417-20 and accompanying text supra.
433. See notes 408-12 and accompanying text supra.
434. In distinguishing Torcaso, the plurality noted that the First Amendment extends
absolute protection to freedom of belief, which counsels against expanding the scope of that
provision for fear of leaving "government powerless to vindicate compelling state interests."
435 U.S. at 627 n.7.
435. See id. at 632 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
436. Id. at 626-27. See notes 410-12 and accompanying text supra.
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question of state law,437 the plurality interpreted the available authority
as indicating that "ministerial status is defined in terms of conduct and
activity rather than in terms of belief."438 Based on this reading of state
authority, the plurality concluded that the Tennessee statute's limitation was different from that in Torcaso which specifically limited the
right to hold public office to those who professed belief in God.439
Justice Brennan argued that the Court had no justification for
equating "status" with "activity." Referring to the fact that Torcaso's
refusal to declare a belief in God was viewed by the plurality as an act
based on religious belief whereas McDaniel's performance of the functions of a minister were not so considered," he stated: "I simply cannot fathom why the Free Exercise Clause 'categorically forbids' hinging
qualification for office on the act of declaring a belief in religion, but
not on the act of discussing that belief with others."" 1 Justice Brennan's disagreement with the plurality's distinction between belief and
activity apparently must await future Court terms for resolution. The
absence of a clear-cut guideline on this issue is likely to pose problems
for lower courts left in confusion as to what criteria to employ in determining whether certain activity involves freedom of belief so as to command absolute constitutional protection.
The members of the Court who utilized a freedom of religion analysis in McDaniel were in agreement regarding both the unconstitutionality of conditioning eligibility for office on the abandonment of
religious activity and the support for that conclusion provided by
Sherbert."2 In relying on Sherbert, however, none of these justices responded directly to the argument relied upon by the lower court that
Braunfeld v. Brown4"3 was controlling. In Braunfeld, the Court sus437. The plurality simultaneously asserted that they were not bound by the Tennessee
court's resolution of the issue, but were only required to consider it. 435 U.S. at 627 n.5.
438. Id. at 627 (footnote omitted). For a criticism of this interpretation, see id. at 643 n.*
(Stewart, J., concurring).
439. See note 410 supra.
440. See 435 U.S. at 626-27.
441. Id. at 635 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart pointed out that the activity/belief dichotomy, as previously enunciated by the Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940), reflected the Court's judgment that acts claimed to constitute a free
exercise of religion were still subject to judicial review so that "acts harmful to society
should not be immune from proscription simply because the actor claims to be religiously
inspired." 435 U.S. 643 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart asserted that McDaniel's disqualification was not based on his acts but rather on his beliefs. Id.
442. 435 U.S. at 626 (plurality opinion), 633-34 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, J.).
443. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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tained a Sunday closing law despite conceding that it necessarily made
the practice of religion by Orthodox Jewish merchants more expensive.
Their religious beliefs required them to close on Saturday and the state
law required them also to close on Sunday, thus resulting in two days
of lost business. The Braunfeld Court held that the state's interest in
having a uniform day of rest justified the "indirect burden" imposed on
Orthodox Jews by the closing laws. 4 "
The Tennessee Supreme Court had found that the disqualification
statute, like the law at issue in Braunfeld,imposed only an indirect burden on McDaniel's free exercise of his religious beliefs." 5 It held that
this indirect burden was justified by the state's interest in preserving the
separation of church and state, an interest even more compelling than
that asserted in Braunfeld.44 The Tennessee court distinguished
Sherbert on the ground that no compelling state interest could be
shown in Sherbert to warrant the state's denial of unemployment benefits.44 7 The failure of any of the opinions in McDaniel to respond to the
lower court's analysis of Braunfeld adds to the lack of standards for the
resolution of free exercise questions.
To a certain extent, the "indirect burden" doctrine enunciated in
Braunfeld was echoed by Justice White in his concurring opinion, in
which he chose to adopt an equal protection approach to the issues
presented. Justice White felt compelled to analyze the issues in
McDaniel by reference to the equal protection clause because the plurality had failed "to explain in what way McDaniel has been deterred
in the observance of his religious beliefs." 448 He argued that Tennessee's disqualification statute did not interfere with McDaniel's free exercise of religion since the minister was not compelled to abandon the
ministry or disavow any of his beliefs. 449 This implicit adoption of the
indirect burden doctrine is susceptible to the same criticism made of the
Braunfeld decision-that there is nothing "indirect" about compelling
an individual to choose between the unfettered exercise of one's religious beliefs and the rights and privileges of citizenship, including
holding public office.
The various decisions of the justices in McDaniel illustrate once
again the difficulty the Court has encountered in positing clear guide444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

Id. at 606-07.
Paty v. McDaniel, Tenn., 547 S.W.2d at 905.
Id.
Id. at 907. See notes 408 & 409 and accompanying text supra.
435 U.S. at 643 (White, J., concurring).
Id. at 643-44.
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lines for resolving the difficult questions arising under the free exercise
and establishment clauses. While the result in McDaniel may be satisfactory in that it repudiates a doctrine long rejected by most states, it is
anfortunate that the Court was unable to base its decision on a common ground expressed in a single opinion.
MARC

* Member, third-year class.

H.

GREENBERG*

Due Process
I. Marriage and the Family
A. "Best Interests of the Child"

In Quilloin v. Walcott,' the Supreme Court unanimously upheld
the constitutionality of a Georgia statutory scheme which permitted the
adoption of an illegitimate child with only the natural mother's con-

sent. 2 In sanctioning the denial of the power to veto such an adoption
to the father while granting this right to the mother, the Court applied a
"best interests of the child" standard to determine the father's substan-

tive rights. The Court concluded that since the result of the adoption
would be to recognize an existing family unit, such a standard was con-

stitutionally permissible.
Leon Quilloin had never married the mother of his son Darrell,
and had never sought custody, although he had maintained contact

with the child, providing support and gifts from time to time.' He was
allegedly unaware of a procedure by which an unwed father could legitimate his child;4 Georgia law provides that such a legitimated child
may inherit from a father who has gained parental rights.5 Darrell's

mother married when he was almost three, but Quilloin's visits continued for another eight years until the mother concluded that the contacts
were having a disruptive effect on the child.6 Her husband petitioned
1. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403 (3) (1973) provides: "Illegitimate children-If the child be
illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall suffice [for adoption]. Such consent, however, shall not be required if the mother has surrendered all of her rights to said child to a
licensed child-placing agency, or the Department of Human Resources."
3. 434 U.S. at 251.
4. Id at 251 n.14.
5. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (3013) (1973) provides: "A father of an illegitimate child
may render the same legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of his residence, setting forth the name, age, and sex of such child, and also the name of the mother,
and if he desires the name changed, stating the new name, and praying the legitimation of
such child. Of this application the mother, if alive, shall have notice. Upon such application, presented and filed, the court may pass an order declaring said child to be legitimate,
and capable of inheriting from the father in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock,
and the name by which he or she shall be known." GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (3028) (1973)
states: "The mother of an illegitimate child shall be entitled to the possession of the child,
unless the father shall legitimate him as before provided. Being the only recognized parent,
she may exercise all the paternal [sic] power." The Georgia Supreme Court noted that the
word "paternal" was a statutory misprint and was intended to read "parental." Quilloin v.
Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 231, 232 S.E.2d 246, 247 (1977), a'd, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
6. 434 U.S. at 251 & n.10.
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to adopt Darrell, apparently to curtail further visits by Quilloin.7 In
response, Quilloin filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking visitation rights, a petition for legitimation and an objection to the
adoption.8 If he had been successful in legitimizing his son, he would
have gained veto power over the adoption proceedings similar to that
exercised by divorced fathers.9
The trial court consolidated the petitions for adoption, legitimation and writ of habeas corpus, thus providing an opportunity for the
natural father to be heard "'with respect to any issue or other thing
upon which he desire[s]. . . , including his fitness as a parent.' "10 Although the trial court did not find Quilloin unfit as a parent, it denied
his petitions and granted the adoption based on a "best interest of the
child" standard. 1 On appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, Quilloin
contended that the sections of Georgia's statutory scheme granting exclusive powers over adoption to natural mothers of illegitimate children were unconstitutional because they deprived natural fathers of
their parental rights without due process of law and equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 2
The Georgia Supreme Court relied on Labine v. f ncent"3 to find
7. Id
8. Id at 250.
9. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. In addition, although not a factor in
Quilloin, GA. CODE. ANN. § 74-101 (3012) (1973) provides that the father of a child born out
of wedlock may legitimate the child by marrying the mother and acknoN ledging the child as
his own.
10. 434 U.S. at 250.
11. Id at 251.
12. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 146 (1977), a id,434 U.S. 246 (1978).
13. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Labine upheld a Louisiana statutory classification of children
on the basis of legitimacy or illegitimacy for the purpose of denying illegitimate children an
equal share in the estate of their father. The Louisiana state interests consisted of promoting
family life and controlling the disposition of property. Since the father of an illegitimate
child could remove the statutory disability by executing a will, the Court found that no
"insurmountable barrier" had been created to bar claims by illegitimate children. Id at 539.
Labine, however, has been substantially narrowed by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
In Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972), the Court struck down a Louisiana
workers' compensation law which discriminated against illegitimates seeking to recover for
the death of their father as a violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Then, in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), the Court invalidated an Illinois
statutory scheme which permitted illegitimate children to inherit by intestate succession
from their mothers, but not from their fathers. It appears from these more recent decisions
that where illegitimate children are denied benefits because of their status, the Court will
look at the asserted state interests and the means chosen to further those interests with less
deference. Where, however, the parentof an illegitimate child is denied a benefit, the Court
is likely to reduce the level of its scrutiny. The Court in Trimble objected to the legitimacy
of a state's attempt to promote family life by imposing sanctions on the children of unformalized unions. Id at 769-70. In contrast, in Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co.,
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that the classification of children on the basis of legitimacy was valid
because it served a strong state interest in ensuring the welfare of children. 14 Such a classification would tend to encourage either marriage
or the legitimation of children by natural fathers who were interested in
obtaining parental rights.1 5 If a father chose not to take either of these
steps, statutes vesting exclusive authority in the natural mother to consent to adoption would prevent him from blocking it for frivolous or
pecuniary reasons.16 The Georgia Supreme Court also noted that illegitimate children are most frequently raised by their mothers; it is
therefore reasonable to place full parental power in the parent who is

present. '

7

Cognizant of the valid state interests in ensuring the welfare of the
children and promoting family life, and the availability of a procedure
through which unwed fathers could acquire parental rights, the Georgia court held that the statutory scheme did not violate equal protection. 8 The Georgia Supreme Court summarily disposed of the claim
of denial of due process by distinguishing Stanley v. Illinois,19 on which
Quilloin had relied, on the facts.2" In Stanley, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional an Illinois statute which permitted the state to take
custody of children of unwed fathers without a fitness hearing, but
granted hearings to divorced and married parents and unwed
mothers.2 ' The Stanley decision required a specific finding of a natural
391 U.S. 73 (1968), the Court applied only a rational basis standard of review to find that a
Louisiana law which denied the parent of an illegitimate child the right to sue for damages
for the child's wrongful death violated equal protection. It noted that it would be "farfetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so that they can be compensated in
damages for their death." d at 75.
14. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. at 232-33, 232 S.E.2d at 248.
15. Id
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id
19. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
20. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. at 233-34, 232 S.E.2d at 248-49.
21. 405 U.S. at 650-51. The Illinois scheme provided for two ways in which nondelinquent children could be removed from the home of their parents: (1) through a dependency
proceeding in which the state could demonstrate that the children were wards of the state
because they had no surviving parent or guardian, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-I, -5(l)(a)
(1973), or (2) through a neglect proceeding, if the state could demonstrate that children
should be wards of the state because the present parent(s) or guardian does not provide
suitable care, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-1, -4 (1973). ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14
(1973) defined "Parents" as: "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of
them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent."
Since unwed fathers did not fit into the statutory definition of "parents," their children could
become wards of the state pursuant to dependency proceedings. In neglect proceedings, the
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father's unfitness before the state could assume custody.-2 2 The Georgia
court noted that Stanley was a defacto member of the family unit and
the mother was dead, whereas Quilloin had never actually lived with
his child and the child's mother was alive. 23 The court therefore found
Stanley not controlling and upheld the statute.
The dissent argued that the majority had misconstrued Stanley. In
Stanley, the right to due process before losing custody of a child
stemmed from the biological fact of paternity, rather than the legal or
defacto relationship required by the majority. 24 The intent of Stanley,
according to the dissenters, was to afford an opportunity for fitness
hearings to all natural fathers, not only those who lived with their offspring-25 They noted that Stanley even approved notice of custody
hearings by publication to "All whom it may Concern" where the father was unknown or had disappeared.2 6 Since, in the dissent's view,
unwed fathers automatically possess due process rights by virtue of biological paternity, a statutory scheme which grants notice and a hearing
burden was on the state to show parental unfitness, whereas unfitness was presumed at law
in dependency proceedings.
22. 405 U.S. at 658. The Stanley Court observed that administratixc convenience did
not justify denial of due process protection, since "[The Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency." Id at 656.
23. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. at 233-34, 232 S.E.2d at 248-49. In xiw ofthe Georgia
majority's perception of the factual distinction between Stanley and Quilloin, Chief Justice
Burger's description of the facts in Stanley is of some interest. In his dissenting opinion, he
noted that Stanley had turned his two children over to a married couple after their mother's
death and had made no attempt to gain legal recognition of parental or guardianship rights
until the state instituted dependency proceedings. In addition, he asserted that Stanley
asked only that legal custody of the children not be granted to anyone else, not that he be
given legal responsibility. He observed that Stanley was concerned over the loss of welfare
payments he would suffer as a result of the designation of a legal guardian of the children.
405 U.S. at 667 (Burger, C.J., joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also
noted a fact omitted in the majority opinion. Stanley's oldest child had "previously been
declared a ward of the court pursuant to a neglect proceeding that was "proven against"
Stanley at a time, apparently, when the juvenile court officials were under the erroneous
impression that Peter and Joan Stanley had been married." Id at 667 n.5 (Burger, C.J.,
joined by Blackmun, J., dissenting.
The Georgia court also noted that "Georgia recognizes common law marriages but Illinois does not." Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. at 233 n.2, 232 S.E.2d 24S n.2 (1977). This
recognition apparently implies that a natural father could accede to parental rights by residing with the child's mother for the prescribed number of years to satisft common law reould have been if
quirements. The court did not discuss what Quilloin's due process rights Nx
he had resided with his child and the mother for a period less than that of the common-law
marriage threshold.
24. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. at 234-35, 232 S.E.2d at 249 (Undercofler, P.J., joined
by Gunter & Ingram, JJ., dissenting).
25. Id
26. Id.
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to all other parents except unwed fathers violates equal protection.2 7
Implicit in the dissent was the substantive judgment that an unwed father should not be deprived of parental rights without a showing of
unfitness.
The Supreme Court's interpretation of Stanley differed from that
of the Georgia court's dissenters. Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, stated that Stanley balanced the "cognizable and substantial"
interest of the natural father in the custody of his children against the
state's de minimus interest in caring for children if the father is shown
to be a fit parent. 28 In addition, the Court stated that Stanley did not
resolve the question of what degree of protection a state must afford to
the rights of unwed fathers where substantial countervailing interests
exist.29 Stanley was thus held to employ a balancing approach rather
than the automatic entitlement to due process perceived by the Georgia
court's dissenters.
Quilloin challenged the constitutionality of Georgia's statutory
scheme as applied to his case, contending that absent a finding of his
unfitness as a parent, he should be entitled to absolute veto power over
his child's adoption.3" He did not object to the sufficiency of notice he
received of the pending adoption, nor was denial of procedural due
process at issue since Quilloin was afforded a full hearing on his legitimation petition in the consolidated proceedings. 3 ' The appellees argued that Quilloin had no constitutionally protectable due process right
because he had not petitioned to legitimate the child until the adoption
proceedings had begun.32 Noting Quilloin's alleged unawareness of the
availability of legitimation proceedings,3 3 the Court did not reach the
issue of whether a natural father was entitled to procedural due process
in such a case because it found that the standard employed by the
Georgia courts did not offend any substantive rights Quilloin might
have possessed.3 4
The Court stressed that the result of adoption in this case was to
recognize an existing family unit, not to uproot a child from a familiar
setting.3 5 Under the circumstances, the Court reasoned that the state
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id at 235-36, 232 S.E.2d at 249-50.
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 248.
Id
Id at 253.
Id
Id at 254.
Id at 254 & n.14.
Id at 254.
Id at 255.
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was only required to find that the adoption and denial of legitimation
were in the best interests of the child, not that Quilloin was actually an
unfit parent.3 6 The Court also rejected Quilloin's claim of denial of
equal protection, sanctioning the state's power to treat unwed fathers

differently from all other classifications of natural parents. 37 Justification for different treatment was found in the recognizable "difference in
the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child"3 shown by a

willingness to assume legal custody.
The Court avoided any discussion of the precipitating cause of the
adoption petition-Quilloin's visits with his child-but noted that although the child desired adoption, he also wished to continue to see his
natural father.39 Under Georgia law, however, adoption would divest
the natural father of all parental rights including visitation rights.4 0

Even if a court finds denial of legitimation and granting of adoption to
be in the best interests of the child, an apparently reasonable inquiry is
whether visiting rights are also in the child's best interest. 4 ' If the natural father is not found to be neglectful or unfit, the rationality of deny-

ing the child the opportunity to know and associate with him might
well be questioned.42 However, Quilloin did not attack the statute di36. Id
37. Id at 255-56.
38. Id at 256. The Court noted that Quilloin's interests were readily distinguishable
from those of divorced fathers, since the latter would have borne full legal responsibility for
their children during the term of the marriage. Id
39. Id at 251 & n.ll.
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-414 (1973).
41. The Court noted that the trial court had determined that adoption would be in the
best interest of the child and further, that granting legitimation or visitation rights would not
be in the child's best interest. The trial court did not, however, find that Quilloin was unfit
or that he had abandoned his child. 434 U.S. at 251.
42. In another decision, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977),
the Court reversed a district court ruling that foster children's due process rights were violated through their improvident removal from foster homes. The "grievous loss" allegedly
suffered by the children did not impinge on a sufficient liberty interest such as to justify
derogation of the natural parents' substantive liberty interest in regaining custody. Id at
840-46. The concurring opinion went further in rejecting any assumption that foster children might have "some sort of 'liberty' interest in the continuation of [the] relationship." Id
at 857-58 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J. & Rehnquist, J., concurring). One of Smith's
primary rationales for rejecting the foster children's and families' claim to constitutionally
protected familial privacy was the fact that the foster relationship has its source in state law,
rather than in history and tradition. The challenged New York procedures for returning
children to their natural parents were apparently designed to counteract agency discrimination against low-status natural parents who had agreed to temporary placement. For a discussion of foster care as an example of wealth-based and racial discrimination see, e.g., A.
KADUSHIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 355 (1967); Jenkins, Child We/fare as a Class
System, in CHILDREN AND DECENT PEOPLE 3, 11-12 (A. Schorr ed. 1974); Mnookin, Foster
Care-In Whose Best Interests?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV.599, 600 (1973).
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vesting parents of visitation rights upon adoption of the child and the
Court, therefore, did not consider the question.
In effect, Quilloin affirms statutes of many states and the common
law rule that unwed mothers are vested with sole parental authority
over their children unless the natural father takes positive legal steps to
gain a paternal voice.4 3 However, the Court's language suggests that
given a different fact situation-one in which the natural father had
attempted to gain custody of his child and had contributed substantially to the child's welfare-a "best interests of the child" standard
would have to consider the natural father's fitness in determining parental rights.'
A realistic appraisal of the Georgia statutory scheme indicates that
unwed mothers would have little to gain by consenting to their child's
legitimation by the natural father, other than the child's eligibility for
inheritance from the father. On the other hand, once the child is legitimated, the father gains veto authority over the child's adoption and
coequal parental powers.4 5 Since Georgia law requires fathers to support their children regardless of legitimacy,4 6 the only additional obligation imposed on the father by legitimation is that upon his estate.
The only incentive for the mother to accede to legitimation, then, is the
possibility of the child inheriting from its father's estate, a remote possibility in many cases because of the natural father's indigence. If the
mother contests legitimation, a court is likely to deny it if she is married
and the child is living with her,47 as in Quilloin, by applying a "best
43. See, e.g., Orsini v. Blasi, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 379 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975),
appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1042 (1976) (unwed father who lived with the child and its

mother for two years denied veto authority over child's adoption); Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div.
2d 433, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1971) (putative father who had executed a written agreement with
mother which purported to extend some parental rights to father, had lived with child and
mother for six months and had fulfilled child support obligations was denied veto power
over child's adoption); In re Connolly, 43 Ohio App. 2d 38, 332 N.E.2d 376 (1974) (mother

of illegitimate child is its natural guardian and has the legal right to custody, care and control, superior to the right of the natural father); Hanson v. Jones, 6 Wash. App. 701, 495
P.2d 1059 (1972) (putative father denied appointment as children's guardian because ap-

pointment would constitute derogation of mother's custodial control, even though serious
questions of maternal fitness were raised).
44. 434 U.S. at 255. The Court negatively distinguished hypothetical cases in which a
father might seek actual or legal custody, or had assumed significant responsibility for the
child.

45. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
46. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-202 (3027) (1973).
47. See, e.g., Orsini v. Blasi, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486, 379 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975),
appealdismissed,423 U.S. 1042 (1976); Doe v. Roe, 37 App. Div. 2d 433, 326 N.Y.S.2d 421
(1971); Note, Family Law-Voluntary Legitimation-FatherHas No Absolute Right to Legitimate ChildSolely On ProofofBiologicalFatherhood,8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 392 (1976). See also
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interests of the child" standard. While it is undoubtedly preferable to
give the child's best interest primary consideration,4 8 when this is done
in a mechanical fashion one might query whether the means employed
rationally relate to the end sought. Presumptions of maternal fitness
and superiority of a family environment may not always reflect reality;
however, these presumptions were held in Quilloin to be so weighty as
to deprive the unwed father of any parental rights.
An increasing number of fathers are winning the custody of their
children in divorce cases, and outright presumptions of maternal fitness
and paternal unfitness for single parenthood appear to be declining.4 9
Actual and defacto presumptions favoring mothers still operate, however, to deny custody to many fathers unless gross maternal unfitness
can be shown.50 In addition to this lingering prejudice, the unwed father must also overcome inherent presumptions of irresponsibility and
lack of parental concern. Although Quilloin was not the ideal case in
which to test the fairness and reasonableness of statutory schemes
favoring unwed mothers over fathers, the Court could have examined
Quilloin's due process and equal protection claims more thoroughly
than it did.
Stanley, decided during the reign of the "irrebuttable presumption" doctrine,5 1 held that a presumption of an unwed father's unfitness
Cheryl Lynn H. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 273, 115 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1974) (mother
may preclude legitimation by refusing to marry child's natural father or relinquish custody
of the child to him).
48. The policy of most states is to recognize a right of custody in the natural mother
superior, absent forfeiture, to all others, including the father, but also to recognize a paramount interest in the welfare of the child. See, e.g., In re R.L.G., 274 So.2d 4 (Fla. App.
1973); Cornell v. Hartley, 54 Misc. 2d 732,283 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1967); Sparks v.
Phelps, 22 Or. App. 570, 540 P.2d 397 (1975).
49. See, e.g., In re Doe, 52 Haw. 448, 478 P.2d 844 (1970); People ex rel Vallera v.
Rivera, 39 Ill. App. 3d 775, 351 N.E.2d 391 (1976).
50. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 26 N.Y.2d 740, 257 N.E.2d 288, 309 N.Y.S2d
40 (1970) (father denied custody although mother had posed for nude pictures, used pills
and marijuana and left child with grandmother during the day); Z. v. A.. 36 App. Div. 2d
995, 320 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1971) (mother ruled prima facie entitled to custody despite father's
ability to provide family environment and economic advantages); Commissioner ex rel Gifford v. Miller, 213 Pa. Super. Ct. 269, 248 A.2d 63 (1968) (past indiscretions of mother and
father's interest in and capability of ensuring child's well-being were not compelling reasons
for taking child from mother).
51. This doctrine provided a means for invalidating statutes which, on the basis of a
conclusive presumption, denied benefits to or imposed burdens on a particular class of persons. In a series of decisions beginning in 1943 with Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463
(1943), frequently relied upon during the early 1970's, the Court required individualized
consideration of eligibility or fitness, despite the additional administrative burden which
hearings would place on a state. The doctrine, grounded in the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, avoided some of the more rigorous requirements which would be
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was repugnant to the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 One of the evils which Stanley was directed toward curing was
the burden placed upon an unwed father to establish "not only that he
would be a suitable parent but also that he would be the most suitable
of all who might want custody of the children."53 Such a burden would
place unmarried and indigent natural fathers at a distinct disadvantage.5 4 The language of Stanley provided the basis for subsequent paternal custody claims, some of which have been successful.5 5 Clearly
Quilloin limits Stanley to cases in which the unwed father has played a
significant role in his child's life. In cases where the mother has continuously resided with the child and can provide a stable family environment, even a substantial degree of paternal involvement on the part of
the natural father may not be sufficient to preserve his parental rights.
B. Marriage-FundamentalRight or Substantive Liberty?
The Supreme Court issued six opinions in Zablocki v. Redhail,5 6 a
case challenging the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute which prevented non-custodial parents, who were under a legal obligation to

support minor issue, from marrying without first obtaining a court order granting permission to marry.5 7 The statute required marriage applicants to submit to the court proof of compliance with the support
obligation, and also to demonstrate that children covered by the support order were "not then and are not likely thereafter to become pubimposed under equal protection analysis. It did not require a showing of a suspect class or
fundamental interest to trigger what amounted to "strict scrutiny." It also avoided explicit
use of the disfavored term "substantive due process." See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)
for decisions in which the Court declined to sit as a "superlegislature" over state legislatures.
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine has been compared to the substantive due process
doctrine of the Lochner era. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) invalidated a New
York statute which forbade employment in a bakery for more than 60 hours a week or 10
hours a day. It has encountered the same attacks which eventually demolished the Lochner
holding and its progeny. Justice Rehnquist has been the Court's most outspoken critic of the
doctrine. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657-60 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, CJ., dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 466 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J.,
joined by Burger, CJ.& Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. 405 U.S. 645, 657 & n.9 (1972).
53. Id at 648.
54. Id at 648 & n.3.
55. See, e.g., Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 II. App. 3d 260, 292 N.E.2d 145 (1972);
Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
56. 434 U.S. 374 (1978). Justice Marshall wrote the Court's opinion; Chief Justice Burger issued a short concurring opinion; Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens issued opinions
concurring in the judgment, and Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent.
57. Wis. STAT. § 245.10 (1), (4), (5) (1973).
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lic charges."5 8 Marriages entered into without compliance with the
statute, whether performed in Wisconsin or other states, were declared
void.5 9 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found the statute violative of equal protection, reasoning that it established a class of persons
60
whose fundamental right to marry was unconstitutionally burdened.
He observed that the legitimate state interests of protecting the welfare
of children and counseling marriage applicants as to the necessity of
fulfilling prior support obligations did not justify the "broad infringement on the right to marry" imposed by the "collection-device" statutory requirement. 6 '
The Court's reliance on equal protection principles drew criticism
from Justices Stewart and Powell, who wrote separate opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Stewart disagreed with the characterization of marriage as a "fundamental right," as well as with the
majority's perception of a discriminatory classification of marriage applicants.6 2 In his view, the proper analysis should be based on the due
process clause. 3 The freedom to marry, a protected liberty subject to
reasonable state regulation, should not be abridged without demonstration of the legitimacy of the state's interest and the rationality and narrowness of the means used to effectuate the state's interest.
Justice
Stewart contended that the Court had cloaked a substantive due process judgment in the guise of equal protection doctrine." In his view,
the Court's decision limited the state's power to regulate marriage,
rather than forcing the state to draw statutory classifications more precisely to avoid invidious discrimination.6 6 Such exercise of judicial
power, he reasoned, should be acknowledged for what it is and used
carefully.6 7
Justice Stewart concluded that the challenged statute offended due
process because it imposed an absolute deprivation of the benefits of
58. Zd § 245.10(1).

59. Id § 245.10(5). In addition to declaring void a marriage contracted without compliance with the statute, Wis. STAT. § 245.30 (1)(f) (1973) prescribed criminal penalties for noncompliance.
60. 434 U.S. at 387. See EQUAL PROTECTION notes 74-168 and accompanying text infra
for discussion of the majority opinion.
61. 434 U.S. at 388-89.
62. Id at 391-92 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
63. Id. at 392.
64. Id at 395-96 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 260 1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
65. Id at 395-96.
66. Id at 392-94.
67. Id at 395-96.
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marriage upon those who were too indigent to comply with its requirements.6 8 In his view, as applied to indigents the law was an irrational
means of achieving the state's purpose of inducing compliance with
support obligations. 69 He found that the law more plausibly related to

the purpose of insuring the finaficial viability of future marriages, but
that even as to this objective the state had overstepped its boundaries. °
"The invasion of constitutionally protected liberty and the chance of
erroneous prediction are simply too great," he asserted, and thus offend
notions of fairness and due process. 7 Justice Stewart appears to have
modified his view of the limits of the due process clause. In Griswold v.
Connecticut,7 2 his dissenting opinion decried the use of the clause to
invalidate state laws which infringed on rights not explicitly found in
the Constitution.7 3 In Roe v. Wade,7 4 however, he adopted the position
which he later repeated in Redhail, stating: "[T]he Griswold decision
can be rationally understood only as a holding that the Connecticut

statute substantively invaded the liberty that is protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 5
Justice Stewart's position on the substantive due process nature of
the Redhail decision appears valid. The cases cited by the majority in
support of its holding that marriage is a fundamental right regarded the
right to marry as a "central part of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause"76 or as a component of the "right to privacy" implicit
68. Id at 394-95.
69. Id at 394.
70. Id at 394-95.
71. Id at 395.
72. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
73. Id at 528-31 (Stewart, J., joined by Black, J., dissenting).
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. Id at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring).
76. 434 U.S. at 384 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). The Court
cited Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) as the leading authority on the right to marry.
Loving was decided primarily on equal protection grounds because the antimiscegenation
statutes challenged there discriminated on the basis of race. The primary focus, however,
was on the invidious racial discrimination, not on the impingement of a fundamental right
to marry. The Loving decision also noted that the challenged statute offended due process
because race was not a supportable basis for denial of the freedom to marry. Id at 12.
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 -U.S. 535 (1942), also cited by the Court, was
similarly decided on equal protection grounds. Skinner regarded as an invidious classification the sterilization of twice-convicted felons whose crimes involved moral turpitude. This
discriminatory classification was held to violate equal protection because it infringed on the
fundamental civil rights of marriage and procreation. Id at 541. While Skinner provides
some basis for strict scrutiny of classifications impinging on marriage, its equal protection
rationale was criticized in a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Stone, who viewed the
blanket condemnation of certain offenders to sterilization as a violation of due process. Id
at 545. See also Comments of C. Foote, Arthur Garfield Hayes Conference, New York City
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in due process.77 While it is within the province of the Court to recog-

nize important traditional values of our society in making its decisions,
the sudden shift from due process to equal protection analysis requires
more clarification than the majority opinion provided." Focusing on
(1963), reprintedin The ProperRole of the United States Supreme Court in Civil Liberties
Cases (N. Dorsen ed.), 10 WAYNE L. REV. 457, 471-72 (1964), for criticism of the narrowness of the Skinner Court's equal protection ruling.
77. 434 U.S. at 384-85. The Court cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(penumbral right of privacy protects the decisions of married couples to utilize contraceptive
devices) and Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (school board rule
requiring pregnant teachers to take leave without pay for at least five months burdened the
exercise of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life through conclusive presumption of incapacity). See note 51 supra for a discussion of the "irrebuttable presumption
doctrine." The other case primarily relied upon was Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678 (1977). Carey invalidated New York statutes which prohibited advertisement for
contraceptives, the sale of contraceptives to minors and the sale of contraceptives by anyone
except a licensed pharmacist. Although Carey noted that the due process right of privacy
was involved, it primarily addressed the issues of whether a compelling state interest existed
and whether the means used to effect that interest were sufficiently narrow. Id. at 684-86.
The decision never explicitly relied on due process or equal protection. and the method of
analysis employed by the Court suggests a synthesis of the two clauses,
78. A consideration of the specific level of scrutiny to be accorded to the reasonableness
of challenged statutes which relate to marriage is particularly neglected in the opinion. The
Redhali Court stated: "By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we
do not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents
of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary,
reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the
marital relationship may legitimately be imposed." 434 U.S. at 386. Justice Marshall distinguished the Court's unanimous holding in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977), which
upheld provisions of the Social Security Act terminating benefits of a dependent disabled
child who married an individual not entitled to benefits, regardless of the latter individual's
handicapped or indigent status. Exempted from the termination rule, however, were marriages between persons who were both beneficiaries under the Act. The Court reached its
conclusion by applying a rational basis standard of review, finding that the general rule
terminating benefits upon marriage and the exception continuing benefits for handicapped
individuals who married persons also entitled to benefits were reasonable. See EQUAL PROTECTION notes 58-61 and accompanying text infra. The distinction Justice Marshall drew
was based on the lack of direct and substantial interference with the decision to marry in
Jobst, which he found present in Redhal. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. at 386-87.
Noting that the Jobsts' income was reduced by only $20 per month after termination of
benefits, he failed to find any significant discouragement of marriage. Id at 387. This position is somewhat at odds with Justice Marshall's dissent in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977), and Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), which criticized the Court's "intellectually
disingenuous 'two-tier' equal protection analysis." Id at 457. By applying a rationality
standard, the Maher Court found that a Connecticut regulation which refused Medicaid
benefits for nontherapeutic abortions, but granted Medicaid benefits for childbirth, did not
violate equal protection. Maher purported to find a "basic difference between direct state
interference with a protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity."
432 U.S. at 475. Justice Stevens felt compelled to expand on the "tension" between Jobst
and the Redhail majority opinion. He saw a distinction between "marital status" and a
classification which determines who may lawfully enter into marriage. Zablocki v. Redhail,
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this omission, Justice Powell noted the problems which inhere in distinguishing whether or not a state regulation directly and substantially
interferes with the decision to marry. 79 He pointed out that state regulation of marriage "typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier.""0 Thus, legislatures and courts are left with little guidance as to
what limits are reasonable. Reliance on substantive due process in
cases like Redhail would not resolve the confusion as to how much and
what kind of state regulation of the freedom to marry is permissible. It
would, however, presumably leave intact those instances of state restriction on marriage which are justified by reasonable, though perhaps
not compelling, state interests. It appears pertinent to query whether
the Court was merely acting out of distaste for the doctrine of substantive due process, 8' or whether it was providing a foundation for strict
scrutiny analysis of future challenges to state restrictions on marriage.
Justice Powell's concurrence criticized the "compelling state interest" showing which would be required for direct state interference with
a "fundamental right to marry."8 2 He noted that domestic relations
have traditionally been a "virtually exclusive province of the States. 8 3
State regulations banning incestuous, bigamous or homosexual marriages or setting preconditions such as blood tests might be called into
question under a compelling state interest inquiry.8 4 Relying on Boddie
v. Connecticut, 5 Justice Powell found the statute violative of due process because it failed to make provision for those who were unable to
comply with child support obligations.8 6 He disagreed with the Court,
however, on the impermissibility of a state "collection-device" as applied to individuals who "simply wish to shirk their moral and legal
obligation."8 " A statute which conditioned the right to marry on satisfaction of support obligations would, in his view, be proper if it exempted those who were able to prove the bona fides of their
434 U.S. at 403-04 (Stevens, J., concurring). The latter classification, in his view, merits
constitutional protection from discriminatory state regulation. Jobst,on the other hand, involved a valid regulation based on marital status. Id
79. 434 U.S. at 396-97 (Powell, J., concurring).
80. Id at 397.
81.

See note 51 supra.

82. 434 U.S. at 396-97 (Powell, J., concurring).
83. Id at 398 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
84. 434 U.S. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Boddie upheld a challenge to a state's requirement of the payment of court fees and costs as a precondition to suit for divorce, as applied to indigents.
State monopoly of the divorce process was held to require equal access for all citizens.
86. 434 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. Id.
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indigency. 8
Justice Powell also noted the arbitrariness of the statute's requirement that a marriage applicant demonstrate that his children "are not
then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges."' 9 The
effect of this provision could be to preclude indigents from marriage
whether or not they had met their support obligations. In addition,
since there are no plausible standards for determining the likelihood of
children becoming public charges, he viewed the statute as granting a
judge a "license for arbitrary procedure."9 These deficiencies, coupled
with the statute's underinclusiveness, were grounds for Justice Powell's
finding of due process and equal protection violations.
Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter, assumed a deferential stance
toward state regulation. He joined with Justices Powell and Stewart in
rejecting the concept of marriage as a fundamental right sufficient to
trigger strict scrutiny, but disagreed with their belief that the statute
was irrational as applied to those who are truly indigent. 9 ' Characterizing the state's aim of securing as much support for needy children as
their parents are able to pay as "an exceptionally strong interest,"9 " he
found the state provisions to be sufficiently rational to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment despite its "possible imprecision" in extreme, atypical cases. 3 Citing the Court's analysis in Caif/ano v. Jobst,94 he found
the burden imposed by Wisconsin on the right to marry to be so substantially similar as to justify a like result.95 This analogy between
Jobst and Redhail may be nearer to reality than the distinction perceived by the Court, which noted that Jobst concerned a reasonable
regulation that did not "significantly interfere" with the decision to
marry.9 6 Justice Rehnquist did not, however, comment on the possible
arbitrariness of foreclosing marriage to indigents, nor did he discuss the
fairness of the statute's requirement that a marriage applicant demonstrate that his children would not become public charges in the future.
Even if the "right to marry" does not rise to the level of a "fundamental
right" in equal protection analysis, the extreme deference of Justice
88. Id
89. Id at 402.
90. Id at 402 n.4 (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966)).
91. 434 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. Id at 408.
93. Id at 407-08.
94. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
95. Justice Rehnquist noted that financial and legal obstacles to marriage both have the
result of making marriage "practically impossible." 434 U.S. at 408.
96. Id at 386-87 & n.12. See note 78 supra.
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Rehnquist's position is inapposite to the due process underpinnings of
such decisions as Loving v. Virginia,9 7 Boddie v. Connecticut,9 8 Carey v.
9 9 and ClevelandBoardof Education v.
PopulationServices International
LaFleur.'0 All of these cases noted that freedom of choice in matters
of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A protected liberty may
not be infringed by the state in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.
By focusing solely on the rationality of the state's purpose in enacting
the challenged statute, Justice Rehnquist dismissed the irrational and
discriminatory effect it visited upon certain individuals.
II. Due Process in Schools
A.

Righting a Constitutional Wrong

Denial of procedural due process, an infringement of an "absolute" right,'' was held in Carey v. Pophus °2 to entitle an injured party
only to nominal damages in the absence of proof of actual injury.
Jarius Piphus, a high school freshman, had been suspended from
school for twenty days for smoking what appeared to be a marijuana
cigarette. 10 3 The suspension took effect immediately after the smoking
incident, despite Piphus' assertion that the cigarette was not marijuana."° Several days later, two meetings were held between school
officials, Piphus' mother and sister, and representatives of a legal aid
clinic, not for the purpose of determining the truth of Piphus' claim,
but rather to explain the reasons for the suspension.'0 5 Unsatisfied with
the outcome of the discussions, Piphus filed suit in federal district court
alleging violation of his right to procedural due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Piphus' case was consolidated with that of Silas Brisco, a sixth
grade student, who had been suspended for twenty days for wearing an
earring in violation of a school rule. Males were prohibited from wearing earrings because such adornment was thought to denote gang mem97. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
98. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
99. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
100. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).

101. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). The Court viewed the right to procedural
due process as "absolute" in that it does not depend on the merits of an individual's claim.
Id
102. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
103. Id at 249.
104. Id.
105. Id
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bership. °6 Although he had been given several warnings, Brisco
refused, with the approval of his mother, to remove the earring, which
he asserted was a symbol of black pride, not gang membership. 0 7 The
students sued under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act °8 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, plus actual and punitive damages in the
amount of $8,000.
The district court held that both students were entitled to and had
been denied procedural due process. 0 9 The students' claim for dam-

ages failed for lack of proof, however, and the court did not reach the
question of whether or not the suspensions were justified.

0

The Sev-

enth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, " holding that:
1) declaratory and injunctive relief should have been granted;" 12 2) the
trial court should have heard evidence as to the pecuniary value of
106. Id at 250.
107. Id
108. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) pro%ides: "Every person
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
109. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 251. The students' suspensions occurred before the
Supreme Court ruling in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), that any disciplinary proceeding involving a suspension that was not de minimus must afford the student an opportunity
to challenge the grounds for such action. 419 U.S. at 582-83. The Carey district court,
however, relied on Linwood v. Board of Educ., 463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert.denied409 U.S.
1027 (1972) as placing defendant school officials on notice that the suspensions violated
procedural due process. Goss did not mandate an evidentiary-type hearing in every case of
student discipline. Rather, the court specified that students must be given oral or written
notice of the charges; if the student denies the charges, he is entitled to a hearing prior to
suspension. The Court defined a "hearing" as an opportunity for the student to hear an
explanation of the evidence against him and to present his version, in an informal setting,
taking place immediately after the "notice" has been given. 419 U.S. at 581-82. Goss also
noted that expulsions or suspensions for more than 10 days might require more formal procedures. Id at 584.
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) held that students suspended without proper
process could maintain actions against school officials only if: (1) the officials acted with
malicious intent to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student,
or (2) if they knew or reasonably should have known that their action would violate a student's constitutional rights. Absent such evidence of "bad faith," school officials would be
immune from suit. Id at 318. The district court in Carey found the school officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity from suit, because their action, though not maliciously intended, was undertaken with knowledge of possible constitutional '.iolation. Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. at 251.
110. 435 U.S. at 252.
111. Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
112. Id at 31.
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missed school days; 1 3 and 3) even if plaintiffs' suspensions were found
to be justified, they would still be entitled to substantial "non-punitive"
damages for their deprivation of procedural due process." 14
In reversing the circuit court's ruling on the third point, the
Supreme Court focused on the purpose of section one of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. l ' This provision established civil liability for the
benefit of persons injured by a deprivation of their constitutional rights.
The students argued that constitutional rights are valuable in and of
themselves, and that violation of such rights may be presumed to cause
injury. In addition, they contended that the deterrent effect of substan6
tial damage liability justified sustaining the circuit court's decision. "
The Court disagreed, stating that Congress' apparent intent in enacting
section 1983 was to create a species of tort liability solely to compensate
persons injured by a deprivation of their constitutional rights.' 17 In
applying the principle of compensation to the case before it, the Court
noted that some constitutionally protectable interests may parallel interests protected under the common law of torts; in such cases, tort
rules of damages could appropriately be applied. 8 In cases where the
constitutionally protectable interests are not analogous to those protected by tort law, the court should adapt common-law principles of
damages to fashion the proper remedy for the injury sustained. 1 9 In
these situations, the nature of the interest protected by the constitutional right forms the basis for such an adaptation. 2 0
113. Id at 32. The court stated, however, that on remand defendant school officials
would be entitled to offer evidence showing there was just cause for suspension. If the dis-

trict court upheld the suspensions, the plaintiffs could not recover compensatory damages.
Id
114. Id at 31-32. Punitive damages have been held recoverable in § 1983 actions when

aggravating circumstances, such as malice, ill-will, reckless indifference to property or desire
to injure, are present, even in the absence of actual loss to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Silves v.
Carmier, 529 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1976); Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir.

1974).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note 108 supra.
116. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 254.

117. The Court noted that the legislative history of § 1983 demonstrated an intention to
create a "species of tort liability" in favor of persons who are deprived of "rights, privileges,
or immunities secured" under the Constitution. 435 U.S. at 253 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976)).
118. 435 U.S. at 257-58.
119. Id at 258.
120. Id at 259. The Court reiterated that "courts of law are capable of making the types
ofjudgments concerning causation and magnitude of injury necessary to accord meaningful
compensation for invasion of [constitutional] rights." Id (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409 (1971) (Harlan, J.,

concurring)).
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Turning to the problem of compensation, the Court stated that
procedural due process is designed to guard against the unfair or mistaken deprivation of a liberty or property interest.' 2 ' Where an individual has been denied procedural due process but the deprivation of
liberty or property is found to be justified, however, the Court reasoned
that the injury cannot necessarily be attributed to the constitutional violation.' 2 2 Even where the deprivation is unjust, an injury cannot be
presumed, it must be proven. Although acknowledging that one purpose of the due process clause is to convey the "feeling of just treatment" by the government, 23 distress suffered by an individual denied
that feeling was found to be neither so inevitable nor so difficult 1to
24

prove as to justify compensation without actual proof of such injury.
The Court concluded its opinion by reaffirming the importance of procedural due process and authorizing nominal damages, not to exceed
25

one dollar, for the violation, regardless of proof of actual injury.'

121. 435 U.S. at 259. The Goss v. Lopez opinion delineated the liberty and property
interests which students possess. The Court found that suspensions could damage pupils'
standing with fellow students and teachers, as well as interfere with later employment and
education opportunities. This type of injury to reputation implicates a person's liberty interest. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 574-75. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972). A property interest is created by an independent source, such as state law, contract
or tenure. 408 U.S. at 577-78. If a state has chosen to extend the right of education to a class
of persons, it has thereby created a legitimate claim of entitlement, or property interest, in
those persons. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 572-74. Since the State of Ohio, the forum of
Goss, specifically directed local authorities to provide free education to all residents of a
certain age and compelled those persons to attend school, it was held to have established a
property interest in education. Id See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3313 AS, .64 (Page 1972 &
Supp. 1973).
122. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 263. The Court pointed out that, in many cases, a
person may not even be aware of procedural deficiencies "until he enlists the aid of counsel
to challenge a perceived substantive deprivation." Id Also, an individual's distress in such
situations may be more likely attributable to the actual deprivation than to the denial of
procedural due process. Id
123. Id at 261 (citing Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
124. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 262-64. The Court rejected the students' argument that
injury should be presumed, as it is in cases of defamation per se. Noting that the doctrine of
presumed damages in defamation per se was "an oddity of tort law" (citing Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)), resulting from virtual certainty of damages which are
nevertheless difficult to prove, the Court found the analogy inappropriate. 435 U.S. at 26263.
125. Id at 266-67. Although the Court did not directly address the effect of awarding
only nominal damages on the possibility of discouraging suits for denial of procedural due
process, it looked to the common-law practice of vindicating absolute rights by such awards.
Id at 266. It might be argued that the interests involved do not support the analogy drawn
by the Court. The purpose of procedural due process is to protect the individual from unfair
or mistaken deprivation of important interests by the state or its agents. See note 121 and
accompanying text supra. A state agency which impairs an individual's liberty or property
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The limitation of damages in Carey indicates no real departure
from previous holdings and dicta. 12 6 As the opinion pointed out, section 1983 has been held to afford a remedy only for compensable injuries caused by violation of constitutional rights under color of law. 27
In many cases, the injury consists solely of embarrassment, humiliation
or mental and emotional distress. In Adickes v. S.H.Kress & Co., 128 for
example, a plaintiff who was wrongfully ejected from a restaurant was
held to have been denied equal protection due to racial discrimination.
The Court noted that Adickes would be entitled to "recover compensation for actual damages, if any"' 12 9 even in the absence of wilful conduct by the defendants. In order for punitive damages to be imposed,
the defendant's actual knowledge of his violation of plaintiff's protected
30
rights, or at least reckless disregard of such rights, must be shown.
The Carey opinion noted that the district court specifically found that
the school officials did not act with a malicious intent to deprive stuinterest without due process might well visit unfair deprivations on other similarly situated
joined by
persons. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 218-19 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (almost one fourth of all appeals from government
agency employment discriminations result in a finding that the dismissal was illegal). The
interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause have been termed
"essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923). Justice Marshall, dissenting in Roth, noted that "it is procedural due process that is our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589
(1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Carey Court's analogy of vindication of procedural
rights with vindication of other more trivial, but absolute, rights dilutes the importance of
procedural due process and the philosophical commitment to protecting individuals from
the arbitrary exercise of government power.
The Carey Court reasoned, however, that the potential liability for compensatory damages, where infringement of a right was found to be unjustified and where injury could be
shown, was a sufficient deterrent to deliberate violations of procedural due process. 435 U.S.
at 256-57. In addition, an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 providing that defendants be
liable for attorneys' fees in § 1983 actions, might insure compliance with constitutional requirements. Id at 257 n. 11 (citing Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-559 § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970)).
126. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (upholding the practice of reasonable corporal punishment in Florida schools without advance procedural safeguards);
Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1977) (teacher unconstitutionally dismissed for exercise of protected speech would not be entitled to reinstatement if
school board could show by a preponderence of evidence that he would have been dismissed
for other reasons); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecuting attorney absolutely
immune from § 1983 suit arising out of his deliberate suppression of material evidence and
knowing use of false testimony at a murder trial).
127. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971).
128. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
129. Id at 232.
130. Id at 233. See note 114 supra.
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dents of their rights or to do them other injury"' and that the court of
appeals approved only "non-punitive" damages.' 32 The circuit court
characterized its award of substantial damages for denial of due process absent harm as "non-punitive,"'' 33 but the difference between punitive damages and those prescribed by the circuit court appears to be
merely semantic.
In Codd v. Velger,'34 a case analogous to Carey, a dismissed police
trainee sought reinstatement and damages, claiming that his liberty interest had been infringed without due process because he had been stigmatized by a report in his employment file concerning an attempted
suicide. 135 The file had been shown to his present employer who allegedly dismissed him because of its contents.136 The Court denied any
relief because Velger had not alleged the falsity of the report; if the
report was not untrue, then Velger could not claim harm from the denial of procedural due process.' 37 Justice Brennan, dissenting in
Velger, stated that once a plaintiff establishes a violation of his constitutional rights, the burden shifts to the wrongdoer to demonstrate that
the violation did not cause any harm. 38 In contrast, the Carey opinion
indicated that on remand, the school officials would have to prove that
the students would have been suspended even if a proper hearing had
been held. 13 Even if they failed to prove this, however, the students
would still have to show that they suffered injury in order to receive
compensatory damages. 4 ' Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted in
Velger: "A jury should be permitted to decide whether to fix and award
damages-perhaps only nominal-for the very denial of a timely due
process forum."'' 41 This language is somewhat inconsistent with Justice
Brennan's agreement with the Carey majority, which specifically lim42
ited damages to one dollar or less.'
131. 435 U.S. at 251 n.6.
132. Id at 252.
133. Piphus v. Carey, 545 F.2d at 32. The circuit court indicated that the amount
awarded "should be neither so small as to trivialize the right nor so large as to provide a
windfall." Id
134. 429 U.S. 624 (1977) (per curiam).
135. Id. at 625.
136. Id. at 625-26.
137. Id at 628.
138. Id at 630-31 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
139. 435 U.S. at 260.
140. Id at 264.
141. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. at 630 n.3 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. The Carey decision was unanimous, with the exception of Justice Blackmun, who
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Marshall concurred in the
result without opinion. 435 U.S. at 267.
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The Carey Court acknowledged that a few lower courts had permitted actions for damages in cases of employee dismissal with just
cause, but without procedural due process. 14 3 In these cases, the fact of
injury was clear in that the employee was deprived of salary and benefits between the time of the procedurally defective dismissal and the
ultimate hearing. One lower court judge noted the "chilling implications for constitutional protections" if employees discharged without
proper hearings could not obtain redress.'" "[Tihe lesson taught the
state employer is that the constitutional safeguard of procedural due
process may be safely ignored if adequate grounds for dismissal can be
proved in the uncertain event of some future proceeding."' 14 5 Where
the issue is employment dismissal, the human component and conflicting interests in the employer-employee relationship may be more susceptible to bad faith denial of procedural due process than would be
the case in student suspensions. It is not clear from the Carey opinion,
however, whether the Court would affirm substantial damage
awards
146
dismissal.
employment
defective
procedurally
of
cases
in
The Court did not specify whether violations of other constitutional rights would entitle the.wronged party to more than nominal
damages absent actual injury. The opinion did caution that "the elements and prerequisites for recovery of damages appropriate to com143. Id at 260 n.15. The circuit court in Carey relied primarily on Hostrop v. Board of
Jr. College, 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976) in awarding damages solely for denial of due process. Hostrop stated that "[t]he wrong done plaintiff was not
the termination of his employment, for that has been determined to have been justified ..
but the deprivation of his procedural due process right to notice and a hearing." Id at 579.
The measure of damages, according to Hostrop, could be determined by considering "the
nature of the constitutional deprivation and the magnitude of the mental distress and humiliation suffered by the plaintiff, as well as any other injury caused as a result of being deprived of federally protected rights." Id at 580. See also Thomas v. Ward, 529 F.2d 916,
920 (4th Cir. 1975) (teacher held entitled to back pay from date of improper termination
without due process to time of full hearing before board); Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521
F.2d 1201, 1208 (4th Cir. 1975) (failure of board to afford procedural due process held
enough to support award of back pay including pension right compensation); Zimmerer v.
Spencer, 485 F.2d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1973) (even though board had valid, constitutionally
sufficient reasons for teacher's discharge, delay in affording due process supported award of
back pay with salary raise for a year plus attorneys' fees); Horton v. Orange County Bd. of
Educ., 464 F.2d 536, 538 (4th Cir. 1972) (although plaintiffs conduct warranted discharge,
procedural deficiencies sustained award of net pecuniary loss of wages for period between
date of termination and date of the court's decisions).
144. Burt v. Board of Trustees, 521 F.2d 1201, 1207 (4th Cir. 1975) (Winter, J., concurring and dissenting).
145. Id
146. The Court did not explicitly disapprove of the cases discussed in note 143 supra,
although it remarked that the views expressed therein were contrary to both circuit court
and Supreme Court holdings in Carey. 435 U.S. at 260 & n.15
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pensate injuries caused by the deprivation of one constitutional right
are not necessarily appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the
deprivation of another."1 47 Numerous cases have permitted damage
actions for wrongful deprivation of the right to vote.1 4 However, this
is virtually the only constitutional violation which is held to merit substantial damages without demonstrable injury,1 49 and the weighty policy considerations involved in protecting the right to vote may serve to
lower the prerequisite threshold for recovery.
B. Dismissalfor D§cient Academic Performance
The Supreme Court ruled in Boardof Curatorsof the University of
Missouri v. Horowitz150 that the flexible nature of due process requires

far less stringent procedures in cases of academic dismissal than for
disciplinary suspension or expulsion.' 5 ' Charlotte Horowitz had been
admitted as an advanced student at the University of Missouri-Kansas
City School of Medicine;' 52 she entered medical school with the express
53
intention of becoming a psychiatrist in order to teach or do research.'

Part of the University's required curriculum included clinical studies,' 5 4 and although Horowitz's academic performance was beyond re56
proach,' 5 5 her clinical abilities were rated deficient by the faculty.'
147. Id. at 264-65.
148. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 (1927); Wayne v. Venable, 260 F. 64
(8th Cir. 1919); Ashby v. White, I Eng. Rep. 417 (H.L.), reviewed, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.
1703) (establishing a common-law rule of damages for wrongful deprix ation of the right to
vote).
149. The Carey Court distinguished cases relied upon by the circuit court in support of
its ruling from those involving voting rights by noting that the former either ignored the
question of injury or found some harm resulting from a constitutional violation. 435 U.S. at
264-65. See, e.g., Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974); Seaton v.
Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974) (damages awarded in both cases for humiliation and distress inferred from discriminatory abridgment of equal housing opportunity).
See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1965); Sexton v. Gibbs, 327 F. Supp. 134
(N.D. Tex. 1970), aftd, 446 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972);
Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo. 1967) (in these cases damages were awarded
to compensate for humiliation and distress caused by illegal search, seizure or arrest).
150. 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
151. Id at 86. See note 109 supra.
152. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1318, rehearingdenied,542 F.2d 1335
(8th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 435 U.S. 78 (1978). Horowitz had a master's degree in psychology
from Columbia University, had studied pharmacology at Duke University, had done graduate study and work in psychopharmacology at the National Institute of Health and scored in
the 99th percentile in four categories on the Graduate Record Examination and in two categories on the Medical College Admissions Test. 538 F.2d at 1318.
153. 538 F.2d at 1318.
154. The University's curriculum was geared to training practicing physicians. Id
155. Horowitz scored first in her class on Part I of the National Board Examination for
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Despite a recommendation from the Council on Evaluation15 7 that she

not be advanced, Horowitz was admitted to the final year of study, but
was placed on probation. She was informed at that time of her deficiencies and warned of the incompatibility of certain conduct with
graduation. 158
About six months later, in December of her final year, the Council
reconsidered Horowitz's status and recommended that she not be permitted to graduate in June. The Council's recommendation was approved by a higher committee and, ultimately, by the Dean. Horowitz
was told that she would be continued on probation, but that she could
not graduate on schedule. She was given the option of taking a set of
oral and practical examinations as an "appeal" of this decision.' 59 The
examinations were administered in various areas of clinical medicine
by seven faculty physicians who thereafter gave their recommendations
concerning Horowitz's future. 6 ° Two of the physicians recommended
that she graduate on schedule; two others suggested that she continue
on probation, and two recommended that she be dropped from the
school. One faculty member believed she was not
qualified to graduate
61
at that time, but expressed no further opinion.1
These opinions were submitted to the Council on Evaluation,
which reaffirmed its position that Horowitz should not graduate in
June, and, shortly thereafter, recommended that she be dismissed from
the school. 162 Although Horowitz had ample notice of her failure to
meet University standards, she was never given an opportunity to rebut
the evidence of academic deficiency at a hearing. When her attempts to
obtain a reversal of this decision failed, she instituted a suit against the
University under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,163 alleging substantive and procedural due process violations. The district court dismissed her commedical students and second on Part II. She ranked fourth in her class examination in
February, 1973 and second in May, 1973. Id
156. One faculty member rated her performance as outstanding, but others criticized her
lack of patient rapport, lack of expertise in coming to the fundamentals of the clinical problem, erratic attendance and poor personal hygiene. Id at 1318-19.
157. The Council on Evaluation is a faculty-student body which can recommend various
actions, including probation and dismissal. Id at 1319.
158. Id
159. Id
160. Id at 1320. The physicians were asked to make one of three recommendations: (1)
graduate on schedule, (2) continued probation and reassessment of her status in May, 1973,
and (3) dismissal from medical school. The option of recommending further study after
May, 1973 was not included. Id
161. Id
162. Id
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note 108 supra.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 6:19

plaint after a full trial, concluding that she had received all of the rights
guaranteed her by the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 4 This decision was
reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which found

that Horowitz had been stigmatized by the dismissal, since it would
probably foreclose any opportunity for her to attend another medical
school or gain employment in a medical field. 165 Imposition of such a
disability was held to constitute a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law since Horowitz was not afforded a hearing. 166 Rehearing en banc was denied with three dissenting judges filing an
opinion.

167

Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, reversed the judgment
of the circuit court. He found it unnecessary to decide whether

Horowitz possessed any constitutionally protected due process interest,
since, in any case, she received at least as much process as the Four164. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 80.
165. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d at 1321. The circuit court reasoned that
the disability sustained by Horowitz met the criteria enunciated in Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1972), that action by the state which imposed "a stigma or other disability that
foreclosed. . . freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities" was a deprivation of liberty requiring notice and a hearing. 538 F.2d at 1321, (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573).
166. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d at 1321. The Eighth Circuit relied primarily on Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975) in determining that Horowitz had not
been afforded procedural due process. Greenhill had been dismissed from the University of
Iowa College of Medicine for poor academic standing, apparently because of his "lack of
intellectual ability or insufficient preparation." Id at 7. Although acknowledging the broad
discretion of school officials in academic evaluations, the court noted that Greenhill's dismissal not only denigrated his academic performance, but also his intellectual ability. This
stigma warranted notice in writing of the alleged intellectual deficienc 3 and an opportunity
to contest the allegation. Id at 9.
167. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 542 F.2d 1335 (8th Cir. 1976). The dissenting circuit
judges contended that Horowitz's dismissal did not stigmatize her in the constitutional sense.
They noted that the Supreme Court held in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976) that in
order for an individual to claim stigma or injury to reputation, he must show public disclosure of the reasons for employment dismissal. Since the actual communication of the reasons for Horowitz's dismissal took place in private, they believed her claim invalid under the
Bishop test. Although this view appears to ignore the fact that Horowitz would undoubtedly
be required to furnish information about her dismissal if she applied to any other school or
for employment in a medical field, it reflects the recent trend of the Court's decisions, which,
combined with others denying liberty infringement, may indicate a withdrawal from the
Roth precepts. See, e.g., Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977), discussedin notes 134-41 and
accompanying text supra; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (mere statc-inflicted damage to
reputation alone does not implicate a liberty interest; it must be coupled with a tangible
interest, such as employment, to merit constitutional protection). For criticism of Court
decisions limiting due process protection of property and liberty interests, see Van Alstyne,
Cracksin "The New Property"'AdjudicativeDueProcessin the Adminiszrative State, 62 CoRNELL L. REv.445 (1977).
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teenth Amendment requires."' All of the justices concurred inthis assessment of the adequacy of process afforded Horowitz.1 69 Even
Justice Marshall, who disagreed with much of the Court's analysis, 70
felt that Horowitz had been given all that Goss v. Lopez 17 1 mandated.
He noted that she had received several notices and explanations and
had been given at
least three opportunities to present her side of the
172
story informally.
The majority opinion went further, however, endorsing a distinction formulated in state and lower federal courts between dismissal for
deficient academic performance and suspension for disciplinary reasons. 173 This distinction is based on the similarity between disciplinary
suspensions and traditional judicial and administrative factfinding,
which is not thought to be present in the context of academic judgments of school officials.' 74 Disciplinary suspensions rest on factual
conclusions which may be erroneous, whereas academic judgments are
based on the subjective evalutions of school officials.175 The Court reasoned that the educational process is not by nature adversarial; 176 there
was therefore no reason to "enlarge the judicial presence in the academic community"' 177 by intruding on the historical prerogative of educators to act upon their expert evaluations of a student's academic
performance.
Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the deprivation suffered in
168. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 80, 85.
169. Id at 92 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 96-97 (White, J.,concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); id at 97 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id at 108 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
170. See notes 186-201 and accompanying text infra.
171. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See note 109 supra.
172. 435 U.S. at 97-108 (Marshall, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. See, e.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976) (applicant who
failed comprehensive examination twice and was not granted master's degree could not
claim violation of due process); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975) (a nurse
trainee possessed a property interest since she had paid a fee for education, but could not
claim due process violation when decision to dismiss was made in good faith and was not
arbitrary); Wright v. Texas S. Univ., 392 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1968) (colleges and universities
are not subject to judicial review of application of academic standards); Mustell v. Rose, 282
Ala. 358, 211 So. 2d 489, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 936 (1968) (school authorities have absolute
discretion to determine delinquency in studies); Bernard v. Inhabitants of Shelburne, 216
Mass. 19, 102 N.E. 1095 (1913) (a public hearing may be useless or harmful in finding out
the truth as to scholarship).
174. Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 87-90.
175. Id at 89-90.
176. Id
177. Id
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cases of academic dismissal is more severe than that sustained in disciplinary suspensions."' The magnitude of the effect of state action on a
private interest is one of the factors to be considered when assessing
what process is due.' 7 9 This factor was lightly treated by the majority
in Horowitz, however, which concluded that the "evaluative nature of
the inquiry and the significant and historically supported interest of the
school in preserving its present framework for academic evaluations"18 outweighed any right to a hearing under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The result of this reasoning is somewhat anomalous in
that fewer procedural safeguards are required when the deprivation is
more severe. The majority assumed a modicum of "good faith" inherent in school officials' academic judgments,' 8 ' an assumption challenged by Horowitz.' 8 2 The Court withheld approval of several lower
courts' dicta that academic dismissals might be reversed on substantive
due process grounds if they were shown to be arbitrary and capricious. 183 While agreeing with the district court that no showing of arbitrariness or capriciousness had been made in Horowitz's case,'8 4 the
Court implied that judicial review of the substantive aspects of aca85
demic dismissals would be improper.1
Justice Marshall, although agreeing with the majority's finding of
the adequacy of the process afforded Horowitz,' 86 criticized the majority's imprimatur of "far less stringent procedural requirements"'' 18 in
cases of academic dismissal than in disciplinary cases.'" He indicated
178. Id at 86 n.3.
179. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): "First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id at 335.

180. 435 U.S. at 86 n.3.
181.

See id at 91-92 & nn.6 & 7.

182. Id at 91. Horowitz alleged that her substantive rights were stolated in that more
stringent standards were applied to her performance because of her sex. religion and physi-

cal appearance. Id at 92 n.7. The circuit court did not consider Horowitz's substantive
claim, but ruled only that she had been denied adequate process. Id at 91.
183.

See, e.g., Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1976); Gaspar v.

Bruton, 513 F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975).
184. 435 U.S. at 92.
185.

Id

The Court noted that "[c]ourts are particularly ill-equipped to evaluate aca-

demic performance." The factors which limit procedural requirements in cases of academic
dismissal "speak afortior" to the substantive content of academic decision-making. id
186. Id at 97-108 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. Id. at 99.
188. Id at 97.
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his concern over the Court's resolution of an issue not presented by the
case; 189 this concern was echoed in the opinion of Justice Blackmun.190
Both justices believed that the case should have been resolved solely on
the basis of the demonstrated adequacy of the procedure utilized by the
school.
Since the majority decided what process is due in cases of academic dismissal, Justice Marshall spoke to the issue from this perspective. He rejected the Court's dichotomy between "conduct" and
"academic performance."' 9 1 Using the circumstances which comprised
192
Horowitz's allegedly defective clinical performance as an example,
he pointed out that there is considerable overlap between the two
terms.19 3 Moreover, he viewed the distinction as irrelevant and misfocused. The pertinent inquiry, according to Justice Marshall, should
be whether the disputed facts are susceptible of resolution by third
94
parties.
Applying the factors enumerated in Mathews v. Eldridge,195 Justice
Marshall arrived at a different assessment of their relative weight than
did the majority. First, he found that the interest involved in Horowitz
was a weighty one: the possible deprivation of "a way of life to which
[s]he ha[d] devoted years of preparation and on which [s]he. . . had
come to rely."' 19 6 Secondly, the risk of error in the assessment of
Horowitz's hygiene and clinical expertise was not, in Justice Marshall's
view, trivial.' 97 And finally, the university had no greater interest in
having a summary procedure than did the school administration in
Goss."'98 Given this balance of factors, Justice Marshall concluded that
an individual in Horowitz's position was entitled to more procedural
189. Id at 107-08. Justice Marshall quoted the warning of Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) against "anticipat[ing] a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it." 435 U.S. at 108.
190. 435 U.S. at 108-09 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
191. Id at 103-04 & n.18 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. Id Horowitz's performance was allegedly inadequate in the areas of personal hygiene, peer and patient relations and timeliness.
193. Id
194. Id at 104-05 & n.18.
195. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See note 179 supra.
196. 435 U.S. at 100 (quoting Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267,
1296-97 (1975)). Not only did Horowitz invest several years in medical training, but she had
an offer of employment at the University of North Carolina, contingent upon her obtaining
a Doctor of Medicine degree. Horowitz v. Board of Curators, 538 F.2d 1317, 1320 (8th Cir.
1976).
197. 435 U.S. at 101 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198. Id In Goss the petitioners were suspended for allegedly disruptive and disobedient
conduct, including damage to school property. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 569-70 (1975).
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protection than the "informal give-and-take" prescribed by Goss.' 9 9
Additional protection need not take the form of an adversarial hearing,
however; Justice Marshall emphasized that the "appeal" procedure afforded Horowitz may have been better than a formal hearing in that it
was tailored to resolve any unfairness or mistake in the assessment of
Horowitz's abilities."° Justice Marshall concluded that the proper
course would have been to remand the case for consideration of the
remaining issues, particularly Horowitz's substantive due process
claim.2 ° ' Justice Blackmun concurred on this point.20 2
The majority's deferential view toward academic judgment received strong support from Justice Powell. He regarded clinical competence, including hygiene and other personal matters, as a component
of academic performance, subject to the "widest range of discretion" in
faculty judgment.20 3 Voicing sharp disagreement with Justice Mar2 4
shall's analysis, Justice Powell saw no parallel with the facts of Goss.
Justice White filed a brief opinion in which he indicated agreement
with Justice Blackmun that the sufficiency of procedural due process
afforded Horowitz rendered consideration of whether she had a constitutionally protectable interest superfluous.20 5 He disagreed with the
majority's view that academic dismissals required no procedural
safeguards.20 6
III. Due Process Constraints on Creditor's Remedies
A. State Action
It is axiomatic that the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protections apply only to those deprivations of life, liberty or property
which are imposed by a governmental authority. 0 7 The task of determining whether such a deprivation has this requisite character is relaJustice Marshall reasoned that this type of conduct posed a greater threat to orderly school
administration than did Horowitz's conduct. 435 U.S. at 101.
199. Id
200. Id at 102.
201. Id at 107-08. In addition to the substantive due process claim, Horowitz contended
that the school had not followed its own dismissal rules. ld at 107 n.22.
202. Id at 108-09 (Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
203. Id at 93-94, 96 & n.6 (Powell, J., concurring).
204. Id at 94-95. Justice Powell considered the procedural protections of Goss to apply
only to cases of "personal behavior." Id
205. 1d at 96-97. (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
206. Id
207. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;.. ." (emphasis added).
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tively simple when state law explicitly confers a property interest, as in
statutes providing for teachers' tenure.2 °8 Where a property interest is
not expressly conferred, state involvement in the denial of benefits 20 9 or
in the transfer of property ownership 210 may still suffice to invoke the
Fourteenth Amendment protections. Even if the state has no involvement with the termination or denial of a private interest, under certain
circumstances financial connections between the state and a private entity,2 1' or a private entity's "public function" status, 212 may invoke
208. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). It should be noted, however, that recent decisions have rendered
the existence of a constitutionally protectable property interest difficult to ascertain, even
when a state law purports to create such an interest. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 343-47 (1976) (policeman classified as a "permanent employee" held to retain his position at the will and pleasure of his employer); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (statute which conferred a property interest in employment and also provided for no
pretermination hearing held not to violate due process).
209. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (California state constitutional
amendment repealing fair housing legislation and forbidding the passage of such legislation
in the future constitutes state approval of racial discrimination and thus violates equal protection); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant in a deed violates equal protection).
210. See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing," Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (state
garnishment procedure that authorized issuance of garnishment order by a clerk upon creditor's affidavit violates due process); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment
replevin procedure upon exparte application and posting of bond by creditor violates due
process); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (prejudgment garnishment of
wages upon filing of papers by creditor denies due process). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (exparte sequestration procedure under a vendor's lien does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment where the writ was issuable only by a judge on creditor's
affidavit and where provision was made for an immediate hearing and for damages for
wrongful levy).
211. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (racial discrimination by private restaurant violates equal protection where state ownership of building
which housed both the restaurant and a state parking lot created interdependence and conferred mutual benefits). See also note 236 infra.
212. The "public function" doctrine refers to the concept of a private entity's equivalence
to the state. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), the Court viewed ownership of an
entire town by a private company as tantamount to being a municipality for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes, including incorporation of the First Amendment. Marsh was followed in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968),
which held unconstitutional an injunction against union picketing of a store in a privately
owned shopping center. Logan Valley was distinguished into virtual oblivion, however, by
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and was overruled in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976).
A private entity, such as a utility, which is heavily regulated, regarded as a govermentally-protected monopoly, and which exhibits a sufficiently close nexus between the state
and its own actions may be subject to Fourteenth Amendment procedural requirements.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974). The status of a regulated
monopoly alone does not convert a' private utility's action into that of the state. Public
Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952). Where the private entity exercises

112
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Fourteenth Amendment protections. In general, this relationship is
more likely to be found when the issue is denial of equal protection or
First Amendment rights than when it is the denial of due process.2 13 In
any case, the elements necessary for a finding of state action are unpre-

dictable, as evidenced by the frequency with which the Court is confronted with the issue.2 14
In FlaggBrothers v. Brooks,21 5 the Court was faced with the question of whether a warehouseman's sale of goods entrusted to him for

storage, as authorized by New York's Uniform Commercial Code,2 16
could be termed "state action" so as to invoke procedural safeguards
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The goods in question had been

stored in the Flagg Brothers, Inc. warehouse after Brooks' eviction
from her apartment for nonpayment of rent; Brooks had agreed to

Flagg's services, though complaining of the high price. Two months
later, Brooks received notice that her belongings would be sold if she
did not bring her account up to date within ten days.2 1

She instituted

powers which were traditionally associated with the state, however, it may attain "public
function" status. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (municipal park); Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company town); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932)
(election). In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), the Court did not
require the observance of due process by a utility in terminating service because the threshold nexus between the state and the company's action was not established. The opinion
noted that, "Metropolitan was a heavily regulated, privately owned utility, enjoying at least
a partial monopoly in the providing of electrical service within its territory, and that it
elected to terminate service to petitioner in a manner which the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission found permissible under state law." Id. at 358. These factors were found
insufficient to connect the utility's action to the state.
213. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1061). Butsee Moose
Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Justice Marshall, dissenting in Jackson, see note 212
supra,pointed out that the majority's analysis could result in finding no constitutional violation if a utility refused to extend service to certain racial or other groups. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 373-74 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 19091 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. As noted in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723 (1961), the
distinction between private and state action frequently admits of no easy answer. The nature of the state's involvement may not be immediately obvious and may require detailed
inquiry.
215. 98 S.Ct. 1729 (1978).
216. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-210 (McKinney 1962) provides for enforcement of a warehouseman's lien and specifies the procedures to be followed. Similar provisions have been
adopted by a total of 49 states and the District of Columbia.
217. 98 S. Ct. at 1732. The circuit court opinion indicates that the city marshal who
evicted Brooks told her she could not call someone to store her belongings, but that Flagg
Bros. would do so. Brooks, apparently believing she had no choice, agreed to pay Flagg $65
per month for moving and storage. After her goods had been placed on the Flagg truck on
June 13, she was told she must pay a total of $178 in various charges. She protested, but
paid. Two days later, she was informed that she owed an additional $156 and, subsequently,
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a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983218 seeking damages, an injunction
against the threatened sale, and a declaration that such sales violate
due process and equal protection. 219 The district court dismissed the
case on the grounds that the action taken by Flagg Brothers could not
properly be attributed to the state, and so did not have to conform to
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 1 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the New
York code provision giving power to warehousemen to enforce liens by
selling stored goods after notice, but without judicial determination of
the amounts owing prior to the sale, rendered that action "under color
of state law."' 221 The court reasoned that by virtue of enacting the applicable Uniform Commercial Code section, the state had delegated its
sovereign power over binding conflict resolution to warehousemen and
had permitted the latter to assume a traditional state function, that of
executing liens.2 22 This involvement in the challenged activity was
found sufficient to constitute state action and to invoke the procedural
safeguards of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, examined the various theories upon which a finding of state
action might have been based and found that the connection between
Flagg Brothers' action and the state did not meet the requisites of any
theory. He set forth two prerequisites for a claim under section 1983:
(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws
223
of the United States; and (2) action taken under color of state law.
In Justice Rehnquist's view, the test for determining whether a constitutionally protected right has been infringed differs from that employed
to determine whether an action has been taken under color of state
law. 224 Moreover, merely acting under the authority of a statute is not
sufficient for state action; it is necessary to prove that the actions are
that another $75 would be due on July 1. On August 25, Brooks received notice that her
goods would be sold unless she paid $306 within 10 days. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d
764, 766-67 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 98 S.Ct. 1729 (1978).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See note 108 supra. Brooks was joined by named plaintiff
Jones whose goods had been stored by Flagg Bros. following eviction. The American Warehousemen's Association, the International Association of Refrigerated Warehouses, Inc. and
the New York Attorney General moved to intervene as defendants. 98 S.Ct. at 1732.
219. 98 S.Ct. at 1732.
220. Id

221. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d 764, 774 (2nd Cir. 1977), rev'd, 98 S.Ct. 1729
(1978). The court found that the "under color of state law" provision of § 1983 was
equivalent to the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 766 & n.2.
222. Id at 771.
223. 98 S.Ct. at 1733 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970)).
224. Id It is essential that a private entity act with knowledge of and pursuant to a
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properly attributable to the state.22 5 State permission for private action, even though embodied in statutory form, does not necessarily involve the state to an extent sufficient to require Fourteenth Amendment
protections. Only actual statutory compulsion suffices to implicate the
state in private actions which deprive individuals of their property.2 2 6
In contrast, compulsion through the direct involvement of a state official would satisfy both prerequisites to a section 1983 action.2 27 Absent
statutory compulsion or actual participation of a government official in
the deprivation, only the presence of narrowly drawn criteria will permit the attribution of private action to the state.
The Flagg majority found that the remedy afforded warehousemen under New York law did not fall within the limited parameters of
the "public function" doctrine.2 2 8 Justice Rehnquist delineated two
main branches of this theory: election 229 and municipal function
cases. 230 The common denominator of the two lines of cases was found
to be the exclusive nature of each function. 23 1 Thus, if the power delegated to Flagg Brothers could be viewed as traditionally the exclusive
statute to satisfy the "under color of state law" requirement of § 1983. Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 162 n.23 (1970).
225. 98 S. Ct. at 1733. In contrast, the Second Circuit Court of Xppeals viewed the
"under color of state law" requirement of § 1983 as equivalent to the state action prerequisite of the Fourteenth Amendment. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d at 7c6 n.2. Other courts
have also treated the two concepts as virtually synonymous. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey,
387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966); Culbertson v.
Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975); Palmer v. Columbia Gas, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973);
Tedeschi v. Blackwood, 410 F. Supp. 34 (D. Conn. 1976); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183
(S.D. Fla. 1972).
226. 98 S. Ct. at 1738. Justice Rehmquist's permission-compulsion distinction was severely criticized in Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. He noted that the majority's reliance
on Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) to support the distinction was misplaced since
"[e]ven Moose Lodge . . . recognize[d] that there are many intervening levels of state involvement in private conduct." Id at 1741 & n.4 (Stevens, J., joined bx White & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting). See also Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich.
1974). But see Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. ds-nied, 420 U.S. 934
(1975); James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
227. 98 S. Ct. at 1734 & n.5.
228. See note 212 supra.
229. 98 S. Ct. at 1734. Under this line of cases, state action is present in state-regulated
elections or elections which, in practice, produce the uncontested choice of public officials.
See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). Justice Rehnquist obliquely challenged the basis of
these holdings, stating their rationale "may be subject to some dispute." 98 S. Ct. at 1734 &
n.6.
230. 98 S. Ct. at 1734-35. The municipal function cases are now restricted to situations
where a private entity has assumed all the attributes of a municipality, ie. is the "functional
equivalent" of a municipality. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
231. 98 S. Ct. at 1735-36.
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prerogative of the state, state action might be found present. In distinguishing Fiaggfrom the two branches of the public function doctrine,
Justice Rehnquist noted that other methods of dispute settlement remained open to Brooks, whereas all other options were precluded in
election and municipal function cases.2 32 In any case, the settlement of
disputes between creditors and debtors was found not to be a power or
duty exclusively reserved to the sovereign. 233 The majority saw this
area as fundamentally private, arising out of the traditional remedy of
self-help, though modified and authorized by statute.2 34 It declined to
broaden the concept of state action to encompass what it considered to
be a facet of property law.23 5
The Court reaffirmed the validity of prior decisions which invalidated on equal protection grounds state and municipal programs benefiting private schools which practiced racial discrimination.2 3 6 As
noted in Norwood v. Harrison,237 "A state may not grant the type of
tangible financial aid here involved if that aid has a significant ten23
dency to facilitate, reinforce and support private discrimination. 1
No financial aid was involved in Flagg, however, even though the
"benefit" conferred upon warehousemen by virtue of state acquieseffect in facilitatcence in execution of liens may have the same general
239
ing unfair and arbitrary deprivations of property.
Justice Stevens, dissenting, rejected the dichotomy perceived by
the majority between action taken under color of state law and action
232. Id Among Brooks' and Jones' options, according to the majority, were: (I) seeking
a waiver of Flagg Brothers' right to sell the goods at the time they agreed to the storage, (2)
replevin in cases of unauthorized storage, and (3) seeking damages for any violations of New
York Uniform Commercial Code § 7-210. Justice Marshall presented a cogent counterargument to the perceived availability of the second option. See note 259 and accompanying
text infra.
233. 98 S. Ct. at 1735-36.
234. Id at 1737 n.12.
235. Id at 1735-36 n.10.
236. E.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (upholding.injunction
against exclusive access to city recreational facilities by segregated private schools and affiliates); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (invalidating state program which loaned
textbooks to students regardless of whether students attended schools with racially discriminatory policies).
237. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
238. Id at 466.
239. Some courts have indicated reluctance to analyze the presence of state action in due
process claims with the same degree of diligence they would employ in racially-based equal
protection claims. See, e.g., James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974); Parks v. "Mr.
Ford," 386 F. Supp. 1251, 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1974), affdin part andrev'd in part, 556 F.2d 132
(3d Gir. 1977). See note 213 and accompanying text supra.
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depriving an individual of a right protected under the Constitution.2 4 °
In his view, the issue was whether "a state statute which authorizes a

private party to deprive a person of his property without his consent
must meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 24 1 The same test of state involvement should apply to a section 1983 claim as to a Fourteenth Amendment violation.2 4 2
The paramount consideration of whether due process constrictions

should apply was, in Justice Stevens' opinion, generally "whether the
State has delegated a function traditionally and historically associated
with sovereignty."2 4 3 As applied to the instant case, the question
turned on "the significance of the States' role in defining and
controlling the debtor-creditor relationship."'2 " The rationale for this
24
view was found in cases dealing with debtor-creditor relationships.

Justice Stevens found the majority's attempt to distinguish these cases
of overt official involvement in the deprivation of property
on the basis
"baffling." 246 The finding of state action there was predicated on a lack
.of state control over the resolution of commercial disputes, not on the
"purely ministerial" actions of "minor governmental functionaries."'2 4 7
To adopt the majority's interpretation of the basis for such cases 24as9
North GeorgiaFinishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,248 Fueztes v.Shevin
and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.25 ° would, in Justice Stevens'
opinion, invert the requirements for state action. It would actually ex-

pand the reach of state action in many cases by imbuing private acts
with official significance merely because a state official performed some
ministerial function. 2 ' By the same token, to deny state action where
240. 98 S. Ct. at 1741, 1744 n.14. (Stevens, J., joined by White & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens indicated that it would be proper to analyze the requirements separately in cases where the private entity deviated from statutory requirements, for in that
case, the action taken would not be under color of state law. Id at 1744 n.14. See note 254
and accompanying text infra.
241. 98 S.Ct. at 1740.
242. See note 240 and accompanying text supra.
243. 98 S.Ct. at 1741 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353
(1974); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)).
244. Id at 1743 (emphasis in the original).
245. Id (citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)). See note 210 and
accompanying text supra.
246. 98 S.Ct. at 1742.
247. 98 S.Ct. at 1742. In North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975), a court clerk issued a writ authorizing the garnishment of property. A sheriff participated in the replevin of property in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
248. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
249. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
250. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
251. 98 S.Ct. at 1743. Justice Stevens cited ministerial functions in connection with the

Fall 19781

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

even "mechanical supervision" over private nonconsensual resolution
of disputes was lacking would controvert the clear intent of Fuentes
and North GeorgiaFinishing,Inc.2 52 These cases were directed at curbing the private use of state power to achieve nonconsensual conflict
resolution. Where a statute authorizes such a private exercise of state
power, Justice Stevens reasoned that the constitutionality of the process
is reviewable in a section 1983 action.2 53 If, however, the deprivation
of property is not undertaken pursuant to statute, the private entity
would not be acting under color of state law and a section 1983 action
would not lie.25 4 In Justice Stevens' opinion, the nature of the delegated power should be the determinant of whether state action is present rather than whether the power is exclusively public.2 55 The
sovereign power to order binding conflict resolution is part of the
25 6
"framework of rules" which govern our commercial transactions;
consequently, the concept of a fair and ordered society requires that
this power be exercised responsibly, in observance of constitutional
restrictions.2 57
Although joining Justice Stevens' opinion, Justice Marshall wrote
a separate dissent decrying the Court's "callous indifference to the realities of life for the poor." 258 He noted that although alternative means
of resolving conflicts over stored property exist, in practicality the option of replevin is not available to indigents. 25 9 The due process retransfer of motor vehicle or real estate ownership as examples of the "legion" number of
such situations. Id & n.12.
252. Id at 1743.
253. Id at 1744.
254. Id & n. 14. See note 240 supra.
255. Id at 1744.
256. Id at 1745 (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, 416 U.S. 600, 624 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
257. Id In a footnote, Justice Stevens quoted Justice Harlan's explanation of this principle appearing in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). 98 S.Ct. at 1744 n.17. In the
context of resolution of marital disputes through divorce, Justice Harlan noted, "It is to
courts, or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for the implementation
of a regularized, orderly process of dispute settlement. Within this framework, those who
wrote our original Constitution. . .recognized the centrality of the concept of due process
in the operation of this system. Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his
rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State's monopoly over
techniques for binding conflict resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable under our
scheme of things." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 375.
258. 98 S.Ct. at 1739 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also emphasized the
importance of historical tradition in determining whether a challenged action could be attributed to the state. He cited numerous instances in which execution of a lien had been
held the traditional function of state officials. This led him to conclude that the majority's
approach departed from historical precedent. Id
259. Id Plaintiff Jones alleged that she had not authorized Flagg Brothers to store her
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quirements of notice and hearing are directed toward avoiding
mistaken or arbitrary deprivations of protected interests. If an individual had not authorized storage of goods, a hearing would be likely to
uncover that fact and provide for return of the possessions. In situations such as Brooks', however, where the storage was authorized, additional process may not avoid forced sale if a contract which describes in
260
full all liabilities which the storing party may incur has been signed.
Under such circumstances, some courts have held that the authority for
seizure of property is the private contract, not the existing state statute,
and that the seizure is therefore not under color of state law.26 1 In fact,
the district court opinion in Brooks went even further, approving enforcement of statutory liens where the parties' contract made no provision for sale, on the grounds that the statute permitted, but did not
2 62
compel, the seizure of property.
The Supreme Court's decision in Flagg suggests a general narrowing of the concept of state action, but little clarification of the circumstances that will support a section 1983 action. 63 The Court did refer
to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' reasoning in Melara v.
Kennedy,2" which held that the execution of a warehouseman's lien
was not state action. Melaranoted several important factors which dictated against a finding of state action in the relationship between warehousemen and debtors: (1) the relationship between the property
involved and the underlying debt;26 5 (2) the existence of a contract
possessions. The majority opinion noted that she could "replevy her goods at any time
under state law." Id at 1735. Justice Marshall pointed out that New York law required an
individual seeking replevin to post an undertaking from a surety for not less than twice the
value of the goods. A surety would demand a substantial advance payment and assurance
of the debtor's ability to pay any judgment awarded, neither of which could be produced by
an indigent who had just been evicted from her apartment. In reality, then, Jones had no
choice but to allow Flagg Brothers to keep the goods. Id at 1739.
260. The circuit court noted, however, that Brooks was not apprised of full charges and

the possibility of sale of the goods upon default until six days after the initial storage when
she received a "Combined Uniform Household Goods Bill of Lading and Freight Bill."

Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d at 767 & n.3.
261.

See, e.g., Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1976); Barrera v. Security

Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975); Fletcher v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Nat'l Bank, 496 F.2d 927 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1001 (1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l
Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2nd Cir.), cer. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974).

262. Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 404 F. Supp. 1059 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aid, 98 S. Ct. 1729
(1978).
263. See notes 240-57 and accompanying text supra.
264. 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976). Melara was factually similar to Flagg and upheld
CAL. COM. CODE § 7210 (West 1977), the counterpart to the New York statute challenged in
Flagg.
265. Id at 807. The Melara court found that the statute had not granted private individuals the "power to exercise a roving commission to satisfy an unrelated debt." Id It viewed
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which provided notice to the debtor of the creditor's potential exercise
of his legal rights;26 6 and (3) enforcement of the lien by peaceful means,
without resort to entry into another's home.26 7 Insofar as the Court did
not disagree with Melara, these considerations may give some guidance
in analyzing the presence of state action in the resolution of
debtor-creditor disputes. The concept of state action after Flagg,however, remains elusive.
B. Proper Notice
The presence of state action was not at issue in Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Division v. Craft,2 68 having been resolved in the affirmative by
the circuit court of appeals and not challenged by the utility before the
Supreme Court.2 69 The circuit court found that Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.270 did not control because Metropolitan Edison was privately owned and operated. In contrast, municipal ownership and control of Memphis Light, Gas & Water (MLG&W) rendered its actions
attributable to the state.2 7 1
The Court did, however, analyze the claim of entitlement to continued utility service advanced by the Crafts to determine whether it
was "property" protected by the due process clause. 72 Since Tennessee
law permitted termination of service only for cause, such as nonpayment of a just service bill, a customer who disputed the amount owed
could assert a legitimate claim of entitlement, provided he tendered any
undisputed amounts.2 73 Having concluded that the Crafts had satisfied
the threshold requirements for a suit under section 1983,274 the Court
turned to a consideration of what process is due in cases of disputed
charges for utility service.
a warehouseman's interest in stored property to be similar to the interest retained by a conditional seller of goods.
266. Id
267. Id at 807-08. Since the stored goods are already in the physical possession of the
warehouseman, their sale involves no seizure or entry into the home.
268. 98 S. Ct. 1554 (1978).
269. Id at 1559 & n.6.
270. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See note 212 supra.
271. Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. (MLG&W), 534 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir.
1976), af'd,98 S. Ct. 1554 (1978).
272. Property interests are created and defined by sources independent of the Constitution, such as state law or contract. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See
note 208 supra.
273. 98 S. Ct. at 1560-61 & nn.9-11. The Court noted that "the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of 'property'. . . has never been interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership." Id at 1561 (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972)).
274. See notes 223-25 and accompanying text supra.
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The Crafts' billing dispute arose when they moved into what had
previously been a duplex with two separate gas and electric meters.
Confusion ensued over double billings despite the Crafts' attempts to
consolidate the meters and their good faith efforts to resolve the problem with MLG&W. The Crafts' attempts to reach an understanding
with MLG&W were unavailing and their service was disconnected five
times.27 5 The bills sent to the Crafts had stated only that their payment
was overdue and that service would be discontinued if payment was
not received by a specified date.27 6
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's ruling that the due
process clause required that termination notices inform the customer of
the existence of a procedure for challenging a disputed bill and that
there be an established procedure for resolution of such disputes.27 7
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, relied on Mullane i'. CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co.2 78 for the proposition that notice must be reasonably calculated to inform interested parties of the action and to
afford them an opportunity to object.2 79 Although the Crafts were informed of the pending termination of service in time to avert it by paying the bill, the notice was held to be defective in that it did not advise
them of the existence of a procedure for contesting the charges.2 8 0
Justice Stevens, dissenting, disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Mullane. In his view, to "afford [interested parties] an oppor275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

98 S. Ct. at 1558.
Id at 1562.
Id at 1567.
339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Id at 314.
98 S. Ct. at 1563. The Court analyzed the case within the framework established in

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Under the balancing approach outlined there, id
at 334-35, the Court found that the customer's interest was substantial, given the necessity of

utility service; that the risk of an erroneous deprivation was not insubstantial, due to the
reliance on computers; and that the utility's interests were not incompatible with affording a
pre-termination hearing, based on its own business interests in producing satisfactory service. MLG&W v. Craft, 98 S.Ct. at 1564-65. The Court concluded that the provision of
"some kind of hearing" would not prove burdensome. Id at 1565.
The majority considered appropriate notice to include provisions of where, during
which hours of the day, and before whom disputed bills could be discussed. This informa-

tion should be included in cut-off notices. Id at 1563 n.15.
The Court also rejected the utility's claim that the available common law remedies of a
pre-termination injunction, a post-termination suit for damages, and a post-payment action
for a refund were sufficient to cure any defect in its procedures. Id at 1566. Noting that

"[Wudicial remedies are particularly unsuited to the resolution of factual disputes typically
involving sums of money too small to justify engaging counsel or bringing a lawsuit," the
Court found the proffered alternatives to be inadequate. Id at 1566. The majority con-

cluded that "an informal administrative remedy
Id

. . .

constitutes the process that is 'due.'"
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tunity to present their objections" 28 ' meant only that notice be given in
time for a party to defend.28 2 He rejected the "paternalistic" assumption that a customer should be "told how to complain about an error in
a utility bill. ' 283 Where deprivation of property must be preceded by a
formal hearing, notice must include the time and place for the hearing. 284 Since, however, the majority had expressly recognized that all
that was necessary in the instant case was an opportunity to meet with a
"responsible employee empowered to resolve the dispute, ' 28 5 this re-

quirement was, in his opinion, inapplicable.
The facts in Craft are unclear as to exactly what procedure was
followed by MLG&W in cases of disputed charges, and whether the
procedure which existed was made available to the Crafts.286 As
pointed out by Justice Stevens, it may even be that the Crafts were
afforded exactly the type of process prescribed by the Court.28 7 Nevertheless, the Court reiterated the balancing test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge288 to determine what process was due in this case. It found
that consumers possess a substantial interest in the continuance of essential services2 89 and that considerable risk of erroneous deprivation
exists.2 9 Justice Powell viewed the requirement of "some administra281. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
282. 98 S. Ct. at 1568 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 1569.
284. Id
285. Id. at 1565.
286. The district court explained the MLG&W procedures for resolution of disputed
bills: "'Credit counselors assist customers who have difficulty with payments or disputes
concerning their bills with MLG&W. If these counselors cannot satisfy the customer, then
the customer is referred to management personnel; generally the chief clerk in the department; then the supervisor in credit and collection. In addition, a dissatisfied customer may
appeal to the Board of Commissioners of MLG&W as to complaints regarding bills, service,
termination of service or any other matter relating to the operation of the Division.'" Id at
1558 n.4.
Despite the existence of the dispute resolution procedure, the majority found that the
opportunity to talk with management was never adequately explained to Mrs. Craft on the
numerous occasions she visited MLG&W's offices to protest double billing. Id at 1558. In
contrast, the dissenters found that Mrs. Craft did meet with employees of the utility empowered to resolve the dispute. Id at 1568 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
287. Id at 1568 n.7. Justice Stevens pointed out that "[t]he Due Process Clause does not
guarantee a correct or a courteous resolution of every dispute." Id
288. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). See note 280 supra.
289. 98 S. Ct. at 1564. The majority noted that deprivation of heat or water for even a
short period of time may threaten health and safety, working a "uniquely final deprivation."
Id Cf.Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647-48 (1972).
290. 98 S.Ct. at 1564-65. Justice Powell acknowledged the fallibility of computers and
the concomitant risk of an erroneous deprivation of service.
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tive procedure for entertaining customer complaints"2 9 as compatible
with the utility's interests in maintaining customer goodwill and avoiding injury.2 92 Given the lbosely structured mandate of the Court, it
appears that the rmajority was merely reaffirming what- is the general
practice of utilities. According to common law and Tennessee decisional law, a utility which terminates a customer's service for nonpayment of a disputed bill runs the risk of liability for damages if the
customer is proven correct. 293 The fact that the Craft majority felt it
necessary to require the establishment of a dispute resolution procedure may indicate its underlying concern that those who were most

likely to suffer termination of utility services would probably not be
aware of the existence of such a remedy. 294 Even if a customer was
aware of the availability of damages for wrongful termination, the
Court recognized the impracticability of instituting a suit for the small
sums involved.

295

The dissenters viewed the damage remedy as the most effective
deterrent against erroneous termination of utility service. 2 96 They also
made the well-taken point that "U]ust what. . . additional procedural
'297
safeguards are constitutionally required is most difficult to discern.
This was particularly apt in view of the circuit court's reliance on its
291. Id at 1564.
292. Id at 1565. He pointed out that the limited procedures recommended by the Court
should not prove burdensome to the utility.
293. At common law, both private utilities and municipalities retained the privilege of
terminating service for nonpayment ofjust charges. See, e.g., Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v.
Young, 116 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1940); Schultz v. Town of Lakeport, 5 Cal. 2d 377, 54 P.2d
1110 (1936). The privilege is subject to an exception or qualification when a bonafide dispute exists, however. A public service company which terminates service is liable for compensatory and, in some cases, punitive damages if the consumer proves to have been correct.
See, e.g., Sims v. Alabama Water Co., 205 Ala. 378, 380, 87 So. 688, 690 (1920).
Consumers who wish to retain service while the dispute is being resolved may pay the
disputed charges and sue for recovery or, in some jurisdictions, obtain an injunction against
discontinuance or a writ of mandamus to compel restoration of service. Sims v. Alabama
Water Co., 205 Ala. 378, 87 So. 688 (1920).
294. Justice Powell viewed the common law remedies, see note 293 .szpra, as inadequate
substitutes for pre-termination review of a disputed bill. 98 S.Ct. at 1566. See note 280
supra. The remedies of injunctive relief or recovery of overpayments are themselves
bounded by procedural requirements, delay, and burdensome, though temporary, additional
expense. 98 S.Ct. at 1566.
295. 98 S.Ct. at 1566. This same impracticability, as applied to a utility's remedies for
nonpayment, underlies the privilege to terminate service. Id at 1566 n.27.
296. Id at 1570 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J.,dissenting). The
dissenters intimated that the procedures suggested by the majority lacked the force that the
damage threat supplied in insuring "careful attention to genuine customer disputes." _d
297. Id at 1569 (footnote omitted).
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holding in Palmer v. Columbia Gas,29 which had required stringent
procedures for termination of utility service. 99 Though affirming the
circuit court's holding, the majority in Craft did not mandate the procedures specified- in Palmer.3"'
The dissent closed on a somewhat provocative note. Justice Stevens stated, "I do not believe the Constitution requires the State to em-

ploy procedures that are so simple that every lay person can always act
effectively without the assistance of counsel." ''

Given the expense of

retaining counsel, however, it can be questioned whether safeguarding
the continuance of a necessity of life such as utility service should de-

pend on one's ability to pay attorneys' fees.
IV. Jurisdiction
A.

Minimum Contacts
Ever since the Supreme Court decided Pennoyer v. Neff in 1877,302

298. 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973). Palmer involved a billing procedure by which the
charge for several months was based on computer-estimated usage. When the meter was
periodically read, the difference between actual usage and the estimate sometimes amounted
to a considerable sum. Consumers who did not pay two consecutive monthly bills were
given a shut-off notice. Five days after such notice, service was terminated if no payment
had been received. Due to the company's inefficiency, significant mistakes were frequently
made, such as mistaken termination of service to consumers who had already paid. The
Palmerrecord also indicated a "shockingly callous and impersonal attitude upon the part of
[the company], which relied uncritically upon its computer." Id at 158.
299. Id at 159-60, 166-69. Palmer required personal delivery of cutoffnotices or delivery
by certified mail, return receipt requested. The notice must specify available credit programs and dispute-resolving mechanisms. A pre-termination hearing must be held, conducted by an employee in a management position.
300. One obvious difference between Palmer and Craft is that Craft merely required that
a customer disputing a bill be afforded an opportunity to meet with "designated" employees
who were authorized to review disputed bills. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft,
98 S. Ct. at 1562 n.13. In Palmer,the court required management intervention in the resolution of disputes because clerks, who also performed a collection function, were "hostile,
arrogant, and unyielding." Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d at 168.
301. 98 S. Ct. at 1571 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Apparently, Justice Stevens regarded the Crafts' predicament as a rare and trivial occurrence, unworthy of constitutional inquiry. He noted that MLG&W processed more than
30,000 complaints of excess charges each year, most of which were, presumably, satisfactorily resolved. Id. at 1569. If a customer failed to gain such a resolution and a sufficient
emergency existed, he would be amply motivated to consult counsel or file suit. Id at 1570.
With an attitude reminiscent of that of Marie Antoinette, he remarked, "A potential loss of
utility service sufficiently grievous to qualify as a constitutional deprivation can hardly be
too petty to justify invoking the aid of counsel or the judiciary." Id
302. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer established, inter ala, the concept of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction. By attaching a non-resident defendant's property located in the forum state, a
court of that state can assume jurisdiction over the defendant to adjudicate his rights in the
property. Id at 723. This form ofjurisdiction is based on notions of traditional state power
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the circumstances which justify a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over a defendant have been a source of contention. °3 Despite
some expansion of Pennoyer's concept of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction in
early cases such as Harrisv. Balk,3°4 that doctrine has been subject to
criticism over the years.3 °5 Last term, in Shaffer v. Heitner,3 °6 the Court
greatly restricted quasi-in-rem jurisdiction by requiring more than the
mere "statutory presence of [defendants'] property" within a state to
confer jurisdiction. 30 7 The Court held the appropriate test for jurisdiction to be the "minimum contacts" standard of nternationalShoe Co. v.
Washington.30 8 This standard requires case-by-case analyses of the
factors which influence the "fundamental fairness" of asserting jurisdiction over a defendant:
over persons and property within its borders. Id at 722-23. Thus, quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
gives a court the power to resolve personal disputes because of its power over the property,
even though that property is unrelated to the claim being litigated. A judgment based on
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction may not exceed the value of the attached property, however, and
adequate notice to the non-resident defendant is essential for assumption of quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction. Id at 730-32.
303. Compare Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); with Atkinson v. Superior Court,
49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958); also, compare Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) with
Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
304. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). The Court in Harrisheld that the situs of a debt is that of the
debtor. Personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant could therefore be obtained by
garnishing a debt owed to the defendant while the debtor was in the forum state, even
though temporarily. See also Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y. 2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d
99 (1966) (attachment of insurance company's contractual promise to defend its insured conferred jurisdiction over non-resident).
305. See, e.g., Hazard, A GeneralTheory ofState-CourtJurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv.
241; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdictionto Adjudicate: A SuggestedArJrsis,79 HARV. L.
REV. 1121 (1966).
306. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
307. Id at 213. Shaffer was a shareholder's derivative suit filed in Delaware against the
Greyhound Corporation, its subsidiary Greyhound Lines, and 28 present or former officers
or directors. Neither the plaintiff nor any defendant resided in Delaware, but jurisdiction
over the defendants was asserted based on a statute which established Delaware as the situs
of ownership of stock in companies, such as Greyhound, incorporated m Delaware. DEL.
CODE tit. 8, § 169. The stock owned by defendants was sequestered, even though the certificates were not located in Delaware, thus conferring quasi-in-rem jurisdiction on the Delaware court. The Supreme Court held the asserted jurisdiction unconstitutional because the
stock was neither the subject matter of the litigation nor related to the underlying cause of
action. The Court stated that, "[the fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is
anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient
form without substantial modern justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to
allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant." 433 U.S. at
212. The Court therefore concluded that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must meet
the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Id See general notes 308-09 and accompanying text infra.
308. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Whether due process is satisfied must depend. . . upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure. That clause does not contemplate that a
state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant
with which the state has no con30 9
tacts, ties, or relations.
Some situations which have been held to establish "minimum contacts" are: a cause of action arising from an act done or transaction
consummated in the forum state; 3 10 a contract which has a substantial
connection with the forum state;3 11 derivation of substantial economic
benefit from the sale and use of one's products in the forum state;31 2 or
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws.31 3 Although the viability of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction may be limited after Shaffer, the presence of
property within the forum state may properly be viewed as one of the
contacts. It appears clear, however, that the mechanical assertion of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, as in cases such as Harris v. Balk,3 14 is no
longer constitutional. Rather, each case must be analyzed to determine
whether the requisite contacts are present.
The Court's latest decision on the subject of minimum contacts,
rendered in Kulko v. Superior Court,3 15 further limits state courts' assertions of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants who have little, if
any, connection with the forum state. Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, reversed the judgment of the California Supreme Court and
ruled that, under the facts of the case, the exercise of personal jurisdiction would violate due process.
309. Id at 319.
310. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E. 2d 761 (1961) (jurisdiction over foreign corporation held proper where cause of action
arose from defendant's negligence in manufacturing a water heater which exploded in the
forum state).
311. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (foreign insurance company subject to suit in state where its contract was s6licited and delivered to
insured).
312. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1951) (defendant
Philippine corporation could be sued in Ohio on a cause of action unrelated to the state by a
non-resident plaintiff based on the corporation's continuous and systematic business within
Ohio).
313. But cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (trustee had no purposeful affiliation with state of decedent's domicile and so could not be subjected to the jurisdiction of the
state's courts).
314. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). See note 304 supra.
315. 98 S.Ct. 1690 (1978).
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Ezra Kulko challenged California's assertion of jurisdiction in an
action to increase his child support obligation. His only personal contacts with California were brief and had occurred years before his exwife moved to San Francisco.3" 6 Their separation agreement had been
drawn up and signed in New York, and the divorce was procured in
Haiti. The separation agreement provided that Kulko would retain
custody of his two children during the school year, but that they would
31 7
spend holidays and summers with their mother. Sharon Kulko Horn
was to receive $3,000 per year as child support to cover the periods
when the children were in her custody. After a year, the Kulkos'
daughter decided to reside in California with her mother, and Kulko
bought her a one-way plane ticket. Two years later, the other child
telephoned his mother expressing the same desire;318 thereupon Horn
sent him a plane ticket without consulting Kulko. Horn reasoned that
the child support payments had become inadequate to provide for the
expanded time during which she was responsible for the children's
care. She therefore petitioned to establish the Haitian divorce decree as
a California judgment, to modify the judgment so as to award her full
custody of the children, and to increase Kulko's child support obligation.3 19 Kulko moved to quash service, which motion was denied by
the trial court. The court of appeals affirmed 32 ° on the basis of its interpretation of California's jurisdictional statute, which provides: "A court
of this State may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with
the Constitution of this state or of the United States." 21 This statute
has been interpreted to confer personal jurisdiction on a court when the
defendant has caused an effect in the state by an act or omission which
occurs elsewhere.3 2 2 The court reasoned that by allowing his children
316. Id at 1694. The Kulkos were married in California in 1959 during a three-day stay.
Both parties were domiciled in and residents of New York State. After the separation in
1972, Sharon Kulko moved to San Francisco.
317. Sharon Kulko remarried shortly after the divorce. Id She will hereinafter be referred to as "Horn."
318. Noted by the California Supreme Court but not considered by Justice Marshall was
the fact that Kulko's son telephoned his mother stating that he was in trouble, that his father
did not want him, and that he wished to live in San Francisco with hi\ mother. Kulko v.
Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 520, 564 P.2d 353, 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586, 591 (1977), rev'd,
98 S.Ct. 1690 (1978).
319. 98 S.Ct. at 1695.
320. Kulko v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1976), af'd, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d
353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977), rev'd, 98 S.Ct. 1690 (1978). Kulko did not contest the court's
jurisdiction over the determination of custody, but only over the claim for increased support.
Id
321. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
322. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Quattrone v.
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to reside in California, Kulko had caused the effect of a direct financial
burden on Horn for increased support costs. It held that he should
therefore be amenable to suit in the state.32 3
The California Supreme Court affirmed, 324 but drew a distinction
between Kulko's affirmative involvement in his daughter's move to
California and his passive acquiescence in his son's change of residence. In the view of the California Supreme Court, by sending his
daughter to California, Kulko purposefully availed himself of the ben-

efits and protections of California's laws and derived an economic benefit from his acts since he was no longer primarily responsible for the
child's welfare. 325 Having thus "caused an effect" in the state, Kulko

was subject to California's jurisdiction for increased support payments
for both children. 326 The court, though noting the important policy
considerations implicit in assertions of jurisdiction over non-resident
parents of children domiciled in the state, considered it reasonable to
exercise jurisdiction over Kulko.32 7
Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 296, 303, 118 Cal. Rptr. 548, 554 (1975) (conspiratorial
conduct out of state resulting in stock issuance).
323. Kulko v. Superior Court, 133 Cal. Rptr. 627, 628 (1976), affid, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564
P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977), rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978). The appellate court noted
that Kulko had offered in a letter to renegotiate the support agreement "in as much as it is
invalidated." Id
324. Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977),
rev'd, 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978).
325. Id at 522-25, 564 P.2d at 356-58, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589-91.
326. Id at 521, 564 P.2d at 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
327. Id. at 522-24, 564 P.2d at 356-58, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589-91. The California court
discussed two lower court opinions in which strong public policies were noted. In Titus v.
Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 792, 100 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1972), a father domiciled in Massachusetts sent his children to visit their mother in California for the summer, pursuant to a
written custody agreement. The court pointed out that permitting California to assume jurisdiction over the non-resident father on the basis of his acts of sending the children to that
state for visits would discourage fathers from entering into and observing visitation agreements. The strong policy of encouraging visitation of children with their parents would thus
be thwarted. Id at 803, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 485. Similarly, in Judd v. Superior Court, 60 Cal.
App. 3d 38, 131 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1976), a non-resident father who visited his children in
California, where they lived with their mother, and who sent the mother spousal and child
support, was able to quash service since he had never had custody of the children nor had he
sent them to California. The policy enunciated in Judd was to encourage the payment of
support and communication between a father and his children. 1d at 45, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
249.
The California Supreme Court's willingness to affirm the assertion of jurisdiction over
Kulko is somewhat inconsistent with its issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate a year
earlier in Sibley v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 442, 546 P.2d 322, 128 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1976). In
Sibley, jurisdiction over a non-resident guarantor of an obligation executed, delivered and
payable in California was held unjustified because the guarantor's relationship to California
and the effects thereby caused in California were adjudged insufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon California courts. Id at 448-49, 546 P.2d at 326, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
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The United States Supreme Court reviewed the factual basis of
California's assertion of jurisdiction and found that the "mere act of
sending a child to California to live with her mother is not a commercial act and connotes no intent to obtain nor expectancy of receiving a
corresponding benefit in the State that would make fair the assertion of
that State's judicial jurisdiction."3'2 8 The fact that Horn could have petitioned in California to increase Kulko's support obligation through
the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968329
weighed heavily in the Court's opinion. 3 30 The Act provides that such
petitions may be adjudicated on their merits in the alleged obligor's
forum, so that neither party need leave his or her own state. The Act
also provides for enforcement of support decrees. Horn's argument
that California had a substantial interest in protecting the welfare of
children within its borders was thus undercut by the Court's reliance on
the Act. The Court viewed California's participation in the Act as ensuring that the state's interest in the welfare and continued support of
resident children was met. 33
The Court criticized the California Supreme Court's reliance on
the "effects" test,332 which the United States Supreme Court viewed as
being applicable to wrongful activity conducted outside of a state, causing injury within the state, or commercial activity affecting state residents. 33 3 Since Kulko's act of buying his daughter a one-way plane
ticket to California could not be analogized to either of those activities,
the Court found it unreasonable to force him to litigate in California. 334
The Court rejected the California court's holding that by sending his
daughter to California, Kulko had purposefully availed himself of the
328. 98 S. Ct. at 1702. The parties had agreed that the controlling standard for the constitutionality of the assertion of jurisdiction was the "minimum contacts" inquiry established
in InternationalShoe. See generally notes 308-09 and accompanying text supra.
329. 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 473 (West Supp. 1977); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 16501699 (West 1972 & Supp. 1977).
330. 98 S. Ct. at 1700.
331. Id It should be noted, however, that the Act permits the alleged obligor to contest
the claim. In such situations, the obligee may submit deposition testimony through the initiating court. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1683 (West 1972). While the Act may facilitate procurement of child support decrees which are uncontested, it is at least questionable whether
the deposition procedure adequately protects the interests of the non-forum party.
332. 98 S. Ct. at 1699. California's "effects" test, see note 322 and accompanying text
supra, is derived from A. L. I. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971):
"A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual mho causes effects in
the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action arising from these
effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's relationship to the state make
the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable."
333. 98 S.Ct. at 1695.
334. Id at 1698-99.
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benefits and protections of its laws.33 5 Justice Marshall stated, "A father who agrees, in the interests of family harmony and his childten's
preferences, to allow them to spend more time in California than was
required under a separation agreement can hardly be said to have 'purposefully availed himself' of the 'benefits and protection' of California's laws." 33' 6 The Court also found, contrary to the California court,
that Kulko did not derive any economic benefit from his daughter's
presence in California, since any benefit resulted not from her presence
in the forum state but rather from her absence from his home. 337 Based
on these considerations, the Court held that California was not a
proper forum for the action. Justice Brennan wrote a brief dissent 'in
weighing of the
which he agreed with the California Supreme Court's
338 ,
facts, though he noted that the issue was "close.
The Kulko decision does not effect any substantial change in jurisdictional bases, as did Shaffer. Rather, the case indicates that where a
state attempts to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident individual, rather than a commercial entity, fairness to the defendant dictates that some purposeful act, by which the defendant avails himself of
the state's benefits and protections, be clearly shown. The number of
"affiliating circumstances" 339 necessary to establish jurisdiction depends upon the facts of each case. Kulko, a narrow, factually-based
decision, does little to clarify the "gray area" of reasonable assertions
of inpersonam jurisdiction.
V. Substantive Due Process
A.

Limiting Liabilityfor Damages in NuclearAccidents

The Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated its reluctance to invalidate legislation on substantive due process grounds.34 ° Its distaste
for substituting a judicial judgment for that of a legislative body is
335. Id See note 325 and accompanying text supra.
336. 98 S. Ct. at 1698.
337. Id at 1697.
338. Id at 1702 (Brennan, J., joined by White & Powell, JJ., dissenting).
339. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958).
340. "Substantive due process" refers to limits on the substance of legislation, rather than
on the procedures employed, or, what the government may do rather than how it may do it.
As stated in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), the Court often refuses "to sit as a
'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation,' and ... emphatically refuse[s] to go
back to the time when courts used the Due Process Clause 'to strike down state laws...
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought."' Id at 731-32 (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423
(1952) and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (footnotes omitted)).
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based on the doctrine of separation of powers.34 1 In view of the continued vitality of this principle and the Court's expressed reluctance to
infringe on legislative prerogatives, 342 it would seem futile to base an
action on the perceived lack of wisdom or judgment embodied in a
statute. Yet, in some cases, a substantive due process challenge may be
the only avenue for redress of a legitimate injury.
In Duke Power Co. v. CarolinaEnvironmentalStud Group, Inc.,
the Price-Anderson Act's3 4 4 ceiling on damages recoverable in the
event of a nuclear accident was attacked on due process grounds. The
action was instituted after previous attempts to block the construction

and operation of nuclear power plants in North and South Carolina
had failed.3 4 5 Plaintiffs, most of whom lived and owned property near
the nuclear plant sites, 346 claimed, that the Act violated the Fifth

Amendment because by both creating the source of the underlying injury and limiting the recovery therefor, the Act constituted arbitrary
governmental action adversely affecting their property rights. Plaintiffs
also claimed that in the event of a nuclear accident, their property
347
would be "taken" without any assurance of just compensation.
The stated purpose of the Act is to protect the public and to encourage the development of the atomic energy industry.3 4 8 Passed in
1957, 34 1 the Act requires the private nuclear industry to purchase the

maximum available amount of liability insurance, then $60 million.3
341. For a discussion of limits on judicial power, see Lochner v. Nea York, 198 U.S. 45,
75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id at 68, 72-73 (Harlan, J., joined by White & Day, JJ.,
dissenting).
342. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977).
343. 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978).
344. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
345. See Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 431 F. Supp. 203, 205 (W.D.N.C. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Carolina Envir. Case],
rep'dsub nom. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 98 S. Ct.
2620 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Duke Power Case]. The district court noted that plaintiffs
had fought against nuclear power at numerous administrative and legal levels. Id The construction permits had been unsuccessfully challenged in Carolina Environmental Study
Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
346. Carolina Envir. Case, supra note 345, at 205.
347. Duke Power Case, supra note 345, at 2628.
348. 42 U.S.C. § 2012(i) (1976). The Act was designed to implement a governmental
policy of encouraging development by the private sector of atomic energy for peaceful uses.
Though both private industry and the Atomic Energy Commission were confident that no
major nuclear disaster was likely to occur, the unique nature of nuclear power and the potential magnitude of an accident deterred private development. See Duke Power Case,
supra note 345, at 2626.
349. Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957).
350. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1976). Since 1957, the available amount of private insurance
coverage has risen to $140 million, but the liability ceiling remains at $5t0 million. See note
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If damages from a nuclear incident exceed private insurance coverage,
the federal government will indemnify the licensee and other "persons
indemnified" in an amount up to $500 million.3 5 ' Subsequent amendments: (1) require all indemnified entities to waive any legal defenses in
the event of a nuclear accident, 352 resulting in the equivalent of strict
liability; (2) institute a deferred premium provision by requiring all reactor owners to contribute between two and five million dollars toward
compensation for victims in the event of a nuclear accident; 353 and (3)
explicitly provide that Congress will take appropriate and necessary action to protect the public in the event of an incident in which aggregate
damages total more than $560 million.35 4
The district court issued a memorandum opinion which explored
the ramifications of nuclear plant operation,35 5 the likelihood of accidents,35 6 and the effect of such plants on the environment.3 5 7 It concluded that a real possibility existed of a nuclear catastrophe causing
352 infra. One claimed effect of the Act is the inability of homeowners to purchase nuclear
catastrophe insurance because the entire insurance capacity has been absorbed by industry.
See Duke Power Case, supra note 345, at 2627 n.9.
351. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1976). "Persons indemnified" refers to the person with whom
an indemnity agreement is executed and any other person who may be liable for public
liability. 42 U.S.C. § 2014(t) (1976).
352. Atomic Energy Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-645, § 3, 80 Stat. 891 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1976)). This 1966 amendment responded to Congress' perception
of the unsettled nature of state tort law regarding nuclear accidents and the need for a common standard of liability. The waiver approach was considered preferable to prescribing
strict liability by federal statute. The 1966 amendments also provided for transfer of all
claims arising out of a single nuclear accident to one federal district court. In the event of
liability in excess of the prescribed limits, the court is empowered to authorize immediate
payment of 15% of the liability limitation to injured parties and to approve a plan of distribution to insure equitable treatment of all parties. Id (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2), (o)
(1976)).
353. Atomic Energy Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 3, 89 Stat. 1111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1976)). This provision effected a reduction in the federal government's contribution to the liability pool. At present, a nuclear incident would result in
contributions totaling $315 million from the 63 existing nuclear plants, $140 million from
private insurance and $105 million in federal government indemnity. As the number of
plants increases, the liability ceiling will ultimately increase. See Duke Power Case, supra
note 345, at 2627 & n.8.
354. Atomic Energy Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 6, 89 Stat. 1111 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1976)).
355. Carolina Envir. Case, supra note 345, at 206-08.
356. Id at 210-14. The court reviewed findings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission published in October, 1975, comparing the Commission's estimates of the
probability of nuclear accidents to those of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency and expert critics of the Commission's study. The court found that the study seriously underestimated the likelihood of a "core melt," i.e., unchecked heat melting through
the steel walls of a reactor. Though a core melt does not result in nuclear explosion, because
the fuel of nuclear reactors does not contain a high enough proportion of Uranium-235, it
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damage well in excess of the Price-Anderson limits. 3 -s The court also
noted that without the protection of the Act, private corporations
would be unwilling to undertake the development of nuclear power
plants and would also be unable to obtain sufficient financing, supplies
and architectural skills to build and maintain such plants. 35 9 After deciding the issues of standing 360 and ripeness 361 in plaintiffs' favor, the
due process
court declared that the Price-Anderson Act violated the
62
and equal protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
The district court appeared to apply a more elevated level of scrutiny to the constitutionality of the Act's provisions than is commonly
employed in due .process analyses. Despite the speculative nature of
damages in. the event of a future nuclear accident, the court found that
the amount of recovery was not rationally related to the potential
losses. 363 In addition, it viewed other protections provided by the Act,
would release large quantities of nuclear contaminants into the air and water. Concerning
the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission findings, see Postscript, infra.
357. Id. at 209-10. The court examined the immediate and potential effects on the environment. These included the immediate effects of releasing small quantities of radiation
into the air and water near nuclear plants, increasing the temperature of nearby lakes resulting in changed ecology, producing objectively reasonable fear in individuals situated
nearby, and other effects on the specific locales in question. The potential effects primarily
concerned the possibility of a core melt or some other major accident.
358. Id at 214-15.
359. Id. at 215-18. The court examined testimony before the 1956-1957 hearings of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and before the renewal hearings in September 1975.
Corporate managers strongly indicated that the Act was necessary to induce their companies
to enter the nuclear energy field. The court concluded that "but for" the Act, the nuclear
plants would not be built or operated. Id
360. Id at 218-21. Standing requires that plaintiffs allege "such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)). The district court found that
the "but for" nexus between the Act and nuclear plant construction, combined with the
immediate and potential effects, the large number of persons likely to be injured, and the
proximity of the plaintiffs to the reactor site, conferred the requisite standing. 431 F. Supp.
at 218-21.
361. 431 F. Supp. at 221-22. The court noted that under North Carolina law, a right of
action arises as soon as a wrongful act has created any injury, however slight, to the plaintiff.
It found that the immediate effects of the plants, see note 357 supra, met this standard.
Additionally, the court viewed the Supreme Court's holding in Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974), as analogous, rendering a prospective "taking" by
virtue of an uncompensable nuclear accident ripe for adjudication. In RegionalRail,plaintiffs who owned interest in the Penn Central Railroad attacked the constitutionality of a law
which authorized eight railroads to continue operating under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy
Act. They asserted that the compulsory operation of the railroads would erode their equity,
effecting a taking of property without assurance of just compensation. Id at 124-25.
362. 431 F. Supp. at 222.
363. Id
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such as certain recovery, 364 prompt release of funds, 365 extension of
statutes of limitation, 366 and the elimination of defenses, 367 as illusory
benefits insufficient to justify limitations on recovery.3 68 The court also
found that policy considerations weighed against the constitutionality
of the Act, in that it might tend to encourage "irresponsibility in matters of safety and environmental protection. ' 369 The due process violation was supplemented by a finding that the Act violated equal
protection by providing a benefit to all of society, but arbitrarily placing the burden of potential injury only on persons who live near nuclear power plants.37 °
The Supreme Court reversed the district court, expressly deferring
to the congressional judgment embodied in the Act.3 71 Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, examined the threshold questions of
subject matter jurisdiction in the district court,3 72 standing and ripeness. The complaint alleged jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1337, which
provides for federal jurisdiction over any civil action "arising under
any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade. 373
364. Id at 224. The court reasoned that by virtue of the Act's ceiling on liability, any
recovery would be in proportion to the total fund available to compensate injured persons
and their property. The amount of any recovery was thus uncertain. In this respect, the Act
differs from other laws limiting damages by formula, such as workmen's compensation
statutes.
365. Id The Act provides for immediate settlements totalling up to 15% of the total fund;
thereafter, claims must be referred to a nearby district judge who determines proportionate
settlements and approves a plan of distribution. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2), (o) (1976). Because
some radiation injuries are not manifested for years, and because the district judge must
provide for late-developing claims, the court saw a possibility that the settlement of claims
could be a prolonged and uncertain process.
366. 431 F. Supp. at 224. The court noted that many statutes of limitation already provide for late discovery of injury by tolling rights of action until that time.
367. Id at 223-24. Pursuant to an opinion expressed in PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs
516 (4th ed. 1971), that the principle of strict liability would certainly be applied in cases of
injury from nuclear incident, the court viewed waiver of defenses as giving up "nothing of
substantial value." 431 F. Supp. at 224.
368. See 431 F. Supp. at 223-24.
369. Id at 222-23.
370. Id at 224-25. The court noted that alternatives to liability limitation exist which
would be rationally related to the interests asserted: 1) establishment of a liability pool
funded by either advance contributions from nuclear power companies or liability for assessment on a unit basis, or 2) payment of damages out of the federal treasury.
371. Duke Power Case, supra note 345, at 2636. Three members of the Court, Justices
Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens, would not have reached the merits of the case, but concurred in the Court's judgment. Id at 2641-42.
372. Id at 2628. The district court had not considered this issue, and it had not been
raised by the parties. The Court noted, however, that it could, under Liberty Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976), address the question on its own motion. Id at 740.
373. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976).
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The appellees' claims were found not to "arise under" the
Price-Anderson Act because their right to relief did not depend upon
the construction of the Act.374 Section 1337 was therefore an improper
jurisdictional base. However, the majority viewed the allegations of
the complaint as stating a cause of action arising under the Constitu-

tion against the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which was charged

with enforcement and administration of the Act.3 75 Jurisdiction could
then be derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1331,376 the general federal question
statute, even though the Commission was not a named defendant.
Since the facts alleged were sufficient to support jurisdiction under section 1331, this pleading defect was held not fatal.3 77
Justice Rehnquist took issue with the majority's disposition of the

subject matter jurisdiction question. In his view, jurisdiction was improper under either section 1337 or section 133 1378 since the underlying
claim arose out of state tort law and the Price-Anderson Act did not
purport to grant any personal rights which could be vindicated in a
federal court.37 9 In fact, the Act was merely an anticipated defense to
be invoked by Duke Power against a state cause of action.380 As such,
it was an improper basis for jurisdiction under the rule of Louisville &
Nashville Railroad v. Motley.381 Furthermore, the complaint alleged
no actual controversy against the Commission since the agency had no
connection with the challenged limitation of liability; it had only
374. 98 S. Ct. at 2628-29. See Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust, 255 U.S. 180, 199
(1921).
375. 98 S. Ct. at 2628-29. The complaint alleged that "[s]ince the Price-Anderson Act
provides victims of a nuclear disaster no benefit while at the same time limiting their right to
recover for their losses to approximately 2-1/2 percent of such losses, the operation of the
$500 million limitation would, in the event of a nuclear disaster, deprive the persons injured
by such a disaster of property rights without due process of law in violation of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States." Id at 2628 n. 12.
376. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
377. 98 S.Ct. at 2629 n.14.
378. Id at 2643-44 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist
noted that the Court has construed the "arising under" language of §§ 1331 and 1337 similarly (citing Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 316 U.S. 350, 353 (1942)).
379. Id
380. Id at 2643. If plaintiffs sued Duke Power for damages, their right of action would
fall under North Carolina tort law. The company could assert the Act as a defense, and the
Act's constitutionality would then be at issue. This chain of events would not confer federal
jurisdiction under the rule that the basis for federal jurisdiction must appear on the face of a
well-pleaded complaint. See note 381 and accompanying text infra.
381. 211 U.S. 149 (1908). In Motley, plaintiffs sought to enforce performance of a contract in which the railroad had promised them free passes for life. An act of Congress forbade free passes. Because the act was merely a defense which the railroad could assert,
plaintiffs could not predicate federal jurisdiction on the alleged unconstitutionality of the
act.

Fall 1978]

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

granted a construction permit to Duke Power and agreed to indemnify
the company. 82 Justice Rehnquist evinced concern over the abrogation of the "well-pleaded complaint" doctrine and would have remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction.3 8 3
Turning to the issue of standing, Chief Justice Burger concluded
that since the district court's findings demonstrated a "distinct and palpable injury" to the plaintiffs3 84 and a "fairly traceable" causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct, 38 5 the standing
requirements were met.3 6 The first prong of the standing inquiry was
satisfied by the immediate adverse effects on the environment, set out
in the district court opinion. 87 The second prong was fulfilled by the
"but for" connection between the Act and construction of nuclear
plants found by the district court. 8 8 The Court did not require that a
connection be established between the claimed injuries and the constitutional rights being asserted. The majority was thus willing to apply a
less rigorous nexus requirement than has been demanded in taxpayer
suits such as Flast v. Cohen.3 89 Justice Stewart disagreed that a relationship had been established between the immediate effects of the nuclear plants and the law limiting liability for future nuclear incidents.
An "interest in the local water temperature" did not, in his opinion,
confer standing.3 9 ° In resolving the final preliminary issue, the majority followed the district court's reasoning, deciding that the issue was
ripe for adjudication. It found that, as in the RegionalRail Reorganizalion Act Cases,391 the Court would be in no better position later to re382. 98 S. Ct. at 2644-45. In Justice Rehnquist's opinion, "The only federal action challenged by this complaint is a hypothetical district court's hypothetical invocation of the statute in the event of a hypothetical nuclear accident." Id at 2644 n.3.
383. Id at 2644 & n.2. See note 378 and accompanying text supra.
384. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1974).
385. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
261 (1977).
386. 98 S. Ct. at 2630.
387. Id at 2630-31. See note 356 supra.
388. 98 S. Ct. at 2631-33.
389. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Flast required taxpayers to establish a link between their status
as taxpayers and 1) the type of legislative enactment being attacked, and 2) the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Id at 102.
The two-level nexus requirement only applies to taxpayer suits. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225 n.15 (1974).
390. 98 S. Ct. at 2642 (Stewart, I., concurring). Justice Stewart believed that no relationship had been demonstrated between the immediate environmental effects alleged and the
challenge to liability limitation, other than the fact that a successful attack would put Duke
Power out of the nuclear power business.
391. 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
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solve the claims presented.3 92
Having decided the threshold issues, the Court rejected appellees'
argument that the constitutionality of the Act merited a more elevated
standard of review than would a challenged economic regulation.39 3

Since Congress' purpose in enacting the measure was to remove economic impediments to the development of nuclear power, in the
Court's view the Act fell squarely into the category of economic regula-

tions. As such, it was endowed with a presumption of constitutionality
which could be rebutted only by demonstrating that Congress acted in
an arbitrary or irrational manner. 39 4 The difficulty of satisfying this
requirement presaged the Court's holding.
The Court agreed with the district court that Congress intended to
stimulate the private development of nuclear power and that the Act

was a rational means of achieving that purpose.395 Chief Justice Bur-

ger pointed out that appellees challenged only the alleged arbitrariness
of the liability ceiling. 396 Given the impossibility of foreseeing the ex-

tent of damage resulting from a nuclear accident and Congress' evident
intention of enacting extraordinary relief measures in the event that
damages exceeded the ceiling,3 97 the Court found the limitation to be
392. 98 S. Ct. at 2635. See note 361 supra.
393. Id. at 2636. The appellees had urged the Court to apply an intermediate standard
such as that utilized in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Craig, a gender-based equal
protection challenge to a statute prohibiting sale of 3.2% beer to males under 21 and females
under 18, struck down the statute because the state did not demonstrate that classification by
sex was "substantially related" to achievement of an "important governmental objective."
Id at 197.
394. 98 S. Ct. at 2636 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)).
By focusing on the economic purpose of the Act, the Court avoided articulating a due process standard of review applicable to legislation with important social consequences. Economic legislation must satisfy only a "relatively relaxed standard of reasonableness," City of
Charlotte v. Local 660, 426 U.S. 283, 286 (1976), and the burden of demonstrating the irrationality of economic legislation rests on the party claiming the due process violation. Usery
v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). This minimal standard reflects the
continuing flight from substantive due process as applied in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905). See notes 340-41 and accompanying text supra. Even if the challenged legislation were not characterized as "economic," it is by no means clear that the Court would raise
its level of scrutiny without the presence of a "fundamental interest" or "suspect class." See,
e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977) (state law impinging on right to privacy held
constitutional even though it was found unnecessary). But see United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (state repeal of an economic covenant was neither necessary
to implement a mass transit plan nor reasonable. The United States Trust decision is an
anomaly, reviving to a limited extent the Lochner prohibition against impairment of
contracts.
395. 98 S. Ct. at 2636.
396. Id
397. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1976) provides that Congress "will take whatever action is
deemed necessary and appropriate to protect the public from the consequences of a disaster
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within "permissible limits" and so not violative of due process. 398 The
majority's reliance upon the likelihood of emergency relief suggests
that the Court would have found a ceiling even lower than $500 million
to be permissible. No mention was made of the fact that the ceiling has
remained virtually constant since 1957, despite inflation. The Court
noted, however, that the probability of an accident is lower and the
likely consequences are much less severe than previously thought, leading Congress to forgo raising the ceiling in 1975.399 The district court's
concern that the Act might tend to encourage irresponsibility on the
part of builders and owners of nuclear plants was dismissed after summary consideration. The Court looked to the rigorous licensing requirements imposed by the Atomic Energy Commission as the

principal safeguard. 4 0 In addition, it viewed a private utility's
401
financial self-interest as assurance of responsible conduct.
The remaining challenge to the Act concerned the abrogation of

the common law rights of recovery of damages without provision of a
satisfactory quidproquo.4 °2 The Court examined the reasonableness of
the Price-Anderson Act remedies, though noting obliquely that "it is
not at all clear that the Due Process Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at
common law or provide a reasonable substitute remedy. '4°3 Although
appellees attempted to distinguish the Act from a host of statutes which

constitutionally limit liability for other types of injuries40 " on the basis
[involving damages in excess of the ceiling]." The district court was considerably more wary
of relying on congressional grace, stating, "Mr. Micawber would like that idea." Carolina
Envir. Case. supra note 345, at 224.
398. 98 S.Ct. at 2637-38.
399. Id at 2637 n.30. See S. REP. No. 454, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprintedin [1975]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2251, 2262.
400. 98 S.Ct. at 2638. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
401. 98 S.Ct. at 2638.
402. Id
403. Id In a footnote to this statement, the Court reiterated: "Our cases have clearly
established that '[a] person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common
law.' Second Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50. . .(1911) quoting Munn v. Illinois,
94 U.S. 113, 134. . .[sic] (1876)." 98 S.Ct. at 2638 n.32.
404. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (sustained act of Congress providing for standard compensation for death or injury to employees arising out of maritime
employment); Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929) (upheld statute barring recovery for injuries sustained by guests in automobiles as a result of drivers' ordinary negligence); New
York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (New York workmen's compensation law
holding employers absolutely liable but limiting damages did not violate due process); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (state tort laws held constitutionally superseded by the Federal Employers' Liability Act).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 6:19

of its "but for" relationship to the claimed injuries, the Court saw no
essential difference.40 5
Viewing the likelihood of injured parties collecting damages in excess of $560 million from a practical standpoint, the Court found several policy justifications for the Act. It assured at least a $560 million
fund with which to compensate injured parties.4 °6 In contrast, testimony before the district court indicated that Duke Power, one of the
nation's largest utility companies, would approach insolvency if required to satisfy damage claims in excess of $200 million.4 07 The Court
declined to speculate as to what other avenues for ensuring satisfaction
of large damage claims might have been developed. Additionally, the
Court regarded the mandatory waiver of defenses4 08 as a substantial
benefit to potential claimants. 40 9 Finally, since the Act provided for
district court resolution of claims against the fund, the spectre of a
"race to judgment" for recovery of a private entity's dwindling resources was laid to rest.4 10
The Court referred to its 1917 decision in New York CentralRailroad v. White 4 " as support for its holding that the Act provided a reasonable substitute for state tort remedies. New York Central was an
employer's challenge to New York's workmen's compensation law in
an effort to avoid liability for the death of an employee. The law, similar in some respects to the Price-Anderson Act, fixed employers' liability for the disability or death of employees in certain hazardous jobs
according to a prescribed scale keyed to the employee's earning power,
the nature of his injuries and the dependency of his beneficiaries. The
duty to compensate employees was made absolute, so that injured
workers were relieved of the burden of proving negligence; no affirmative defenses would obtain. The employer, though absolutely liable,
405. 98 S. Ct. at 2639 n.33. The Court pointed out that in order for the "but for" connection to mandate a quidpro quo inquiry, a due process right to be free of nuclear power must
be demonstrated. No such right exists, however. The Court implicitly acknowledged that
the suit was a tactical maneuver to stay the development of nuclear plants altogether, rather
than an action to assure adequate compensation for damages.
406. Id at 2640. The Court also noted the express statutory commitment to take
whatever steps necessary to alleviate the consequences of a nuclear accident. Id See 42
U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1976).
407. 98 S. Ct. at 2640 n.36.
408. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1976). See note 352 and accompanying text supra.
409. 98 S. Ct. at 2640. The Court pointed out that the standard of liability applicable to
a nuclear accident is unclear, and that even if strict liability were applied, there are exceptions for acts of God or of third parties. Id
410. Id at 2640-41. Other flaws in the Act discerned by the district court were also
dismissed as unwarranted.
411. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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was assured of not incurring damage liability in excess of a certain
amount. 4 12 Although the New York provisons are similar to those of
the Price-Anderson Act, the underlying policy justifications for each
are quite different. The New York law was an effort to compensate for
the complexity inherent in ascertaining the causes of industrial accidents, which often worked to the detriment of injured workers who
were unable to embark on costly, prolonged litigation.41 3 The
Price-Anderson Act appears to be only secondarily concerned with
safeguarding the rights of injured parties. Its primary raison d'tre is to
induce private industry to enter the nuclear power field. Where the
substantive rights of individuals are pitted against the economic or administrative burdens of a corporate or public entity, the Court sometimes raises its level of scrutiny.414 Despite its disclaimers in Duke
Power, the Court's detailed assessment of the Act's provisions suggests
that, in fact, an augmented standard of review was employed. In view
of the importance of nuclear energy research and development, the
Court might well have concluded that the Price-Anderson Act's liability ceiling served an "important governmental objective" and was
"substantially related to the achievement of that objective. ' 41 5 Its explicit refusal to characterize its analysis as anything more than the most
limited review may have been intended to discourage substantive due
process claims of a less unique nature than were presented in Duke
Power.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, remarked that the
Court's opinion "will serve the national interest in removing doubts
concerning the constitutionality of the . . . Act. 41 6 Nevertheless, he
viewed the "advisory opinion" as inappropriate "statesmanship" rather
than proper adjudication.41 7
Postscript
On January 19, 1979, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Com412. Id at 192-93.
413. Id at 197.
414. See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (modification of
a state's obligation to bondholders held neither reasonable or necessary to serve state's mass
transit plan). See note 394 supra. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977) (ordinance restricting dwelling occupancy to narrowly-defined single families merited
the Court's careful examination of the importance of the governmental interests advanced
and the extent to which they were served by the regulation); see also Hurst, Munic4,al Bonds
and the Contract Clause: Looking Beyond United States Trust Company v. New Jersey, 5
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 25, 59 (1978)).
415. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See note 393 and accompanying text
supra.
416. 98 S. Ct. at 2646 (Stevens, J., concurring).
417. Id
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mission issued a statement4" 8 qualifying its endorsement of the Nuclear
Reactor Safety Study.4 19 The Study's findings on the low probability of
nuclear accident were extensively cited in the House report recommending renewal of and amendments to the Price-Anderson Act.4 u"
The Commission's statement criticized the Safety Study's peer review
processes and the reliability of its quantitative estimates of the risks of
nuclear accidents. In addition, the Commission withdrew any explicit
or implicit past endorsement of the Study's Executive Summary of the
voluminous report. The Commission found the Summary did not adequately portray the full extent of the consequences of reactor accidents
and was a poor description of the contents of the report. One might
query whether the Commission's second thoughts on the Safety Study
would have made any difference to the Court's analysis in Duke Power
and, further, whether the latest statement may influence Congress to
raise the liability ceiling in the future.
JEANNE LABORDE SCHOLZ*

418. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Press Release (January 19, 1979).
419. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reactor Safety Study, An Assessment of Accidents Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (NVAsH.-1400) (1975).

See note 356 and accompanying text supra.
420. H.R. REP. No. 94-648, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. 15-16 (1975).
* Member, third-year class.

Equal Protection
Introduction

The following discussion analyzes the most significant equal protection decisions handed down during the Supreme Court's October, 1977
Term. These decisions can be divided into two categories. The first relates
to freedom of choice in matters of family life; the second involves the status of aliens.1
Califano v. Jobst,2 Quilloin v. Walcot 3 and Zablocki v. Redhail4 furl. The long-awaited "reverse discrimination" decision, Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978), is not discussed below for two reasons. First, its
actual holding is extremely narrow. The Court held that a state medical school's special
admissions program, under which a certain number of places in the entering class were
reserved exclusively for minority applicants, violated the prohibition against racial discrimination contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 2764 (opinion of Powell,
J.), 2815 (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.I., and Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.). Secondly, the
extraordinary split within the Court and the multiplicity of separate opinions issued by the
Justices in support of their various views renders the decision difficult to analyze in the
necessarily abbreviated scope of this Review. The points upon which two different fiveJustice majorities of the Court agreed are: 1) that racial and ethnic classifications of any sort
are inherently suspect and thus subject to the most exacting judicial scrutiny; and 2) that an
individual's race may be taken into account to ensure racial diversity in governmental programs, even absent a finding of past racial discrimination. The thrust of the Court's decision
is that state admissions programs may make race a competitive consideration, but they must
not rigidly foreclose the evaluation of applicants not within the favored racial or ethnic
groups. For a discussion of Bakke and its implications, see Schwartz, Foreword-The
Supreme Court, October 1977 Term, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 3-6 (1979).
Only two other decisions handed down last term which had an impact on equal protection clause analysis are not discussed below. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Commission of
Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), dealt only tangentially with the equal protection clause.
Baldwin's primary focus was on the question of whether a Montana elk-hunting statute
which imposed substantially higher (seven and one-half times) license fees on nonresidents
than on state residents denied nonresidents their rights under the privileges and immunities
clause of the federal Constitution. The Court found that the right to engage in recreational
activity was not "fundamental" and therefore not protected under the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 388. As a corollary to the Court's central holding, the distinction between residents and nonresidents was held permissible under the equal protection clause as
a rational exercise of the police power to protect wildlife when used to allocate access to
recreational hunting. Id. at 390.
Carter v. Miller, 434 U.S. 356 (1978), affirmed per curiam by an equally divided Court
without opinion a decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 547 F.2d 1314
(1977), which held that a city ordinance absolutely barring an individual convicted of certain offenses from obtaining a chauffeur's license, while permitting one who already held
such a license but who was similarly convicted to retain it, violated the equal protection
clause. The Court of Appeals found such distinctions among the class of ex-offenders
irrational.
2. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
3. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
4. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
[141]
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ther refine the extent to which the Constitution will be construed to protect
individual autonomy in making important personal decisions in various
contexts. The opinions reflect little significant change in the developing
trends of equal protection analysis in this area of privacy and fundamental
rights. If any generalization can be made, it is that the Court is apparently
becoming more willing to protect a person's right to marry against excessive governmental interference, and will elevate the interests of persons
within a legally sanctioned marriage over the interests of those who are not
part of such a traditional family unit. The Court remains reluctant, however, to interfere with complex schemes of federal social welfare legislation, even when the provisions of such statutes may not affect all recipients
evenhandedly.
Foley v. Connelie5 is a significant opinion defining the constitutional
protection afforded aliens lawfully residing in this country as permanent
residents. The decision carves out a broad exception in the area of public
employment to the right of aliens to obtain employment free from discrimination based on their status as noncitizens.
I. Freedom of Personal Choice in Matters of Family Life
Three decisions handed down during the October, 1977 Term concern governmental regulations having the potential for undue interference with an individual's constitutionally protected right of personal
choice in matters of family life.' Two of the three, Califano v. /obs12
and Zablocki v. Redhail,3 were sharply distinguished on their facts and
so must be considered together if a consistent pattern of equal protection analysis can be developed from this term's opinions. It should also
5. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
1. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978);
Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
The constitutional right of familial privacy has been developed in a line of cases commencing with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which held that a statutory
prohibition against the use of contraceptives by married persons was an impermissible intrusion into the marital relationship, one of the constitutionally protected "zones of privacy."
Id. at 484. Subsequent cases have expanded this right in order to protect: the use of contraceptives by single persons, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); a woman's
ability to obtain an abortion free of burdensome procedures, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973), Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); a woman's decision to bear her
child, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1974); the commercial distribu-

tion ofnonmedical contraceptives, Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); and,
generally, "the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing," Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973). This right
has been characterized as "the interest in making certain kinds of important decisions."
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (footnote omitted). See generally L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 921-34 (1978).

2. 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
3. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
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be noted that, although Jobst, Zablocki and Quilloin v. Walcott4 are
nominally equal protection decisions, much of their doctrinal support is
taken from due process considerations.
A. SocialInsuranceLegislation
Calfano v. Jobst5 is remarkable in that it is a unanimous decision
by the Supreme Court, a rarity in the recent climate of equal protection
analysis. Authored by Justice Stevens, Jobst adds further weight to the
line of cases that have applied the rational basis standard of review to
challenges to social welfare legislation.'
John Jobst, disabled since birth by cerebral palsy, qualified for and
received child's insurance benefits as a disabled dependent under the
Social Security Act.7 Although the woman he subsequently married
was also disabled, she was not entitled to benefits under the Act and
Jobst's child's insurance benefits were therefore terminated.8 He
4. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
5. 434 U.S. 47 (1977), rev g Jobst v. Richardson, 368 F. Supp. 909 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
6. See Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974);
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970);
Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
The Supreme Court has articulated this standard of review by stating, "In the area of
economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely
because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some
'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'" Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911)). Although Jobst concerns a federal statute-the Social Security
Act-a classification that meetings the Dandridgetest is consistent with the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment, the basis of the challenge in Jobst. Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(l)(D), (5) (1976). The statute provides:
(d)(l) Every child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title) of an individual
entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or of an individual who dies a
fully or currently insured individual, if such child(A) has filed application for child's insurance benefits,
(B) at the time such application was filed was unmarried and (i) either had
not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had not attained the age of
22, or (ii) is under a disability (as defined in section 423(d) of this title) which
began before he attained the age of 22, and
(C) was dependent upon such individualshall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit for each month, beginning with the
first month after August 1950 in which such child becomes so entitled to such insurance benefits and ending with the month preceding whichever of the following
first occurs(D) the month in which such child dies or marries,
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brought suit alleging that the relevant provisions of the Social Security
Act denied him equal protection of the laws in violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 9 The denial of equal protection was claimed to arise from the statutory exemption from the termination of benefits granted to disabled child beneficiaries who marry
persons also entitled to benefits under the Act."° The district court held
the Social Security Act violative of principles of equal protection because of the different treatment of various classes of child's insurance
beneficiaries who marry disabled persons."
Jobst had urged application of the strict scrutiny standard of re-

view, claiming that his constitutional right to marry the person of his
choice was being infringed by the Act.'" The lower court did not reach
the strict scrutiny question, however, striking the statute down on the
ground that even though there may be a rational basis for the distinc(5) In the case of a child who has attained the age of eighteen and who
marries(A) an individual entitled to benefits under subection (a), (b). (e), (f), (g), or
(h) of this section or under section 423(a) of this title, or
(B) another individual who has attained the age of eighteen and is entitled to
benefits under this subsection, such child's entitlement to benefits ander this subsection shall, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection but
subject to subsection (s) of this section, not be terminated by reason of such marriage ....
9. Because Jobst was a challenge to a federal statute, the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment rather than the due process or equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was implicated. It is well established, however, that equal protection principles
are present in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. E.g., Mathews v. De Castro,
429 U.S. 181, 182 n.1 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 770 (1975); Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The Social
Security Act is therefore subject to equal protection scrutiny.
Last term in Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976), the Court applied this test of
constitutionality to the Act: "To be sure, the standard by which legislation such as this must
be judged 'is not a toothless one'. . . . But the challenged statute is entitled to a strong
presumption of constitutionality. 'So long as its judgments are rational, and not invidious,
the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems of the poor and the needy are not subject to a
constitutional straitjacket."' Id at 185 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510
(1976); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 (1972)).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(5) (1976), quoted in note 8 supra.
11. Jobst v. Richardson, 368 F. Supp. 909 (1974), rev'd,434 U.S. 47 (1977).
12. Id. at 912. Plaintiff cited Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1969) and Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) in support of this claim. He attempted to invoke the rule
that, "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [a constitutional] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis in original). The district
court noted that it had "serious doubt whether plaintiffs strict standard argument may be
said to be tenable in light of Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 . . . and San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1..
" Jobst v. Richardson, 368 F.
Supp. at 912. The court did not reach this issue, discussedin the text accompanying note 13
infra, and the strict scrutiny argument was dropped before the Supreme Court.
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tion drawn between those beneficiaries marrying benefit-collecting disabled persons and those beneficiaries marrying persons who are not
disabled, the statute actually created another distinction which was arbitrary and unrelated to its purpose. 13 As applied, the statute created
two different classes of beneficiaries, those who marry disabled persons
who receive child's insurance benefits, and those who marry disabled
persons who do not.' 4 The court noted that the purpose of the statute
was to provide continuing benefits to those beneficiaries who were disabled before their marriage because it was felt that their need would
continue even after marriage if both husband and wife received child's
insurance benefits.' 5 Since the purpose was to alleviate hardship where
disabled dependent persons marry one another, it was held to be irrational to terminate benefits where two persons who were in fact disabled, married.1 6 The basis of the lower court's opinion was its
interpretation of the legislative purpose of the statute. If the legislative
intent was to be implemented, the triggering event for the collection of
benefits after marriage should be a marriage to another disabled person, not the contingency that both disabled persons be child's insurance
beneficiaries.1 7 The lower court found no rational basis for the distinction between beneficiaries who marry disabled persons who receive
benefits and beneficiaries who marry disabled persons who do not, and
that the distinction had no relevance to the purpose for which the general classifications in the statute were drawn.1 8 It therefore held that
the statute violated principles of equal protection incorporated in the
Fifth Amendment.
On direct appeal' 9 the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Jobst
was not deprived of property without due process of law by the marriage termination rule,' 0 and that the favored treatment of marriages
between secondary beneficiaries does not violate the principles of
13. 368 F. Supp. at 913.
14. Id. at 913.
15. Id. at 912-13.
16. Id. at 913. The court stated that, "legislation must be drawn so that the distinctions
made have 'some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made."' Id. (quoting Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966)).
17. 368 F. Supp. at 913.
18. Id. "We find and conclude that Congress did not draw [the statute] in a manner so
that the result of the application of those provisions in this case is consistent with what may
have been an effort to establish a rational classification."
19. The statute allowing direct appeal from decisions invalidating acts of Congress is 28
U.S.C. § 1252 (1976).
20. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 54.
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equality embodied in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 2 '
The Court began its analysis with an examination of the broad structure and purpose of the Social Security Act. This analysis was divided
into two parts, considering first the validity of a general requirement
that benefits payable to a wage earner's dependent terminate upon
marriage, and second, the propriety of an exception to the general requirement for marriages between persons who are both receiving
benefits.
The Social Security Act was characterized as a "complex statutory
scheme designed to administer a trust fund" financed by contributions
of wage earners, the primary beneficiaries. 22 The Court found that the
entitlement of a secondary beneficiary is based on his or her relation-

ship to a contributing wage earner; consequently, eligibility for benefits
is unrelated to actual need.23 Since the purpose of the statute is to pro21. Id. at 58. Before the Court's decision on the merits, the case was remanded for
reconsideration in light of a newly enacted statute, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1381a (1976), under
which Jobst and his wife had become entitled to supplemental security income benefits.
Weinberger v. Jobst, 419 U.S. 811 (1974). The district court concluded that the new program had no relevance to the case, however, and reinstated its original judgment. See 434
U.S. at 50.
22. Id. at 52.
23. Id. (citing Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1976)). De Castro was a
nearly unanimous decision: the opinion by Justice Stewart was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens; Justice Marshall concurred without a separate opinion. De Castro held that a provision of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1) (1976), which grants benefits to a married woman under
62 with dependent children in her care whose husband retires or becomes disabled, but
which denies them to a divorced woman under 62 with dependents, is not violative of equal
protection under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The objective of the provision, like that at issue in Jobst, is to protect workers and their families from the hardships
arising from the loss of earnings due to illness or old age, 429 U.S. at 185-86. The comparability of a divorced woman's need to that of a woman entitled to benefits was therefore
"hardly in point." Id. at 187. Since "Congress could rationally have decided that the resultant loss of family income, the extra expense that often attends illness and old age, and the
consequent disruption in the family's economic well-being that may occur when the husband stops working justify monthly payments to a wife who together with her husband must
still care for a dependent child," id. at 187, and since "Congress could have rationally assumed that divorced husbands and wives depend less on each other for financial and other
support than do couples who stay married," id. at 188, the classification excluding divorced
women was upheld. The Court set forth a rational basis standard by which such legislation
would be judged: "The basic principle that must govern an assessment of any constitutional
challenge to a law providing for governmental payments of monetary benefits is well established. . . . 'The discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display
of arbitrary power, not an exercise ofjudgment.'" Id. at 185 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937)).
The near-unanimous opinion of De Castro, in which there was a clear discrimination
between similarly situated beneficiaries distinguished only by their marital status, coupled
with the unanimous opinion in Califano v. Jobst, indicate that the Court will be unwilling to
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tect the wage earners and the dependent members of their families
against "the hardship occasioned by [a] loss of earnings," the statute "is
24
not simply a welfare program generally benefiting needy persons.
The district court's emphasis on Jobst's continuing need as a disabled
dependent, due to his marrying another disabled person, was therefore
rejected. Need was not the relevant distinguishing characteristic of
child's insurance beneficiaries; the determining factor was probable dependency.2 5 The focus of the analysis was thus shifted to the validity of
the occurrence of marriage as the triggering event for the discontinuance of benefits.
The Court found the concept that marriage changes dependency
expressed throughout the Social Security Act.26 Congress had elected
to use simple criteria, such as age and marital status, to determine
probable dependency, and the Court held that it need not require individualized proof on a case-by-case basis.2 Relying on Weinberger v.
Saf,28 which upheld provisions of the Social Security Act denying
overturn social welfare legislation, particularly where statutory classifications under the Social Security Act are challenged.
24. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. at 52 (citing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 213-14
(1977) (plurality opinion)). Goldfarb held that the different treatment of men and women
mandated by a Social Security Act provision that automatically provided benefits for widows regardless of dependency, but denied similar benefits to widowers not receiving at least
half of their support from their wives, 42 U.S.C. § 403(f)(1)(D) (1976), constituted invidious
discrimination against female wage earners by affording them less protection for their surviving spouses than is provided to male employees. The Court focused on the fact that
eligibility for benefits hinged upon whether one was to some degree a dependent of the
covered wage earner. The Goldfarb cotrrt focused on actual dependency, 430 U.S. at 212-13,
in contrast with Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181 (1976), discussedin note 23 supra. No
"reasonable congressional judgment that nondependent widows should receive benefits because they are more likely to be needy than nondependent widowers" was found, 430 U.S. at
214, and the provision was invalidated.
25. 434 U.S. at 52 (citing Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1976), discussed
in note 23 supra).
26. 434 U.S. at 52-53 n.8.
27. Id. at 52-53 (citing Weinberger v. Saffi, 422 U.S. 749, 776 (1975)). It is interesting to
note the Court's agreement with Mathews v. De Castro, discussedin note 23 supra(upholding a provision of the Act by a nearly unanimous court) in connection with its failure to cite
Califano v. Goldfarb, discussedin note 24 supra,striking a provision of the Act down by a
bare majority of a sharply divided court). In Goldfarb, Justice Stevens wrote a separate
concurring opinion agreeing with several substantive points raised by the dissenting opinion
of Justice Rehnquist. See ConstitutionalReview: Supreme Court 1976-77 Term, 5 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 74 (1978).
28. 422 U.S. 749 (1975). Authored by Justice Rehnquist and joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and Powell, the opinion is highly deferential
to legislative judgment. Id. at 768-77. In its vehement disapproval of the irrebutable presumption doctrine applied by the lower court in ruling a provision of the Social Security Act
unconstitutional, the court stated: "We think that the District Court's extension of the holdings of Stanley, Viandir and LaFleur to the eligibility requirement in issue here would turn
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widows' benefits to all persons who had not been married at least nine
months before the death of the primary beneficiary wage earner, the
Court held that efficiency in the administration of a complex social welfare system such as Social Security requires such general rules.2 9 The
Court enunciated a very narrow category of cases in which a distinction
would be held irrational: "Differences in race, religion, or political affiliation could not rationally justify a difference in eligibility for social
security benefits .. ."10 A distinction between married and unmarried persons, on the other hand, is a relevant test of probable dependency, and the Court found the assumption that a married person is
less likely to be dependent on his parents for support than an unmarried person unquestionably valid.3 ' Thus, the general rule that benefits
of secondary beneficiaries terminate upon marriage was upheld.
The latter portion of the Jobst opinion was devoted to an analysis
of the propriety of the exception to the marriage termination rule. The
Court initially criticized the lower court's characterization of the statutory classification. Whereas the district court had identified the classification as distinguishing between marriages of disabled beneficiaries to
other disabled persons on the basis of whether or not the latter is receiving benefits,32 the Supreme Court found that the statutory scheme
had a much broader effect. Both the general marriage rule itself and
33
the exception to it were said to affect persons who were not disabled.
It was therefore held that "[t]he broad legislative classification must be
judged by reference to characteristics typical of the affected classes
rather than by focusing on selected, atypical examples. ' 34 The Court
undertook to make such a judgment in the balance of its opinion.
The exception was said to recognize that where two persons who
receive benefits marry, the fact of marriage-upheld as a general indicator of probable dependency 35 -is not likely to alter the dependent
the doctrine of those cases into a virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution." Id. at 772. Cf.Cleveland 3d. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414

U.S. 632 (1974); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
29. 434 U.S. at 53.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 53-54 (citing Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976), discussed in

notes 9 & 23 supra, Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70 (1975). discussed in note 28
supra).
32. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
33. 434 U.S. at 55 & n.12.

34. Id. at 55.
35. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
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status of either spouse.3 6 The Court found it reasonable "for Congress
to ameliorate the severity of the [marriage termination] rule by protecting both spouses from the dual hardship which it effected."3 7 Since
Jobst was arguing that his hardship was just as great as that against
which the exception protected, because of his wife's disability, his challenge was characterized as an underinclusion attack on the statute.38
The Court found that even if such an attack were sustained, Jobst
would not necessarily be entitled to relief since the legislation has a
"nation-wide impact" and the equities of individual cases such as
Jobst's would not control.39 Moreover, even if it could be assumed that
the legislative intent was, as the lower court found, to continue support

for those beneficiaries whose marriage did not change their economic
status,4° an assumption the Court was unwilling to make,4 1 the limitation on the types of marriages to which the exception applies-marriages between two persons receiving benefits under the
Act-was found to be justified. The analysis on this point was characteristic of the Court's deferential attitude towards social welfare
36. 434 U.S. at 55.
37. Id. In an explanatory footnote the Court stated, "The fact that marriage characteristically signifies the end of a child's dependency on parental support justifies a general rule
terminating benefits when a child marries. The fact that a marriage between two spouses
who are both receiving dependents' benefits does not characteristically signify a similar
change in economic status justifies the exception. In other words, since the justifying characteristic of the general class does not apply to the excepted class, the exception rests on a
reasonable predicate. This is true even though some members of each class may possess the
characteristic more commonly found in the other class." Id. at 55 n.13.
38. Id. at 56. Underinclusive classifications do not include all who are similarly situated with respect to a rule. In situations invoking only the rational basis standard of review,
discussedin note 6 supra, the Court has been unwilling to sustain such attacks: "[T]he reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489
(1955). See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 997-98 (1978). See generallyTussman & tenBroek, The EqualProtection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
39. 434 U.S. at 56 n.14 (citing Developmentsin the Law-EqualProtection, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 1065, 1136-37 (1968)). If an equal protection violation was found to exist, it could be
cured either by invalidating the entire exception or by enlarging it. 434 U.S. at 56 n.14. If
the former remedy was chosen, Jobst would still not rcceive secondary benefits under the
Act. If the latter remedy was chosen, some new test of dependency would have to be formulated. Since all beneficiaries who marry needy nonbeneficiaries would be as disadvantaged
as Jobst, merely enlarging the statutory exception to include marriages among physically
handicapped persons would not make the exception constitutionally valid. Id.
40. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
41. See 434 U.S. at 56 n.L15. "We note. . . that Congress could have rationally concluded that beneficiaries who marry other beneficiaries present a more compelling case for
legislative relief than beneficiaries who marry needy nonbeneficiaries. Secondary beneficiaries who marry each other lose two sets of benefits and thus may suffer a greater loss than
does a couple that sacrifices only one set of benefits." Id.
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legislation.42
The exception to the general rule was said to be easy to adminisIt does not require an individualized inquiry as to hardship or
need;' it avoids the necessity for a periodic review of the beneficiary's
entitlement; and it is a reliable indicator of probable hardship. 45 Based
on these factors the Court concluded, "Congress could reasonably take
one firm step toward the goal of eliminating the hardship caused by the
general marriage rule without accomplishing its entire objective in the
same piece of legislation. '46 The Court found that the criticism that
the limitation of the exception has an adverse impact on a secondary
beneficiary's desire to marry and may make him or her a less welcome
suitor would apply to any limited exception to the rule.47 Since Congress was not motivated by antagonism toward any class of marriages
or marriage partners, but rather intended simply to remedy a particular
injustice-the simultaneous loss of benefits when dependent, covered
individuals marry-the exception could not be attacked as an impermissible interference with the right to marry.a
The crucial question before the lower court, whether it was constitutionally permissible to create two classes of child's insurance benefiter.43

42. See note 6 supra.
43. 434 U.S. at 56-57. Administrative convenience is not, however, a universally valid
justification for discriminatory treatment. Tee Frontiero v. Richardson. 411 U.S. 677, 690
(1973) (plurality opinion) ("any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the
sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands
'dissimilar treatment for men and women who are ... similarly situated,' and therefore
involves the 'very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution]
'(citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,76,77 (1971) (emphasis in original)). It should be
....
noted, however, that Frontiero involved gender-based discrimination, %hichis subject to a
higher standard of review than the rational relation test, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) ("classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives"). In contrast, Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495 (1976) held that, "presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they
may approximate, rather than precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case adjudication
would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so long as that lack of precise
equivalence does not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of
scrutiny." Id. at 509. Since Lucas involved discrimination based on illegitimacy, which has
been held not to be a "suspect" classification, id. at 506, and so requires only a "rational
relation" analysis, administrative convenience will constitute a sufficient justification for a
statutorily mandated discrimination that does not invoke more than minimal scrutiny.
44. 434 U.S. at 57. In an explanatory footnote to this finding, the Court noted that
Congress was reluctant to use such individualized determinations. Id. at 57 n.16.
45. Id. at 57.
46. Id. (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955), quotedin note
38 supra).
47. 434 U.S. at 58.
48. Id.
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ciaries--those who married fellow beneficiaries and those who did
not 4 9 -was framed in the Supreme Court to consider whether it was
permissible to distinguish between classes of marriages of beneficiaries." Although the Court squarely faced the question of whether
terminating benefits upon marriage operated in some way to interfere
with an individual's choice to marry, the Court deftly resolved the issue
without defining the parameters of the individual's right to marry."
Obliquely hinting at such a right, the Court explained that the general
marriage rule is not invalidated "simply because some persons who
might otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or because
is
some who did marry were burdened thereby."5 2 This qualification 53
Redhaii,
v.
Zablocki
with
together
read
is
Jobst
when
significant
where the Court candidly announced a "fundamental" right to
marry. 4 The majority in Zablocki reconciled its holding with that in
Jobst by pointing out that the statute in Zablocki interfered "directly
and substantially with the right to marry. '5 5 The result, vis-h-vis the
individual's constitutionally protected interest in marriage,5 6 is the permissibility of a "deterrence" to or "burden" upon marriage upheld in
Jobst in contrast with the "direct and substantial" interference held
unconstitutional in Zablocki.7
49. See notes 13-18 and accompanying text supra.
50. 434 U.S. at 54.
51. As discussed in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), see notes 74-168 and
accompanying text infra, the "right to marry" has achieved the status of a fundamental right
this term.
52. 434 U.S. at 54 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
53. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
54. Id. at 383.
55. Id. at 387.
56. Id. at 383-87.
57. The line between deterrence or burden on the one hand, and direct and substantial
interference on the other, is uncertain and ill-defined at best. As succinctly stated by Justice
Powell in his concurrence in Zablocki: "The Court does not present, however, any principled means for distinguishing between the two types of regulations. Since state regulation in
this area typically takes the form of a prerequisite or barrier to marriage or divorce, the
degree of "direct" interference with the decision to marry or to divorce is unlikely to provide
either guidance for state legislatures or a basis for judicial oversight." Id. at 396-97 (Powell,
J., concurring).
The Jobst Court appears to be making the same attempt at differentiating between relative interferences with protected rights that has previously plagued the Court in cases relating to the right to travel after its decision in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), see,
e.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645 (1976); Sosna v. Iowa, 419
U.S. 393 (1975); and the "right" to an abortion after Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), see,
e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The basic postulate of this tendency is that "fundamental" rights are not absolute, and that some degree of infringement of such rights is therefore constitutional. This may reflect a growing concern within the Court to move away from
the rational basis/strict scrutiny dichotomy toward an intermediate analysis where deci-
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The Court in Jobst indicated that merely a rational basis for the
marriage rule was sufficient to sustain the statute because no considerations relating to a suspect class5 8 were involved, nor was there any attempt to interfere with a fundamental right.5 9 As the Court framed the
distinction, the marriage rule is not "merely an unthinking response to
stereotyped generalizations about a traditionally disadvantaged group
[n]or. . . an attempt to interfere with the individual's freedom to make
a decision as important as marriage."6 A finding that "suspect" criteria were utilized in the formulation of the statute, or that there was a
deliberat6 legislative intent to interfere with the right to marry, would
sional outcomes are not foreordained by categorization of interests as "fundamental" or
classifications as constitutionally "suspect." See Gunther, In Search o]'Evolving Doctrineon
a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer EqualProtection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]; Nowak, Realigningthe Standardsof Review I "nderthe EqualProtection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral and Permissive Class/ications 62 GEO. L.J. 1071
(1974); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The EqualProtection Clause and the Three Faces of
ConstitutionalEquality,61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975).
Justice Marshall has been a vocal critic of the two-tiered approach to constitutional
analysis. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. "Suspect" classifications have been found in legal restrictions wAhich curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Strauder v. West
Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879); or which discriminate based on alienage, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But see Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). The identifying
characteristic of suspectness, the Jobst Court emphasized, is the "unthinking response to
stereotyped generalizations about a traditionally disadvantaged group." 434 U.S. at 54.
Emphasis on these two criteria, stereotyped generalizations in relation to a certain group and
traditional disadvantageness, is worthy of note. Both notions are central to what Professor
Karst has termed the equality principle of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Karst, Foreword, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARX. L. REV 1 (1977).
Under Professor Karst's view, the substantive core of the Fourteenth Amendment should
serve to protect the central values of our society, the respect given to members of society, and
the ability to participate fully in society. It is the stigma and stereotyping attached to what
the Court calls "suspect" classes that inhibits the class members' exercise of equal citizenship. Because respect and participation in society are crucial, legislation which hinders these
values must be carefully scrutinized by the Court. Professor Karst identifies two subordinate
values of equal citizenship-participation and responsibility. The more an inequality stigmatizes and thus impairs participation, the more the substantive concept of equal citizenship
demands state justification. Id. at 9.
59. Involvement of a "fundamental" right triggers a more stringent standard of review.
See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973). If legislation
infringes upon the free exercise of some fundamental personal right or liberty, it will be
subject to strict scrutiny by the Court. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), was the
genesis of the "fundamental right" concept that required "strict scrutiny" and laid the cornerstone for the constitutional right of privacy. See note 1 supra. Other fundamental rights
are the right to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), and the right to vote,
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See sources cited at note 57 supra.
60. 434 U.S. at 54 (footnotes omitted).
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impliedly have necessitated some further substantiation beyond mere
administrative convenience, which was the state's main contention in
support of the Act. 6 ' The first consideration would be relevant were
stereotypes about sex,62 national origin, 63 or race6 4 found to have
shaped the statute. The second consideration would be implicated only
if there were a showing of a conscious attempt on the part of the
legislature to interfere with a beneficiary's marriage.6 The Court carefully ascribed a* benign purpose to the marriage rule, noting that
recognized that marriage traditionally brings a
Congress had simply
66
change in status.
As noted above, the Court did not specify "suspect" classes or

"fundamental" rights as such as competing considerations. Rather, the
Court referred to stereotypes affecting legislative judgment on the one
hand and intentional interferences "with the individual's freedom to
make a decision as important as marriage" on the other.67 This second
evaluative criterion is taken from last term's opinion in Whalen v.
Roe,"8 also a unanimous decision authored by Justice Stevens. In
Whalen, the Court held that no right or liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment was invaded by a New York statute that required
61. See notes 58 & 59 supra.
62. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
63. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948). But cf. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
64. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
65. The language of "attempted interference" with individual freedom to make an important family choice was also emphasized in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Zablocki, distinguished the two cases by noting that the
Social Security Act provision challenged in Jobst did not constitute an attempt at interference with an important personal choice, whereas the Wisconsin statute at issue in Zablocki
was characterized as an "intentional and substantial interference with the right to marry."
434 U.S. at 391 (Burger, C.J., concurring). This emphasis on legislative intent should be
compared with two recent decisions: Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252 (1977), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Those cases refined the
distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination. Washington held that a qualifying
test administered to applicants for positions as police officers was not violative of equal
protection even though four times as many blacks failed the test as whites. The Court stated
that racially disproportionate impact alone is not sufficient proof of invidious discrimination
to strike down a law under the equal protection clause; instead, such laws or official acts
must also reflect a racially discriminatory purpose. 426 U.S. at 242; accord, Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. at 265.
66. 434 U.S. at 54 n.ll.
67. Id. at 54.
68. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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all prescriptions for certain habit-forming drugs to be recorded in a
central computer file for investigative purposes.6 9 Plaintiffs' principal
contention was that a constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" was
being invaded by the statutory scheme for recordkeeping .0° The Court

noted that "[language in prior opinions of the Court or its individual
Justices provides support for the view that some personal rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'. . . are so 'fundamental' that
an undefined penumbra may provide them with an independent source
of constitutional protection."'" The Court characterized these privacy
interests as being comprised of two distinct types: "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is
the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."7 2 It is the latter interest that Justice Stevens refers to as potentially protected in Jobst. The universality and reiteration of this broad
categorization of privacy interests-those relating to "certain kinds of
important decisions,"--will undoubtedly be valuable in future litigation seeking to extend the parameters of constitutionally protected private interests in family matters.7 3
69. Id. at 603-04.
70. Id. at 598.
71. Id. at 598 n.23.
72. Id. at 599-600 (footnotes omitted). Under the former category of interests, the
Court cited Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), in which the "right to be let
alone" was characterized as "the right most valued by civilized men," id. at 478 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Court stated that
"the First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion," id. at 483; and California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring; Marshall, J., dissenting). CaliforniaBankersAss'n upheld certain recordkeeping
and reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970. Justice Powell's concurrence
was limited to the narrow regulations before the Court, but he emphasized that "[a]t some
point, governmental intrusion upon [intimate areas of an individual's personal affairs] would
implicate legitimate expectations of privacy." Id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Douglas affirmed that fundamental personal rights are involved when "the Government gets
large access to one's beliefs, ideas, politics, religion, cultural concerns, and the like." Id. at
85-86 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Griswold was the landmark decision that identified a constitutional "right to privacy"
that encompassed a married couple's decision to use contraceptives. The doctrinal basis of
the right to privacy was found by the majority in the "penumbras" of selected provisions of
the Bill of Rights, by Justice Goldberg in the Ninth Amendment, and by Justices Harlan and
White in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The basis for the right of
privacy remains unclear, but it is agreed that such a right exists. See Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
73. The cases cited by the Court in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), support somewhat this broad interpretation of a constitutionally protected interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions. See 429 U.S. 600 n.26. The concept is not
limited strictly to decisions regarding family matters, as Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
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B. Marriageas a FundamentalRight

The right to marry was declared fundamental in Zablocki v.
Redhail,74 which held that a statutory classification which significantly
interfered with the exercise of the right to marry was subject to strict
scrutiny. The object of this critical examination, a Wisconsin statute7 5
(1897), cited by the Whalen Court, held it was a deprivation of liberty under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit contracts of marine insurance between
Louisiana residents and non-resident non-admitted foreign insurers.
74. 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (Marshall, J., writing for the Court).
75. Wis. STAT. § 245.10(1), (4), (5) (1973) read: "(I) No Wisconsin resident having
minor issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court
order or judgment, may marry in this state or elsewhere, without the order of either the court
of this state which granted such judgment or support order, or the court having divorce
jurisdiction in the county of this state where such minor issue resides or where the marriage
license application is made. No marriage license shall be issued to any such person except
upon court order. The court, within 5 days after such permission is sought by verified petition in a special proceeding, shall direct a court hearing to be held in the matter to allow said
person to submit proof of his compliance with such prior court obligation. No such order
shall be granted, or hearing held, unless both parties to the intended marriage appear, and
unless the person, agency, institution, welfare department or other entity having the legal or
actual custody of such minor issue is given notice of such proceeding by personal service of a
copy of the petition at least 5 days prior to the hearing, except that such appearance or notice
may be waived by the court upon good cause shown, and, if the minor issue were of a prior
marriage, unless a 5-day notice thereof is given to the family court commissioner of the
county where such permission is sought, who shall attend such hearing, and to the family
court commissioner of the court which granted such divorce judgment. If the divorce judgment was granted in a foreign court, service shall be made on the clerk of that court. Upon
the hearing, if said person submits such proof and makes a showing that such children are
not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges, the court shall grant such
order, a copy of which shall be filed in any prior proceeding.., or divorce action of such
person in this state affected thereby; otherwise permission for a license shall be withheld
until such proof is submitted and such showing is made, but any court order withholding
such permission is an appealable order. Any hearing under this section may be waived by
the court if the court is satisfied from an examination of the court records in the case and the
family support records in the office of the clerk of court as well as from disclosure by said
person of his financial resources that the latter has complied with prior court orders orjudgments affecting his minor children, and also has shown that such children are not then and
are not likely thereafter to become public charges. No county clerk in this state shall issue
such license to any person required to comply with this section unless a certified copy of a
court order permitting such marriage is filed with said county clerk.
"(4) If a Wisconsin resident having such support obligations of a minor, as stated in
sub. (I), wishes to marry in another state, he must, prior to such marriage, obtain permission
of the court under sub. (1), except that in a hearing ordered or held by the court, the other
party to the proposed marriage, if domiciled in another state, need not.be present at the
hearing. If such other party is not present at the hearing, the judge shall within 5 days send
a copy of the order of permission to marry, stating the obligations of support, to such party
not present.
"(5) This section shall have extraterritorial effect outside the state; and § 245.04(1) and
(2) [providing that out-of-state marriages to circumvent Wisconsin law are void] are applicable hereto. Any marriage contracted without compliance with this section, where such coin-
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prohibiting the marriage of any state resident under an obligation to
support minor children without a court order, which could only be
granted upon a showing both that the support obligation had been met
and that the children were not then or in the future likely to become
public charges, was held to violate the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall,
Brennan, White, and Blackmun joined in an opinion which elevated
the right to marry to the status of a constitutionally protected "fundamental right."7 6 Justices Powell and Stevens, who concurred in the
judgment, agreed that the statute violated principles of equal protection, although Justice Powell also found a due process violation. Justice Stewart based his concurrence entirely on the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The lone dissent from Justice Rehnquist
found neither the due process nor the equal protection clause to be
impediments to the statute.
In 1972, while a minor and a high-school student, Roger Redhail
was adjudged the father of a child born out of wedlock and was ordered to pay support until the child reached the age of majority.77 Unemployed and indigent, Redhail had made no such payments when, in
September of 1974, he filed an application for a marriage license with
defendant county clerk Zablocki. Redhail's application was denied because he did not have a court order directing that the license be issued.7 8 Such an order was necessary because of his child support
obligation, but it could not be issued unless he showed that he had met
the obligation and that the child was not then nor was likely to become
a public charge.79 Clearly unable to meet this burden,8" Redhail filed a
class action on behalf of all Wisconsin residents under support obligations for children not in their custody who had been refused licenses to
marry, against a class consisting of all Wisconsin county clerks.8 1 He
pliance is required, shall be void, whether entered into in this state or elsewhere." 434 U.S.
at 375-77 n.l.
76. For a discussion of fundamental rights and the corresponding level of scrutiny that
is applied where the infringement of such a right is alleged, see note 165 infra.
77. Redhail v. Zablocki, 418 F. Supp. 1061, 1063 (1976), a'd, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
78. Id. at 1063-64.
79. See note 75 supra.
80. Not only was Redhail in arrears in his child support payments, but the child was
receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. He therefore failed both prerequisites to the issuance of a court order granting him permission to
marry. It is interesting to note that since the AFDC benefits were greater than the required
payments, the child would have been a public charge even if Redhail had met his support
obligation. 418 F. Supp. at 1069. He thus would have been barred by the statute from
marrying even if he were current in his payments.
81. Since'Redhail was alleging violations of the due process and equal protection
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sought a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional and a permanent injunction restraining its enforcement.8 2 A three-judge district
court"3 certified the class84 and held that the statute violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 5
The lower court characterized the statute as one that created two
groups of Wisconsin residents who desire to marry, and subjected one
group to special treatment. 6 This group, plaintiff Redhail's class, had
to obtain a court order before marrying, which could only be issued
upon the showing described above. Any marriage contracted without
compliance was void, and persons who obtained marriage licenses
87
without complying with the statute were subject to criminal penalties.
Those indigents unable to meet their support obligations were therefore
88
unable to marry so long as they remained Wisconsin residents.
The court was initially faced with the question of the appropriate
standard of review against which to measure the statute. The court
outlined the two-tiered standard generally employed in equal protec-

tion analysis. Measured against the rational relationship test, classifications are upheld "if they are rationally related to some legitimate
governmental interest."8 9 Alternately, if "the classification impinges

upon fundamental rights or constitutes a suspect classification, it is subjected to strict scrutiny and can be upheld only if it is necessary to
promote compelling governmental interests and is narrowly drawn to
express only such interests." 9 The court found that "although not exclauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976) and jurisdiction was conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
82. 418 F. Supp. at 1063.
83. Because a permanent injunction restraining the enforcement of a state statute was
requested, designation of a three-judge court was required. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (repealed
1976).
84. The plaintiff class was certified under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (1977).
85. 418 F. Supp. 1061 (1976).
86. Id. at 1068.
87. Wis. STAT. § 245.30 (1978) reads: "(1) The following shall be fined not less than
$200 nor more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both: ...(f)Penalty
for obtaininglicense withoutpermission ofcourt. Any person who obtains a marriage license
contrary to or in violation of § 245.10, whether such license is obtained by misrepresentation
or otherwise, or whether such marriage is entered into in this state or elsewhere."
88. 418 F. Supp. at 1068-69. Under § 245.10(5), any marriage contracted without compliance with the statute is void, regardless of where it took place.
89. 418 F. Supp. at 1069 (citing United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.
528 (1973); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)). For a discussion of the rational relation standard of review, see note 6 supra.
90. 418 F. Supp. at 1069 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)). For a discussion of the strict scrutiny standard of review, see note
105, supra.
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plicitly set forth in the constitution, there is a constitutionally protected
right to marry which occupies the status of being a fundamental
right." 9 ' The individual's interest in marriage, the court noted, has
been recognized as coming within the constitutional right of privacy. 9z
Finding it "apparent" that the classification created by the statute
placed substantial burdens on the plaintiff class members' ability to
marry, the court held that the statute must be subjected to strict
scrutiny.

93

The court also held that the wealth discrimination inherent in the
statute afforded an additional justification for applying the strict scrutiny standard of review. 94 The court noted that wealth discrimination
alone does not afford a sufficient basis for invoking strict scrutiny, but
found that two distinguishing characteristics of the affected class would
make such discrimination a significant factor in constitutional analysis:
poverty resulting in a complete inability to pay for a desired benefit,
and, as a consequence, an absolute deprivation of the opportunity to
enjoy that benefit.9 5 Because the inability of certain members of the
plaintiff class to pay child support resulted in the automatic denial to
them of the state approval necessary for a legal marriage, strict scrutiny
was held to be applicable. 96
91. 418 F. Supp. at 1069 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). For a
discussion of fundamental rights, see note 105 infra.
92. 418 F. Supp. at 1069 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)). Later, the
Supreme Court upheld this conclusion. 434 U.S. at 384-86.
93. Id. at 1069-70.
94. Id. at 1070.
95. Id. at 1070 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 20
(1973)). Cf Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). In Boddie, a state statute requiring
the payment of court fees in divorce proceedings was challenged. Noting that, "resort to the
state courts is the only avenue to dissolution of their marriages," id. at 376, the Supreme
Court held the statute a denial of due process of law as applied to indigents who could not
pay the fees. Id. at 380-81.
96. 418 F. Supp. at 1070. The defendants had argued that a "sliding scale" equal protection analysis should be applied to the facts of the case, citing, inter a/ia, San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1973) (Marshall, J. dissenting); Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword,In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Modelfor a New EqualProtection,80 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972). The court rejected
this approach because "it is not apparent which contexts require application of the more
flexible equal protection approach," and because it found that strict scrutiny was still appropriate where statutory classifications infringe upon fundamental rights. 418 F. Supp. at
1071. The court also noted that the statute probably could not be upheld under such an
intermediate standard of review, since a less restrictive means of furthering the governmental interests existed. Id. (citing United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
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Applying this standard of review, the court noted that the state
bears the burden of showing a compelling interest in support of the
classification, and that the measure is narrowly drawn to achieve only
that interest.9 7 The defendants advanced two interests which they asserted were furthered by the statute: (1) providing counselling to prospective marriage partners emphasizing the necessity of fulfilling preexisting support obligations, and (2) protecting the welfare of the children who were the recipients of the support.9 8 Reviewing the legislative history, the court found some evidence supporting the contention
that counselling had been one of the main objectives of the statute.
Even accepting this, however, the court found that it was neither sufficiently compelling to warrant state interference with marriage nor narrowly drawn to implement only that interest, since counselling could be
made mandatory without so drastically interfering with marriage."
The second justification-safeguarding the children's welfare-was
recognized as a conceivably legitimate and compelling state interest,
but it was found to be unnecessary to prohibit the future marriages of
those under support obligations in order to achieve this interest. Alternative measures already existed to ensure that payments were made,
including, inter alia, wage garnishment and contempt proceduresi °°
Since "statutory provisions give the state alternative means of enforcing
the child support obligations of the plaintiff class members which do
not abridge their rights to marry,"'°' the children's welfare justification
was rejected. Although the court recognized that the state had legitimate interests in regulating the domestic relations of its residents, this
statute, not relating to the health or competency of persons to contract
marriage, was held to be outside this permissible regulatory sphere.'0 2
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the statute
was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause.10 3 Eight Jus536-37 (1973); Timberlake v. Kenkel, 369 F. Supp. 456, 466-68 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacatedand

remanded, 510 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975)).
97. 418 F. Supp. at 1071.
98.

Id.

99. Id. at 1072.
100. Id. In addition to such civil remedies, the court noted that the state could charge a

nonsupporting parent with a felony-abandonment of a minor child, Wis. STAT. § 52.05
(1978), or a misdemeanor-failure to support a minor child, id. § 52.055 (1978).
101. 418 F. Supp. at 1072. The court also noted that since the children who were public
charges were receiving support under benefit programs, allowing the marriage would have
no effect on their welfare. The court further found that some members of the plaintiff class
would actually improve their financial position if they married, due to the likelihood of a
working spouse. Id. (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975)).
102. 418 F. Supp. at 1072.
103. Zablocki v. Redhal, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). The Court noted that Redhail had also
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tices found that the statute was not compatible with constitutional
guarantees, and seven of those would employ an equal protection, as
opposed to due process, analysis to support their opinions.
Following the analytical framework established by the lower
court, Justice Marshall began his analysis by noting that the nature of
the classification and the individual interests affected would determine
what burden of justification the statute must meet under the equal
protection clause.'0" Because past decisions had established that the

right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue significantly interfered with the exercise of that right, "critical examination" of the state interests advanced in support of the
statute was held to be required.'
The Court cited Loving v.
presented a substantive due process argument in support of his case. Id. at 382. Redhail
had argued that the right of privacy is a liberty protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that a number of decisions protecting the right of privacy from
unnecessary interference by a state have relied on due process principles. All of the decisions cited by the Zablocki Court, notably Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973), did, in
fact, base the right to privacy on the due process clause. Exceptions are Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which founded the right to privacy on penumbras emanating
from selected provisions of the Bill of Rights, and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), which held that marriage and procreation are "fundamental to the very existence
and survival of the race," id. at 541, without citing a textual constitutional authority, and
that it was a denial of equal protection to sterilize persons habitually committing certain
felonies, but not to sterilize persons committing substantially similar offenses. The Zablocki
Court did not indicate why it declined to follow the due process approach.
104. See 434 U.S. at 383 (citing Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 253
(1974)). This should be compared with language Justice Marshall employed in his vigorous
dissenting opinion in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
Strenuously objecting to the "rigid two-tier model. . . as the Court's articulated description
of the equal protection test," Marshall characterized the inquiry he felt the Court had actually undertaken in equal protection cases as follows: "It has focused upon the character of
the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the state interests
asserted in support of the classification." Id. at 318 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. 434 U.S. at 383 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
312, 314 (1976); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973)). Both
Murgia and Rodriguez discuss the two-tier standard of review in the same fashion as does
the lower court in Zablocki, see notes 89 & 90 and accompanying text supra.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell pointed out that no previous decision concerning regulations touching marriage had found it to be a "fundamental right" triggering the
most exacting scrutiny. 434 U.S. at 397. Indeed, while the decisions cited by the majority
opinion and the lower court recognize freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life as coming within the concept of liberty protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, no court had formulated this freedom as a "fundamental right" that would necessarily invoke strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973), which states that "only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' . . . are included in this guarantee of privacy. . . . [The right has some extension to activities relating to marriage." Id. at 152
(emphasis added). Justice Powell emphasized that the states have long exercised virtually
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Virginia1 6 as the "leading decision" on the right to marry. " Loving
held that state antimiscegenation laws discriminated on the basis of
race in violation of the equal protection clause' 08 and deprived interracial couples of a fundamental liberty protected by the due process
clause. 0 9 The Court noted other instances, outside the context of racial
discrimination, where marriage had been recognized as fundamental to
the existence and the foundation of society." 0 More recent cases, the
Court observed, have routinely categorized the decision to marry as
among the personal decisions protected by the "right of privacy" first
enunciated in Griswold v. Connecticut."'I

The Court thus recognized two cognate bases for the "right to
marry." One evolves from the concept of personal liberty secured by
exclusive control over the domestic relations of their citizens, and that the marriage relation
traditionally has been subject to regulation, first by the church and later by the state. He
argued that "[a] 'compelling state purpose' inquiry would cast doubt on the network of restrictions that the States have fashioned to govern marriage and divorce." 434 U.S. at 399.
106. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
107. 434 U.S. at 383.
108. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 12. However, the Court only stated that, "restricting
the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause." Id. The Court in Loving thus focused only on the existence
of a racially-based discrimination; it did not state that marriage was a fundamental right.
109. Id. Although the Court stated that, "[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men," id., and that "[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person
of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State," id., the
Loving Court's due process analysis, like its equal protection inquiry, focused on the element of racial discrimination. "The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of
choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations." Id. See Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. at 398. (Powell, J., concurring).
110. The Court cited Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Maynard upheld the validity of
Oregon's divorce laws, stating that because marriage created the most important relation in
life, it must be subject to control by the legislature. 125 U.S. at 205. It is ironic that this case
should be cited in a landmark decision circumscribingthe powers of the state to regulate the
marriage relation. Meyer held a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages below the eighth grade level to be a denial of liberty under the due process clause, as
the statute unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
education of children under their control. 262 U.S. at 400. Skinner held it violative of equal
protection to sterilize some felons and not others, although similar offenses were committed.
Marriage was described as "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 316
U.S. at 541.
111. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See note 1 supra. The Court implied that Griswold stood for
the proposition that the right to marry is part of the fundamental right to privacy implicit in
the due process clause. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US. at 384. Griswold in fact found the
right to privacy in the penumbra of selected provisions of the Bill of Rights, 381 U.S. at 484.
Only the concurring opinions of Justices White and Harlan based the constitutional right to
privacy on the due process clause. See id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring), 502 (White, J.,
concurring).
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the due process clause. As the Court stated in Roe v. WIfde," 2 a decision relied on by the Zablocki majority, "[previous] decisions make it
clear that. . . personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'. . . are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.""' 3 A second basis is the personal freedom
of choice in matters of marriage and family life." 4 Last term, Whalen
v. Roe" 5 identified this freedom of choice aspect in significant decisions in life as one of the two main interests secured by a constitutionally-based "zone of privacy."' 16 Apart from these precedents, the
Zablocki Court reasoned further that inasmuch as the woman whom
Redhail desired to marry had the protected right either to secure an
abortion of their expected child or to rear it as an illegitimate child, the
decision of the couple to marry and bring the child into a traditional
7
family setting should receive equivalent protection."
The test Wisconsin had to meet in light of the fundamental character of the right to marry was that its enactment be supported by "sufficiently important state interests and [be] closely tailored to effectuate
only those interests."" 8 The state profferred the same justifications for
112. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
113. Id. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The majority in
Roe held that the right of privacy was "founded in the Fourteenth Am Jdment's concept of
personal liberty." Id. at 153. This concept of the substantive content of the due process
clause serving as the source of the right of privacy was reiterated in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 598 n.23 (1977). Whalen, authored by Justice Stevens, also cited Justice Stewart's concurrence in Roe v. Wade and Justice Harlan's concurrence in Griswold v.Connecticut, two
strongly worded substantive due process decisions. Id. Both Roe v. Wade and Whalen v.
Roe therefore indicate strong support for a substantive due process argument in the context
of privacy interests. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 US. 494, 499 (1977)
(plurality opinion). Although the trend seemed to be towards a due process basis for the
fundamental right to privacy, the Zablocki Court preferred to use an equal protection
approach.
114. See Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974): "This court has
long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one
of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
LaFleur struck down mandatory maternity leave rules promulgated by various school
boards noting that, "[b]y acting to penalize the pregnant teacher for deciding to bear a child,
overly restrictive maternity leave regulations can constitute a heavy burden on the exercise
of. . .protected freedoms." Id. at 640.
115. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
116. Id. at 598-99. "The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have in
fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making cerain kinds o/imlportant decisions." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Id.
117. 434 U.S. at 386.
118. Id. at 388 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262-63 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972)).
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the measure as had been previously advanced.' 1 9 The Supreme Court,
upholding the lower court, rejected both the "counselling" and the
"collection device" rationales.12 0 The Court noted that the statute "was
intended merely to establish a mechanism whereby persons with support obligations to children from prior marriages could be counselled
before they entered into new marital relationships and incurred further
support obligations," and the "permission [to marry] was automatically
to be granted after counselling was completed."'' 12 The Court found,
however, that the statute as enacted neither required counselling nor
provided for automatic granting of permission.122 Since this purported
jsutification-ensuring counselling-was not actually served by the
statute, it was held insufficient to validate it.12 3 As to the "collection
device" rationale, the Court found that preventing the marriage of one
unable to meet the statutory requirements did nothing to benefit the
children to be supported. 24 Additionally, the State had other, less intrusive means of enforcing the support obligation, such as wage garnishments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties. 2 5 This
justification was therefore also rejected. Finally, the State had suggested that the statute protected the welfare of the prior children by
preventing new support obligations from being incurred. In response,
the Court stated that the provisions were both underinclusive, in that
they did not limit the incurrence of other additional financial obligations other than those attending a new marriage, and overinclusive, inasmuch as a new marriage might in fact contribute to one's ability to
meet his or her support payments. 26 In the final analysis, the Court
aptly noted, preventing marriage will not necessarily mean that additional support obligations to other children will not arise, as they are
incurred whether children are born in or out of wedlock. 27 The justifications advanced in support of the classification were thus found
119. The justifications were to provide counselling to the applicant as to the necessity of
fulfilling prior support obligations, and the protection of the welfare of the children to whom
that obligation was owed. 434 U.S. at 388.
120. The Court assumed for purposes of analysis that these justifications were "legitimate and substantial interests." Id.
121. Id. (footnotes omitted).
122. Id. The Court concluded that "it can hardly be justified as a means for ensuring
counselling of the persons within its coverage." Id. at 388-89.
123. Id. at 389. The Court went on to note that even if counselling does take place, an
open question since there was no evidence that it did, there was no justification for withholding permission to marry once it was completed. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 389-90.
126. Id. at 390.
127. Id. "Since the support obligation is the same whether the child is born in or out of
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insufficiently served by its application, and the district court's opinion
was accordingly affirmed.
The Court was careful to distinguish the facts of Roger Redhail's
case from those of John Jobst's. Since Redhail was "absolutely prevented from getting married" by the statute, it "directly and substantially" interfered with his constitutional right to marry. 28 The
regulations within the Social Security Act that deprived Jobst of his
benefits, by contrast, were characterized as "reasonable regulations that
do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship" and therefore may be legitimately imposed.' 29 The Court
created, in effect, exceptions to the rule of strict scrutiny that was applied in Zablocki to invalidate the legislative classification. Without
specifying which regulations may be permissible or under what standards, the Court stated that not every enactment pertaining to the incidents of or prerequisites to marriage must be subjected to "rigorous
scrutiny."' 30 The result is a highly protected "fundamental right to
marry," but one which is not absolute and which presumably would
not extend beyond the decision to enter into a traditional, two-party,
heterosexual union.
In their concurring opinions, both Justices Powell and Stevens
stated that they would not elevate marriage to the status of a fundamental right invoking a compelling state interest analysis.' 3 ' Although
both Justices recognized that the individual's interest in marriage merits special constitutional protection, each also stressed that marriage is
not "an interest which is constitutionally immune from evenhanded
regulation."''3 2 In their view, laws prohibiting the intermarriage of
family members, for example, although "directly and substantially" interfering with the right to marry, would clearly be upheld by the
Court. 3 3 In contrast to the majority's approach, Justices Powell and
134
Stevens would apply only an intermediate standard of review.
wedlock, the net result of preventing the marriage is simply more illegitimate children."
This is exactly what occurred in Redhail's case.
128. Id. at 387.
129. Id. at 386-87. See also id. at 391 (Burger, C.J., concurring). For a criticism of the
direct and substantial/reasonable regulation distinction, see id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring), discussed in note 105 supra.
130. 434 U.S. at 386.
131. Id. at 396 (Powell, J.,
concurring), 406 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring). Seealsold.at
392 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I do not agree with the Court that there isa 'right to marry' in
the constitutional sense").
132. Id. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 396 (Powell, J., concurring), 404 (Stevens, J., concurring).
134; Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring), 406 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring). Both Justices
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Justices Stewart and Powell both based their concurrences on the
deliberate discrimination against the poor inherent in the application of
the statute. As Justice Stewart phrased it: "[A] person's inability to pay
money demanded by the State does not justify the total deprivation of a
constitutionally protected liberty."' 3 5 And in Justice Powell's words,
"[t]he vice inheres not in the collection concept, but in the failure to
make provision for those without the means to comply with child support obligations."' 3 6 The absolute foreclosure of indigents with child
support obligations from entering into a legal marriage suggested a
strong parallel with Boddie v. Connecticut.'3 7 Boddie held that a state
could not require the payment of filing fees as a prerequisite to its
granting a divorce, a function which the state alone was empowered to
perform. Since Wisconsin did not recognize marriages of its residents
not complying with the statute,' 3 8 there was in Zablocki a monopolization of a vital mechanism analogous to that found in Boddie. Consequently, the discrimination against the truly indigent rendered the
statute unconstitutional.

39

Justice Stevens' analysis in his concurring opinion was analogous
to the approach taken by Justices Stewart and Powell in that it focused
on the statute's discrimination against the poor. But while Justices
Stewart and Powell cited Boddie as precedent and thus found a due
process violation,"4 Justice Stevens echoed the majority opinion by
cited their concurring opinions in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), wherein they noted
ihat the Court had. not, in reality, followed the traditional two-tiered approach to equal
protection analysis. See id. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring), 211-12 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
135. Id. at 394 (Stewart, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring).
137. 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (Harlan, J.).
138. See note 88 supra.
139. Because the basis of their opinions on this point was the holding in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), both Justices found a violation of the due process rights of
indigent persons desirous of marrying but who were barred from doing so by their economic
status. 434 U.S. at 383. This is a departure from the majority's analysis, which focused
solely on the perceived equal protection violation. See note 103 and accompanying text
supra. However, Justice Powell also found an equal protection violation in that "[t]he challenged provisions. . . are so grossly underinclusive with respect to [the objective of preserving the ability of marriage applicants to support their prior issue by preventing them from
incurring new obligations], given the many ways that additional financial obligations may
be incurred by the applicant quite apart from a contemplated marriage, that the classification 'does not bear a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.' 434 U.S. at
402 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976)). As noted
previously, see note 134 and accompanying text supra, this represents the application of an
intermediate standard of equal protection review.
140. See note 139 supra.
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measuring the statute against the equal protection clause.' 4 ' Although
noting that classifications based on marital status are frequently upheld, he found that "[a] classification based on marital status is fundamentally different from a classification which determines who may
lawfully enter into the marriage relationship." 142 Since the second type
of classification affects an interest "sufficiently important to merit special constitutional protection,"' 143 the deference to the legislative judgment exhibited in Jobst was inappropriate in this situation. To Justice
Stevens, the controlling factor was that "a person's economic status
may determine his eligibility to enter into a lawful marriage."' 44 Upon
examination of the statutory provisions, he concluded that they reflected a series of irrational legislative assumptions about the affected
class of persons.
Justice Stevens initially noted that the statute bars marriages
which might actually improve a couple's financial situation-those
where the intended spouse is economically independent. He reasoned
that this reflected a legislative judgment "(a) that only fathers would be
affected by the legislation, and (b) that they would never marry employed women."' 145 Finding neither assumption tenable, 4 6 he concluded that by preventing such marriages the statute "not only rests on
unreliable premises, but also defeats its own objectives."' 4 7 An addi141. Justice Stevens was unable to join the majority opinion, however, because he did
not believe that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review for the statute. See
434 U.S. at 406 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 403-04 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). In an explanatory footnote, he stated that the classification in Jobst, discussedin notes 10-18 & 49-50 and accompanying text supra,was in the first category, while that in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
discussed in notes 106-09 and accompanying text supra,was in the second. 434 U.S. at 404
n.2.
143. 434 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Whalen v. Roe. 429 U.S. 589, 599600 (1977)).
144. 434 U.S. at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring). Finding that even those parents who had
met their support obligations would be prevented from marrying if their children were still
public charges, Justice Stevens concluded that, "within the class of parents who have fulfilled their court-ordered obligations, the rich may marry and the poor may not. This type
of statutory discrimination is, I believe, totally unprecedented, as well as inconsistent with
our tradition of administering justice equally to the rich and to the poor." Id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (footnotes omitted).
145. Id. at 405 (Stevens, J., concurring).
146. This first assumption was said to ignore "the fact that fathers are sometimes
awarded custody," and the second assumption "ignores the composition of today's work
force." Id. (footnotes omitted). In an explanatory footnote, Justice Stevens stated that,
"both of these assumptions are the product of a habitual way of thinking about male and
female roles 'rather than analysis or actual reflection."' Id. at 405 n.8 (quoting Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222 (1977)).
147. 434 U.S. at 405 (Stevens J., concurring).
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tional defect was found in that the statute applied only to the noncustodial parent; the parent with custody of the children does not need the
permission to marry. Since "the danger that new children will further
strain an inadequate budget is equally great for custodial and noncustodial parents,"1 48 the legislature must have assumed "(a) that only
mothers will ever have custody and (b) that they will never marry unemployed men."1 49 Being the converse of the assumptions previously
rejected, these judgments were also found irrational.' 5 0 Finally, Justice
Stevens found that the statute failed to regulate the marriages of the
most impoverished persons-those least likely to be able to afford another family-because such persons are unlikely to have support obligations, the triggering event for the statute. This too was found to be
irrational because "[i]f the State meant to prevent the marriage of those
who have demonstrated their inability to provide for children, it overlooked the most obvious targets of legislative concern."'' Because of
the lack of validity of the assumptions he found implicit in the statutory
scheme, Justice Stevens concluded, "this clumsy and deliberate legislative discrimination between the rich and the poor is irrational in so
under the Equal Protecmany ways that it cannot withstand scrutiny' 52
Amendment."'
Fourteenth
the
of
Clause
tion
The last principal point of difference between the majority and
concurring opinions is embodied in Justice Stewart's conception of the
majority's approach as a misapplication of equal protection analysis.
The equal protection clause is invoked where invidiously discrimina53
Justory classifications, such as those based on race, are challenged.
tice Stewart would find no substantive rights or freedoms in the equal
protection clause; rather, marriage is within the sphere of liberty protected by the due process clause.' 54 The problem, then, is one of an
encroachment upon that constitutionally protected freedom. Justice
Stewart was clearly accurate in that the precedents relied upon by the
majority place the interest in marriage within the scope of liberties protected by the due process clause, as the majority opinion itself con148. Id. at 405-06 (Stevens, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring).
150. Id

See note 146 supra.

151. 434 U.S. at 406 (Stevens, J., concurring).
152. Id. (footnote omitted). Although this language suggests that Justice Stevens was
applying a rational relation analysis, see note 6 supra, he suggested in a footnote that an
intermediate level of scrutiny was required. Id. at 406 n. 10 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976)). See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
153. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1136 (1978); J. NoWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 515-687 (1978).
154. 434 U.S. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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ceded.1 5 5 It can just as clearly be stated, however, as did the lower
court, that the statute created two classes of persons: those who may
marry and those who must seek court orders and meet certain prerequisites before they may marry.' 56 This classification thus created two
groups of persons and discriminated against one because it infringed
157
upon its members' rights to enter into the marriage relationship.
The majority's choice of couching the constitutional violation in
terms of equal protection rather than due process may indicate that the
Court is disenchanted with the expanding rights of privacy that have
been developed under the due process clause, 58 that the Court is disinclined to follow the substantive due process approach taken by a plurality of the Court in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,1" or simply that
the equal protection analysis was presented to the Court in a superior
fashion and was the rationale with which the majority of Justices could
be comfortable. In any event, Justice Stewart stands alone in his preference for founding his constitutional objections to the statute solely on
the due process clause.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist argued that the legislative judgment was entitled to the traditional presumption of validity;
he would apply the rational basis standard of review to the statute. 60
He characterized the statute as a permissible regulation of family life
and as a measure to assure the support of minor children.' 6 1 Justice
Rehnquist would not differentiate between the burdens imposed upon
marriage in Jobst and those imposed in Zablocki,1 62 and he found that
155. The cases relied on by the majority are all due process decisions with the exception
of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), discussedin note 103 supra. Recent due process "right to privacy" decisions include
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
156. See notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra.
157. Although conceding that the statute "affects some people and does not affect
others," 434 U.S. at 391 (Stewart, J., concurring), Justice Stewart maintained that the use of
equal protection analysis was in reality an application of substantive due process. Id.at 395
(Stewart, J., concurring). There is undoubtedly a large measure of truth in his assertion.
Whereas a finding of an equal protection violation usually requires the legislature to redraw
its classifications, the holding in Zablocki entirely disabled the State from acting, characteristically the rerult of a due process violation. However, the complete invalidation of the
statutory scheme may be due to the State's failure to include a severability clause. See id. at
401 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 404 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring).
158. See notes 103 & 155 supra.
159. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
160. 434 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the rational basis
standard of review, see note 6 supra.
161. 434 U.S. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162. His characterization of the statute considered in Jobst as making marriage "practi-
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the state had "an exceptionally strong interest in securing as much support as their parents [were] able to pay."' 6 3 The same standard of review should therefore apply, he reasoned, and the Wisconsin act should
be upheld.
The Zablocki opinion indicates what may be two important trends
where the protection of individual choice in making important decisions about family life is at issue."6 The Court in Zablocki has rather
explicitly created a fundamental right to marry in the context of equal
protection analysis, an expansion of the concept of "fundamental
cally impossible," id. at 408, was referred to by the majority as an "imaginative recasting of
the case." Id. at 387 n.12.
163. Id. at 408 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
164. It should be noted that the elucidation of a right to marry as one of the interests the
Court recognizes under the concept of "the interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions," Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (footnote omitted), is
apparently understood by the Court as strictly confined to the decision to enter into a traditional, two-party heterosexual marriage. All the cases cited in support of the proposition,
and which support the contention that the family and matters relating to family life will
receive judicial protection, were limited to cases involving the nuclear or extended natural
family. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), for example, limited its holding
specifically to the right of married couples to make their own decisions about contraception.
And in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), the Court invalidated a zoning
ordinance it perceived as "slicing deeply into the family itself," id. at 498, and thus invalid,
while it upheld, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), an ordinance that
defined single-family dwellings so as to permit any number of members of a natural family
to live together in one house but limited the number of unrelated individuals who could do
so to two. Further, in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), the Court unanimously
recognized as firmly established that "freedom of personal choice in matters of. . family
life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," id. at 255 (quoting Cleveland Bd.of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974)),
but denied the natural father of an illegitimate child veto rights over his child's adoption,
since the natural father at no time had, or sought, legal custody of the child. In addition,
since the proposed adoption would not place the child with a set of parents with whom it
had never before lived, the Court reasoned that giving full recognition to an already-existing
"family unit" (the conventionally married mother and the prospective adoptive father)
would serve the child's "best interests." 434 U.S. at 255. See also Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (upheld procedures for removal of foster children from
foster homes; the foster families did not have as intensely protectable an interest in "family
matters" as had the natural family); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199
(E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (summary affirmance of sodomy statute as not
invading privacy interests of consensual homosexual adults); Wilkinson & White, ConstitutionalProtectionfor PersonalLffestyles, 62 CORNELL L. REV.563 (1977).
The interest in freedom from state intrusion into the individual's decision to marry is
not absolutely protected, particularly when Social Security legislation, or other complex federal or state public benefit legislation is involved. Judicial deference to legislation in those
areas, as Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977) indicates, is significantly greater. See also
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (refusal of Medicaid benefits for nontherapeutic abortions upheld, although Medicaid benefits given for childbirth); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519
(1977) (no constitutional violation to publicly fund hospital services for childbirth but not to
fund nontherapeutic abortions).
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165
rights" that commentators had thought unlikely in the Burger Court.

Additionally, the analytical technique the Court used, while in sub-

stance the equivalent of strict judicial scrutiny requiring a compelling
state interest, is couched in terms of "critical examination" that will be
given legislative enactments when "rights of fundamental importance"
are "significantly interfere[d] with."' 6 6 The test the Court formulated
is, "[w]hen a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported
by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests."' 6 7 Employment of the revised "strict scru165. "Fundamental rights" analysis in terms of the equal protection guarantee originated
with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). It has been noted that use of fundamental rights in this context was the alternative the court selected after rejecting the natural
law, substantive due process approach in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). "The
natural law concepts first espoused in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalU.) 3S6 (1798) have represented the shared belief of a majority of Justices of the Supreme Court that certain values
are essential to individual liberty within our democratic structure of society, as was recently
restated in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). See also Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 541-43, 550-54 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937). After rejecting the substantive due process label because of the stigma attached
to "Lochnerizing," the Court continued to afford special recognition to values it began with
Skinner to term "fundamental." Professor Nowak delineated the "fundamental rights" deserving "strict" judicial scrutiny as: 1) the freedom of association implied by the First
Amendment, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960). NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958); 2) the right to vote and participate in the
electoral process, a prerequisite to the exercise of "liberty" under the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); 3) the right to travel freely among the states
derived from several constitutional provisions, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
4) rights accompanying the, right to a hearing in the criminal process, including right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment, Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); 5) rights of
procedural fairness where individual claims against governmental depnvation of life, liberty
or property are concerned, see, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); and 6) a fundamental right to privacy,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which encompasses the rights to freedom of
choice in marital decisions, Loving v. Virgnia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), the right of child bearing, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973), and the right of child rearing, Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 418-19 (1978).

The Burger Court has been noted for its desire to curb the expansion of additional areas
of fundamental rights. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR & J.
CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1534 passim (4th ed. 1975); Karst, The Supreme Court,
1976 Term-Foreword." Equal Citlizenshi Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1977).
166. 434 U.S. at 383.
167. Id. at 388.
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tiny" standard may indicate that the Court, while endeavoring to move
away from the incongruity of constitutional standards inherent in the
two-tiered approach to equal protection questions in which some statutes require merely a rational basis to be sustained while others must
be supported by a compelling state interest, is not reverting to a rational basis test for all classifications, but is moving perhaps to a unified
the extremes of both the
analysis on an intermediate ground that avoids
68
rational basis and strict scrutiny standards.1
C ParentalRights of Unwed Fathers
Quilloin v. Walcott16 9 is the third in the trio of decisions handed
down during the past term that deals with freedom of personal choice

in matters of family life. 17 0 A brief, unanimous opinion authored by
Justice Marshall, Quilloin represents how restrictive the Court may be
becoming in determining the rights of certain parents to determine how
their children will be raised and to maintain for themselves a place in
their children's lives even if they are not part of a traditional family
unit. The Court's opinion is a strong indication that the familial rights
previously enunciated by the Court' 7 ' will be more narrowly circumscribed where the rights of unmarried, non-traditional parents or families are in issue. Quilloin held that in certain circumstances, a less
168. It has become accepted that the Burger Court has, in fact, at least since Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), employed an intermediate or sliding-scale standard of review. See
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term--Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Modelfor,4 Newer EqualProtection,86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Nowak,
NeuRealigningthe StandardsofReview Under the EqualProtection Guarantee-Prohibited,
tralandPermissive Classfications,62 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1071 (1974). Justice Marshall, the
author of Zablocki, has repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the rigid double-tiered
dichotomy represented by the rational basis/strict scrutiny tests. See, e.g., Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-22 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Powell, concurring in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) has also openly acknowledged the emergence of the "middle tier." Justice Stevens' concurrence in Craig also openly
grappled with the problem of varying standards. Stevens would see the Court's standards as
variations on one theme: "[W]hat has become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal
protection claims does not describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather
is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion." Id. at 212.
169. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
170. See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47
(1977).
171. See, e.g., Smithv. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (procedures
for removing a child from a foster home need not, consistent with due process, meet the
standards applicable when a child is removed from its natural family). See also note I
supra.
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demanding standard, the "best interests of the child," may be applied
in the case of unwed fathers in determining their parental rights. Married or divorced parents and unwed mothers, by contrast, cannot be
separated from their children unless they are found "unfit."' 72
When Darrell Webster Quilloin was born in 1964, his parents were
neither married nor living together. His father, Leon Quilloin, provided irregular support for him, gave him presents and occasionally
visited him. In 1967, Darrell's mother married Ardell Walcott; Darrell
lived with the Walcotts and their son, born a few years later. The litigation was precipitated when, in 1976, Walcott filed a petition for Darrell's adoption. 73 Quilloin objected to the proposed adoption, filed an
application for a writ of habeas corpus for visitation rights, and petitioned for legitimation. 174 He also argued that the Georgia statutes giving sole parental control to Darrell's mother were unconstitutional
75
because they denied him the rights granted to married parents.
Under Georgia law, the mother of an illegitimate child is the only recognized parent and may exercise all parental power.' 71 Generally, no
adoption of children is permitted without the express consent of both
children, however, the consent of
parents; 77 in the case of illegitimate
178
suffices.
alone
mother
the
The trial court heard evidence relating to the child as well as to
Quilloin's fitness as a parent. It determined that the proposed adoption
and the denial of visitation rights and legitimation were in the best interests of the child. The court further held that since Quilloin had
never legitimated Darrell, he lacked standing to object to the adoption. 17 9 On appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, 8 ° Quilloin argued
172.
173.
174.
175.

Cf.Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
434 U.S. at 249-50.
Id. at 250.
Id. at 250.

176. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1973) provides: "The mother of an illegitimate child
shall be entitled to the possession of the child, unless the father shall legitimate him as before
provided. Being the only recognized parent, she may exercise all the paternal power."
177. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(l) (1975) provides: "Except as otherwise specified in the

following subsections, no adoption shall be permitted except with the Aritten consent of the
living parents of a child. Said consent, when given freely, voluntarily, may not be revoked
by the parents as a matter of right. In the case of a child 14 years of age, or over, the consent
of such child also shall be required, and must be given in writing in the presence of the
court."

178. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1975) provides: "Illegitimate children.-If the child be
illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall suffice. Such consent, however, shall not

be required if the mother has surrendered all of her rights to said child to a licensed childplacing agency, or to the Department of Human Resources."
179. 434 U.S. at 251.
180. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246 (1977).
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that the statutes operated to deny him equal protection and due process
of law. He claimed that he was entitled to the same power to veto an
adoption as is provided to married or divorced parents and to unwed
mothers. Absent a finding that he had abandoned his child or was unfit, he contended that the adoption should not have been allowed without his consent. 8 '
The Georgia Supreme Court held that classifications based on legitimacy are constitutional if based upon valid state interests. 8 2 The
court emphasized the "public policy favoring marriage and the fainfly," "the state's interest in promoting the family as an institution for
child rearing" and the fact that, "tlo further the protection and care of
its children, Georgia favors and encourages marriage and child rearing
in a family relationship."" 3 It found placing full parental power in the
mother alone to be consistent with these policies because the father
could "choose to join" the family either by marrying the mother or by
petitioning to legitimate the child. 8 4 The court found a true -lack of
interest in the child on Quilloin's part because he had failed to legitimate the child for eleven years.' 8 5 In addition, the court held that a
natural father's due process right to a fitness hearing before his child
can be taken from his custody, established in Stanley v. Illinois,'8 6 did
not apply in Quilloin's case because he was not a member of the family
unit and the child's mother was still alive.'8 7 It therefore held that the
181. Id. at 231, 232 S.E.2d at 247.
182. Id. at 232, 232 S.E.2d at 248 (citing Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971)). Labine
is all but explicitly overruled in light of Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). See also
New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Under this line of cases,
classifications based on illegitimacy are virtually 'suspect.' See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968). But see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976).
183. Id. 238 Ga. at 232-33, 232 S.E.2d at 248.
184. Id. at 232, 232 S.E.2d at 248. The provision governing legitimation is GA. CODE
ANN. § 74-103 (1973), which provides: "A father of an illegitimate child may render the
same legitimate by petitioning the superior court of the county of his residence, setting forth
the name, age, and sex of such child, and also the name of the mother, and if he desires the
name changes, stating the new name, and praying the legitimation of such child. Of this
application the mother, if alive, shall have notice. Upon such application, presented and
filed, the court may pass an order declaring said child to be legitimate, and capable of inheriting from the father in the same manner as if born in lawful wedlock, and the name by
which he or she shall be known."
185. 238 Ga. at 233, 232 S.E.2d at 248. This evidence was properly rejected by the
Supreme Court since Quilloin testified that he was unaware of the possibility of legitimizing
Darrell until he received notice of the adoption petition. See 434 U.S. at 254 n.14.
186. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
187. 238 Ga. at 233-34, 232 S.E.2d at 248-49.
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88
statute violated neither equal protection nor due process of law.1
Three justices of the Georgia court dissented. They interpreted the
Supreme Court in Stanley as holding that an unwed father has due
process rights and that he is denied equal protection when all other
parents are granted a hearing on parental fitness and he is not.'8 9 In
Stanley, an Illinois statute whereby the children of unmarried fathers
were declared state wards and placed in guardianship upon the death
of their mother without any hearing on parental fitness or proof of neglect by the natural father, although such hearing and proof were required when the state assumed custody of children of married or
divorced parents and unmarried mothers, was challenged as a denial of
due process and equal protection.1 90 The Stanley Court noted that the
due process clause protects the integrity of the family, and that such
relationships are also recognized in families not legitimized by a marriage ceremony.' 9' The unwed father's interest in retaining custody of
his children was found "cognizable and substantial."' 2 The Court
concluded that it was violative of the equal protection clause to grant a
hearing on parental qualifications to some but not all parents. There-

188. Id. at 234, 232 S.E.2d at 249.
189. Id. (Undercofler, P.J., joined by Gunter & Ingram, JJ., dissenting).
190. 405 U.S. at 646-47.
191. Id. at 651. The Court's language warrants repetition in this context, as the parallel
between the types of interests asserted in Stanley and Quilloin are significant: "The Court
has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise
one's children have been deemed 'essential,' Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923),
'basic civil rights of man,' Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), and '[r]ights far
more precious. . . than property rights,' May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). 'It is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). The integrity
of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, at 399, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, at 541, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
"Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a
marriage ceremony. The Court has declared unconstitutional a state statute denying natural, but illegitimate, children a wrongful-death action for the death of their mother, emphasizing that such children cannot be denied the right of other children because familial bonds
in such cases were often as warm, enduring, and important as those arising within a more
formally organized family unit. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968). 'To say that
the test of equal protection should be the "legal" rather than the biological relationship is to
avoid the issue. For the Equal Protection Clause necessarily limits the authority of a State to
draw such "legal" lines as it chooses.' Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76
(1968).
"These authorities make it clear that, at the least, Stanley's interest in retaining custody
of his children is cognizable and substantial." Id. at 651-52.
192. Id. at 652. See note 191 supra.

Fall 19781

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

fore, all parents were entitled to a hearing on
their fitness before their
193
children were removed from their custody.
The dissenters in the Georgia court recognized the state's interest
in promoting legitimation of the children of unwed fathers. In light of
Stanley, however, they found that an unmarried father could not be
denied rights accorded all other parents when the adoption of his children is contemplated. Under the Georgia legislation, all other parents
94
were required to give their consent before adoption could take place. 1
Consent was not necessary if the child had been abandoned, if the parent was insane or otherwise incapable of giving consent, or where the
95
parent had previously surrendered all of his or her rights to the child. 1
A finding of abandonment or wilful non-support was not required to
terminate the right of consent to adoption in the case of unwed fathers,
however; 196 in the case of illegitimate children, the consent of the
mother alone was sufficient. 19 7 Because the adoption provisions denied
Quilloin the same rights concerning his child accorded other parents,
the dissent would hold that they violated due process and equal protection. 198 The dissenters agreed with the majority that the statute placing
all parental authority in the mother was a constitutionally permissible
ordering of family relationships, and that they would uphold that
provision. 99
On appeal, the Supreme Court framed the issue before it as
"whether, in the circumstances of this case and in light of the authority
granted by Georgia law to married fathers, [Quilloin's] interests were
adequately protected by a 'best interests of the child' standard" in the
hearing before the trial court at which he was denied legitimation and
visitation rights.'c ° The court initially dismissed the finding that Quilloin had never petitioned for legitimation prior to his notice of the
adoption proceedings as the court found that he was not aware of the
existence of the legitimation procedure prior to the filing of the adoption petition.2"' The Court acknowledged that "the relationship be193. Id. at 658.
194. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(1) (1975). See note 177 supra.
195. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(2) (1975).
196. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1975). See note 178 supra.
197. Id.
198. 238 Ga. at 235-36, 232 S.E.2d at 249-50 (Undercofler, P.J., joined by Gunter &
Ingram, JJ., dissenting).
199. Id. at 236-37, 232 S.E.2d at 250.
200. 434 U.S. at 254. Quilloin's claim that the gender-based distinctions implicit in the
statutes violated the equal protection clause was not presented in his jurisdictional statement, so although the point was briefed, it was not considered by the Court. Id. at 253 n.13.
201. Id. at 254.
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tween parent and child is constitutionally protected" 20 2 and that
"'freedom of personal choice in matters of. . .family life is one of the
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' "203 But Quilloin had never sought either actual or legal
custody of the child, and the result of the adoption in this case would
be to recognize an existing family unit.20 4 These factors provided a
basis for distinguishing Stanley v. Illinois. In Stanley, the father had
lived with the mother and their children during most of eighteen years,
and the effect of the Illinois statute was to place his children with total
strangers. It was consequently held in Stanley that the father had the
same right as other parents to a fitness hearing before his children
could be made wards of the state.2 "5 Since Quilloin had not shown the
same level of commitment to or interest in his child, Stanley was im-

plicitly found inapposite.
The Quilloin opinion also noted the observation made last term in
2 °6 that the due process clause
Smith v. Organization of FosterFamilies
202. Id. at 255. The Court cited Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), where it was
held that compulsory education after eighth grade impinges upon the fundamental right to
free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment and the traditional interest of
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children. The right of parents to
rear their children was recognized as part of a "strong tradition" founded on "the history
and culture of western civilization," and it was stated that the parental role "is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." 406 U.S. at 232. The Court also
cited Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(statute prohibiting teaching of foreign language to children in the eighth grade or below
constituted deprivation of liberty in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). "Liberty" encompasses the right of the individual to "establish a home and
bring up children." Id. at 399. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
203. 434 U.S. at 255, quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40
(1974) (overly restrictive maternity leave provision penalized pregnant teachers for deciding
to bear a child; conclusive presumption of unfitness for teaching five months before the
expected childbirth violates due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
204. 434 U.S. at 255.
205. 405 U.S. at 658. See note 191 supra.
206. 431 U.S. 816 (1977). Foster Families provides strong support for the proposition
that the traditional, natural family will be given greater protection in equal protection challenges than any other family-type structure. That opinion, authored by Justice Brennan,
was joined by five Justices, with three Justices concurring in the judgment.
FosterFamiliesinvolved a due process challenge to New York's procedures for transferring children from foster homes. The lower court held that before a child may be peremptorily transferred, either to another foster family or to the natural parents, it is entitled to a
hearing at which all concerned parties may present relevant information. The foster parents
argued that they possessed a "liberty interest" in the psychological ties that develop among
foster family members.
The Court's discussion of the elements that define the concept of "family" shows that
the Court considers biological relationships and the marital relationship the basic boundaries of the "family" concept: "[Tihe usual understanding of 'family' implies biological relationships, and most decisions treating the relationship between parent and child have
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would be offended "[i]f a state were to attempt to force the breakup of a
naturalfamiy, over the objections of the parents and their children,
without some showing of unfitness andfor the sole reason that to do so
was thought to be in the children's best interest."2" 7 The Court apparently viewed Quilloin's rights as more closely akin to those of the foster
parents in FosterFamiliesthan those of the natural parents in that case.
Foster Families found that when the interests of foster parents in a
child are compared with those of its natural parents, the natural parent's interests are substantially stronger and thus subject to greater procedural safeguards. Thus, the unfitness standard had to be met in the
case of removing a child from its natural parents, but was not required
before a child could be removed from a foster home. Similarly, Quilloin could be divested of his rights in his child without a showing that
he was unfit as a parent.
Quilloin's rights as Darrell's natural father were not accorded the
same weight as those of the established family unit with which Darrell
had been living, that unit consisting of Darrell's natural mother, her
husband, and their child. The reason the Court gave as to why Quilloin could be denied his legitimation petition and visiting rights, even
though he had always maintained contact with his son, was that he had
never had actual custody of the child, and that the result of the adoption would be to recognize an existing family unit. Because of these
factors, the Court reasoned that as a matter of due process, deprivation
of Quilloin's rights in his son could properly be based on a "best interests of the child" standard, rather than upon a showing that Quilloin
was unfit as a parent.2 °8
stressed this element." Id. at 843. Although acknowledging that biological relationships are
not the exclusive determinant of the existence of a family, the Court noted that there are
important distinctions between foster and natural families and held that there was only "the
most limited constitutional liberty interest in a foster family." [d. at 843-46.
207. Id. at 862-63 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
208. 434 U.S. at 255. The arguments of the Foster Family decision to the effect that
natural parents' rights in their children are stronger than those of foster parents seems uncontrovertible when the two are compared, particularly where there is no showing of parental unfitness. The focus on the traditional family is, however, unfortunate because the
privacy and child-rearing interests recognized by Foster Families and other cases are not
likely to be extended to the interests involved in nontraditional types of family living, and
even less so to the single parent families, or families with more than one single parent and
child.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), another decision handed down
last term, is even more restrictive in its concept of family. Moore held unconstitutional a
zoning ordinance making it a criminal offense for more than a "single family" to live within
a specified area. "Family" was defined narrowly, allowing only certain blood-related family
members to live together. Mrs. Moore was fined and sentenced to jail because her son and
two grandsons lived with her, in violation of the ordinance. The Court found that East
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The Court also held that Quilloin was not denied equal protection
even though his authority to veto an adoption was not measured by the
same standard as applied to a married father. Quilloin's interests, the
opinion noted, were "readily distinguishable" from those of a separated
or divorced father."z 9 Although subject to essentially the same support
obligations as a married father, the Court emphasized that Quilloin
"has never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has
never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child." ' The distinguishing characteristic between married and unmarried fathers justifying this disparity in treatment was "legal custody of children," which
21 1
the Court found to be "a central aspect of the marital relationship.
In contrast to Quilloin, a divorced father would have borne, at least
theoretically, full responsibility for the rearing of his children during
the course of the marriage. Given this "difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child," the Court held that "the State
could permissibly give [Quilloin] less veto authority than it provides to
Cleveland's regulations sliced deeply into the family itself. Because of the interest in personal choices concerning family living arrangements, the statute was held violative of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In substantiating the Court's application
of a substantive due process rationale in overturning the statute, Justice Powell stated: "Our
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because
the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. It is
through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
moral and cultural." Id. at 503-04 (footnotes omitted). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The decision also noted that the proper limits on
substantive due process may come from "'respect for the teachings of history [and] solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.'" 431 U.S. at 503 (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (footnote omitted)).
Thus, individual liberties are restricted by whether they are "deeply rooted. . . intradition." Depending on one's point of view, these "traditions" may also encompass the concept that women should stay in the home, that consensual homosexual acts are criminal, or
indeed that sexual activity outside of the marriage relation is criminal. Problematically, the
teachings of history may not necessarily provide a reliable guide for constitutional litigation
in the context of modem society. It may be precisely those nontraditional, nonconforming
types of expression and lifestyles which are in most need of protection under the equal protection and due process "liberty" guarantees.
209. 434 U.S. at 256.
210. Id.
211. Id. It should be noted that the Court does not delve into what standard of review
would be applicable to classifications discriminating on the basis of marital status. The
Court merely notes at the close of its opinion that, "the State was not foreclosed from recognizing th[e] difference in the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child." d. According to this reasoning, the parents of illegitimate children apparently may be required to
prove a certain degree of participation in their children's upbringing before they will be
accorded the same rights as natural parents. This tendency indicates a withdrawal from the
Court's more liberal stance in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See note 191 supra.
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a married father.
The Court thus held the extent of pecuniary support for and involvement with the child to be determinative of the quantum of parental rights afforded an unwed father. What is particularly notable is the
Court's emphasis on custody of the child, since legal custody may not
be a viable alternative for impoverished fathers or for fathers who must
spend a large portion of the day working and therefore away from their
children. The Court assumed, as had the Georgia Supreme Court, that
legitimation or custody were possible alternatives for Quilloin. The
Georgia Court indicated that Quilloin could have joined in the family
either by marrying Darrell's mother or by legitimating Darrell. 213 It is
questionable whether parental rights should be dependent upon the
marital status of the parents. For any number of reasons, the failure to
marry may not have been a matter of Quilloin's personal choice. Furthermore, Quilloin's option of legitimating Darrell was not unilateral
or absolute, since Darrell's mother had a right to object to the proposed
legitimation.2" 4 In fact, during the legitimation proceeding held in the
trial court, it was determined that it was in Darrell's best interest that
his father not legitimate him.21 5 Without legitimation, Quilloin was
precluded from vetoing his child's adoption.
The reasons for Quilloin's failure to exercise custody were similarly not examined by the Court, except to note that Quilloin had not
sought it. This fact was held sufficient not only to preclude Quilloin
from determining whether or not his son would be adopted, but also
from legitimating his son and from acquiring any rights to visit him in
the future. The rights of an unmarried father in regard to his children,
then, appear sharply limited by the extent of his relationship with their
mother, because whether he married or lived with her reflects at least in
part the extent of his relationship with his children. Other factors reflecting on that relationship include whether he was able to support
them financially or to secure their custody.
This unanimous decision held that different criteria may constitutionally be applied, under any standard of review, 216 to the rights of
fathers in regard to their children, depending upon whether or not they
are unwed. By clearly giving greater weight to the "family interests" of
established, traditionally married family units, the Court gave a strong
212. 434 U.S. at 256.
213. 238 Ga. at 232, 232 S.E.2d at 248.
214. See note 184 supra.
215. See 434 U.S. at 251.

216. Id. at 256.
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indication in Quilloin that its avowal of freedom of personal choice in
matters of family life will be limited to a narrow concept of family, one
encompassing only the heretofore legally recognized marital unit.
II.

Classifications Based on Alienage

A.

Foley v. Connelie

Chief Justice Burger, joined by a clear majority of the Court,217
authored Foley v. Connelie,21 8 a decision which signals an abrupt volte

face concerning the extent of protection the Court will accord aliens
under the equal protection clause. Alienage was explicitly added to the
narrow category of suspect classes only seven years ago in Graham v.
Richardson,"' and has been subjected to varying degrees of scrutiny
22 0
when used as the basis of federal or state statutory classifications.
217. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices Stewart, White, Poxell and Rehnquist.
Justice Blackmun concurred in the result. Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices
Brennan and Stevens. Justice Stevens was joined in a separate dissent by Justice Brennan.
218. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
219. 403 U.S. 365 (1971). Graham held that a state may not condition receipt of welfare
benefits on possession of U.S. citizenship, or impose a 15 year residency requirement on
noncitizens. The Court held, "[C]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny. Aliens as a
class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority. . . for whom such heightened
judicial solicitude is appropriate." 403 U.S. at 372 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prod.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)) (footnotes omitted). The judgment was almost unanimous, as eight Justices joined in Justice Blackmun's majority opinion and Justice Harlan
joined in it in part. Subsequent to Graham, the Supreme Court has relied on that decision
and reiterated that strict scrutiny is applicable in cases involving state statutory classifications based on alienage. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1,7 (1977) (Burger, C.J., Powell,
Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (state statute excluding aliens from state educational
grants struck down in 5-4 decision); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v.
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting in part, Stevens, J.,
abstaining) (Puerto Rican statute excluding aliens from private practice of civil engineering
struck down in a 7-1 decision); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (Burger, C.J., &
Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (state court rule prohibiting aliens from pri%ate practice of law
struck down in a 7-2 decision); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) (Relnquist,
J., dissenting) (state law excluding aliens from all competitive civil ser%ice positions struck
down in an 8-1 decision).
220. State action excluding aliens from a broad range of public employment, see
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), or from "common occupations of the community," see Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (11)76); In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717 (1973), and state statutes withholding public benefits from aliens, see Nyquist
v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (11471), have been examined under strict judicial scrutiny and found to violate the equal protection guarantee.
See also note 219 supra. Federal laws discriminating against aliens are subject to more
relaxed standards of review under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, however,
due to Congress' plenary power over immigration and naturalization, its power over foreign
commerce, and its war power. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7, 8 n.8 (1977); Hampton
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Connelie established a broadly defined exception to the virtual hornbook-law rule that state classifications based on alienage are subject to
strict scrutiny. 22 1 The Court reasoned that "'a State's historical power
to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institutions'" is part of its obligation "'to preserve the basic conception of a
political community.' "222 As regards matters that are " 'firmly within a
State's constitutional prerogatives' "223 in this respect, Connelie held
that "[t]he State need only justify its classification by a showing of some
rational relationship between the interest sought to be protected and
the limiting classification. 2 24 Under this deferential standard of review, the state of New York was permitted to exclude aliens from its
police force.
Edmund Foley, a citizen of Ireland, was a permanent resident
alien, eligible to become a naturalized citizen upon fulfilling the five
year residency period required as a prerequisite to applying for citizenship,2 25 when he sought appointment as a New York state troopv. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100-01 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-87 (1976);
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.6 (1976). This bifurcated approach to equal protection analysis of alienage classifications has been noted by commentators to be indicative of
the sliding scale standard of review the Court actually employs, without acknowledgement,
in equal protection analysis. Although alienage has been accepted as a "suspect" classification, differing standards of review are employed depending on whether the action is taken
by state or federal government. This lack of clarity contributes to uncertainty as to what
types of discrimination against aliens are constitutionally permissible. See J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 592-601 (1978); L. TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1052-56 (1978); K. Karst, The FifthAmendment's Guaran-

tee ofEqualProtection, 55 N.C.L. Rav. 541 (1977).
221. See Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Mansfield, C.J., dissenting), a'd, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
222. 435 U.S. at 295-96 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647, 648 (1973)).
223. 435 U.S. at 296 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)).
224. 435 U.S. at 296.
225. See 5 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q., 131 n.345 (1978). Aliens can file a petition for naturalization only after residing in this country for five years, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1976), or three
years if married to an American citizen, 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1976). The naturalization laws
have created certain exceptions to this durational requirement where the alien is (1) married
to a citizen employed abroad by the government, by a United States institution of research
or as a missionary, and is present in the country at the time of naturalization and declares an
intention to reside in the country as soon as his or her spouse terminates such foreign employment; (2) employed for at least five years by a nonprofit corporation recognized by the
United States Attorney General as one that promotes United States interests abroad; or (3) is
the surviving spouse of a citizen killed during a period of honorible service in the armed
forces and who was living in "marital union" with the citizen spouse at the time of death. 8
U.S.C. §§ 1430(b)-(d) (1970). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S.
1 (1977), pointed out that these exceptions are de minimus, Id. at 18 n.1 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), and went on to state the rationale behind holding certain classifications of aliens
"suspect": "If a classification. . . places aliens in one category, and citizens in another,
then, thereafter, every entering resident alien must pass through a period of time in this

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 6:19

er.226 He was not permitted to take the qualifying competitive
examination, however, pursuant to a New York statute under which
only United States citizens may be appointed to the state police
force. 227 Eligibility for beginning positions was further limited to those
between 21 and 29 years of age.2 28 By the time he could become naturalized, Foley would be too old to apply for a trooper position. 22 9 He
therefore brought a class action seeking a declaration that the New
York law was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause insofar as it excluded aliens from employment, and for an injunction restraining its enforcement. 230 A three-judge district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, upholding the statute's validity.
The lower court evaluated recent Supreme Court decisions relating to employment prohibitions against aliens, 231 and determined that
the strict scrutiny, compelling state interest test applied to cases involving the "discrete and insular minority" of aliens.23 2 The court found,
however, that an exception to this rule was articulated in Sugarman v.
Dougall,2 33 the Supreme Court decision invalidating New York's total
exclusion of aliens from its competitive civil service positions. Under
Sugarman, a state has an historic obligation "'to preserve the basic
conception of a political community.' "234 To accomplish this goal, a
state has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and
voters. This power, the Sugarman Court found, applies "also to persons holding state elective or important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who participate directly in the
formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy perform funccountry during which he falls into the one category and not the other. Nothing except time
can remove him from his identified status as an 'alien' and from whatever associated disabilities the statute might place on one occupying that status. In this sense, it is possible to view
aliens as a discrete and insular minority, since they are categorized by a factor beyond their
control." Id. at 18-19.
Justice Rehnquist's rationale is especially appealing when applied to Foley's case, although the Court did not elaborate on this point. Due to the age restrictions, see note 229
and accompanying text infra, Foley was wholly precluded from attaining a position as a
police officer, even though he would, after the mandatory waiting period, become a citizen.
226. 435 U.S. at 292.
227. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 215(3) (McKinney 1972): "No person shall be appointed to the
New York State police force unless he shall be a citizen of the United States."
228. Id.
229. Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. at 900 n.l.
230. Id. at 890.
231. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), In re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
232. 419 F. Supp. at 894.
233. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
234. Id. at 647 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972)).
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tions that go to the heart of representative government. 2 35 Such state
action, while "not wholly immune from scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause"2 36 will be subjected to less demanding scrutiny:
This Court has never held that aliens have a constitutional right
to vote or to hold high public office under the Equal Protection
Clause. . . . A restriction on the employment of noncitizens,
narrowly confined, could have particular relevance to this important state responsibility, for alienage itself is a factor that reason' 237
ably could be employed in defining "political community.
From its reading of Sugarman, the lower court concluded that
"[t]he classification of alienage, suspect for some purposes, may be permissible when the state is dealing with democratic government and its
participants."2 3 Applying this standard, the court found that the state
trooper's job is a "delicate nonelective executive. . . position" and that
it "entails participation in state government. '23 9 It is therefore "not
included in the class of 'common occupations of the community' to
which the shelter of the equal protection clause has been held to extend
for the benefit of aliens.""2 4 Foley's exclusion from the state police
force was therefore held constitutionally permissible.2 4 ' In the alternative, the district court found that even under strict scrutiny, the statute
would withstand constitutional challenge because the state had asserted
a compelling state interest in "the maintenance of public order to effect
the preservation of the political structure." 4 2 Viewing aliens as existing in a "limbo of loyalty" for at least five years while they retain
their foreign citizenship,24 3 the court would have upheld the exclusion
of aliens from the police force under any standard of review.
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's analysis, except
that the majority did not find it necessary to go so far as to apply strict
scrutiny to the classification in question. Rather, the Court elevated the
Sugarman exception, which had been dicta and had been characterized
235. Id.
236. Id. at 648.
237. Id. at 648-49.
238. 419 F. Supp. at 895 (citing Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
239. Id.
240. Id. (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973)).
241. The court stated, "We believe that the state has a special interest in the composition
of its police force which justifies exempting it from the class of ordinary occupations from
which aliens cannot be excluded," 419 F. Supp. at 895, and concluded, "This is a situation
where citizenship bears a vital and essential relationship to the proper performance of the
duties of a state trooper." Id.

242. Id. at 898. See id. at 896-98.
243. Id. at 898.
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as a narrow exception last term in Nyquist v. Mauclet,244 into a fully
mature decisional rule in equal protection jurisprudence relating to
alienage classifications.
The bulk of the concise majority opinion developed the Court's
rationale that the police function is "one of the basic functions of government,"2 45 equating the broad discretionary powers of police officers
with the duties of jurors and judicial officers.24 6 The duties of the latter
encompass the power to judge citizens, a power which only citizens
may themselves exercise. By analogy, the Court found it fitting that
only citizens be vested with the "almost infinite variety of discretionary
powers ' ' 47 ranging from invasion of privacy in public places to making
an arrest without a warrant.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion provided an interpretation of the
decisions relating to aliens since Graham. He was careful to point out
that although "the Court ha[d] treated certain restrictions on aliens
with 'heightened judicial solicitude,' "248 the Court had "never suggested that such legislation is inherently invalid, nor. . . held that all
limitations on aliens are suspect."24 9 The Chief Justice characterized
244. 432 U.S. 1 (1977). In Nyquist, the Court discussed the parameters of the Sugarman
exception and found it exceedingly limited: "[Als Sugarman makes quite clear, the Court
had in mind a State's historical and constitutional powers to define the qualifications of
voters, or of 'elective or important nonelective' officials 'who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.'" Id. at 11 (quoting Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)). The Nyquist Court went on to state, "In re Grfflths,
decided the same day, reflects the narrowness of the exception. In that case, despite a recognition of the vital public and political role of attorneys, the Court found invalid a state-court
rule limiting the practice of law to citizens." 432 U.S. at 11. This view of the Sugarman
exception, expressed only last term in Nyquist, and the view implicit in Co'nnelle are sharply
at variance. That Nyquist represented a bare majority opinion and that Connelie was supported by six members of the Court indicates a trend to expand, rather than curtail, the
Sugarman exception.
245. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. at 297.
246. Id. at 299. The States may constitutionally exclude aliens from voting. See
Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344
(1972). States also have the power to prescribe the manner of selection and qualifications of
its officers. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Boyd v. Nebraska exrel. Thayer,
143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892). The Connelie reasoning supports the proposition, as yet not explicitly relied upon by the Court, that aliens may also be excluded from jur3 service. See 435
U.S. at 296; Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974), afd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976)
(exclusion of aliens from grand and petit jury panels in state and federal courts does not
deny resident alien equal protection).
247. 435 U.S. at 297.
248. Id. at 294 (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)).
249. 435 U.S. at 294. In one sense, the Court is correct, as the compelling state interest
test has never meant automatic invalidation of laws, even in those cases involving racial
classifications. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). However, cases
dealing with State exclusions of aliens have consistently stated that classifications involving
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those state statutes that have been struck down, such as those excluding
aliens from educational benefits,25 ° public employment,2 5 ' or licensed
professions, 252 as striking "at the noncitizen's ability to exist in the
community, a position seemingly inconsistent with the Congressional
determination to admit the alien to permanent residence. ' 25 3 He concluded that "[t]he essence of our holdings to date is that although we
extend to aliens the right to education and public welfare, along with
the ability to earn a livelihood and engage in licensed professions, the
right to govern is reserved to citizens. 2 54
Chief Justice Burger was concerned that subjecting all statutory
exclusions of aliens to strict scrutiny would "'obliterate all the distinctions between citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizenship.'-255 Citing Sugarman, he noted the "'State's
alienage are suspect. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7 (1977); Examining Bd. of Eng'rs
v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 602 (1976); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
250. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). It should be noted that in Connelie the Chief
Justice was evaluating the importance of educational benefits to the ability of aliens to survive as permanent residents in a manner inconsistent with the views in this regard set forth
in his dissenting opinion in Nyquist. In that case, he distinguished all previous decisions
striking down state classifications based on alienage as involving the denial of essential
means of economic survival. See id. at 12-14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He stated that he
would not treat educational benefits as essential to survival. Id. at 13.
In his dissenting opinion in Nyquist, the Chief Justice suggested a method of determining the constitutionality of various discriminations against aliens. He would allow exclusion
of aliens if a 'fundamental personal interest is not at stake." Id. at 14 (emphasis in the
original). But if alienage is truly a "suspect classification," an additional inquiry as to
whether a "fundamental interest" is involved, as a prerequisite to invoking strict scrutiny, is
redundant. Such a requirement would strip the concept of suspect classifications of its
meaning. This view was not advanced by the majority in Connele.
251. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973). The exclusion of aliens from private
employment was struck down in the early case of Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). The
observation of the Court there bears repeating: "It requires no argument to show that the
right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence
of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. . . . If this could be refused solely upon the ground of race or nationality,
the prohibition of the denial to any person of the equal protection of the laws would be a
barren form of words." Id. at 41 (citations omitted). The Connelie majority stressed that the
office of a policeman is not one of the "common occupations of the community" referred to
in Truax. 435 U.S. at 298.
252. Examining Bd. of Eng'rs v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (exclusion of all
non-citizens from practice of civil engineering in Puerto Rico held unconstitutional); In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (exclusion of all permanent resident aliens from the practice of
law held a denial of equal protection).
253. 435 U.S. at 295.
254. Id. at 297.
255. Id. at 295 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 14
(1977)).
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historical power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic
political institutions'" as part of the sovereign's obligation "'to preserve the basic conception of a political community.' ,,25 The essence
of citizenship is the entitlement to participate in the processes of democratic decisionmaking. The Court found it clear that a state may deny
aliens the right to vote or to run for elective office, for these rights "lie
at the heart of our political institutions."2 " 7 The majorit. opinion also
indicated that aliens may be excluded from jury service, for similar reasons.2 5 Finally, the Court noted that "citizenship may be a relevant
qualification for fulfilling those 'important nonelective executive, legislative and judicial positions,' held by 'officers who participate directly
in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.'-259
The police officer was held to occupy such a position, justifying the
exclusion of aliens from New York's police force.2 6 °
Connelie thus established a new "test" for alienage classifications.
The "practical consequence" of the theory that the state must preserve
its political community, the Court held, is that "'our scrutiny will not
be so demanding where we deal with matters firmly within a state's
constitutional prerogatives.' . . . The state need only justify its classification by a showing of some rational relationship between the interest
Connelie
sought to be protected and the limiting classification." 2 6'
posits an essentially open-ended, ad hoc test to determine whether a
state is acting within its constitutional prerogatives: "[We must necessarily examine each position in question to determine whether it involves discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of policy, which
substantially affects members of the political community."2 6' 2 The majority had no difficulty in classifying the exercise of police authority as
calling for a high degree of judgment and discretion, the abuse of
which could have a serious impact on individuals. 263 The test as formulated, however, could also be applied to a wide number of positions
in both the private and public sectors that "substantially affect" citizens. The Court's new test subtly, but importantly, differs from
256. 435 U.S. at 295-96 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647, 648 (1973)).
257. 435 U.S. at 296.' See note 246 supra.
258. Id. See note 246 supra.
259. 435 U.S. at 300 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
260. 435 U.S. at 300. The Court stated, "In the enforcement and execution of the laws
the police function is one where citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands of the particular position." Id.
261. Id. at 296 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973)).
262. 435 U.S. at 296 (footnote omitted).
263. Id. at 297-98. The Court emphasized the discretionary power of an arresting officer
without a warrant to curtail citizens' liberty and to invade their privacy. Id.
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Sugarman's initial formulation. The Court would now permit the exclusion of aliens from any position involving "discretionary decisionmaking or execution of policy."
Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion 264 emphasized the narrowness of the Sugarman exception relied upon by the majority and the
fact that it was so characterized only last term in Nyquist v. Mauclet.265
In his view, the phrase "execution of broad public policy" applies only
to those persons having "responsibility for actually setting government
policy pursuant to a delegation of substantial authority from the legislature. 2' 66 The majority's reading of Sugarman would permit the exception to swallow the rule. Justice Marshall found a substantial
difference between "the formulation and execution of broad public pol2 67
icy and the application of that policy to specific factual settings."
The policy judgments that govern police officers' conduct are not formulated by the officers themselves; rather, they are contained in the
federal and state constitutions, statutes and regulations. 268 The law enforcement responsibilities of a state trooper do not make him a formulator of government policy any more than the practice of law makes an
attorney a judicial officer equivalent to a judge.2 6 9 Since no compelling
interest had been proffered by the state, Justice Marshall would hold
the state's exclusion of aliens from state trooper positions a violation of
the equal protection clause. 7 0
Justice Stevens' dissent 27 1 attempted to divine the assumptions the
state was making about aliens as a class. In his view, the validity of the
wholesale exclusion of aliens from this government service required a
satisfactory answer to the question, "What is the group characteristic
that justifies the unfavorable treatment of an otherwise qualified individual simply because he is an alien?" 27 2 Finding that the disqualify264. 435 U.S. at 302-07 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
265. 432 U.S. 1 (1977), discussedin note 244 supra.
266. 435 U.S. at 304 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
267. Id.
268. Id.

269. Id. at 306. Justice Marshall was referring to In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). In
that case, the justification offered by the State of Connecticut for its exclusion of permanent
resident aliens from the bar, that attorneys are "officers" of the court and must therefore be
citizens, was rejected in a 7-2 decision.
270. 435 U.S. at 306-07.
271. 435 U.S. at 307-12. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 308. Justice Stevens' approach in his dissenting opinion should be compared
to the reasoning applied by the Court in a line of cases dealing with gender-based classifications. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Justice Brennan noted that statutes "employing gender as an inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of classification" had been
invalidated. Id. at 198. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975); Schles-
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ing characteristic implicit in the statute was aliens' foreign allegiance,
suggesting a lack of trustworthiness or loyalty, Justice Stevens concluded, "[u]nless the Court repudiates its holding in In re Griths,...
it must reject any conclusive presumption that aliens, as a class, are
disloyal or untrustworthy."273
Justice Stevens also criticized the exception to the rule of strict
scrutiny formulated by the majority. The line between policymaking
and nonpolicymaking positions should be drawn "in as consistent and
intelligible a fashion as possible. ' 274 He noted two areas where police
officers are categorized differently than their superiors. In the context
of immunity from liability, a police officer is judged by a good faith
and probable cause standard, while the decisions of officers of the executive branch are judged by a more complex standard.2 5 And in the
political patronage context, the Court has held that most public employees are protected from discharge because of their political beliefs,
but that when an administration changes certain policymaking officials
may constitutionally be removed based on their political affiliation. 76
Justice Stevens argued that under either concept, a state trooper would
not be deemed a high-ranking, policymaking official. He found it "inexplicable" that the trooper was so characterized when the issue was
"whether persons may be excluded from all positions in the police force
simply because they are aliens. 2 7 7
Justice Stevens' last point was particularly insightful. He strongly
disagreed with the majority's "unarticulated premise that the police
function is at 'the heart of representative government' and therefore all
persons employed by the institutions performing that function 'participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public
policy.' "278 In his judgment, "in our representative democracy neither
inger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 (1973).
He went on to state, "[l]ncreasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females
in the home rather than in the 'marketplace and world of ideas' were rejected as loose-fitting

characterizations incapable of supporting state statutory schemes that Nere premised upon
their accuracy." 429 U.S. at 198-99. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535 n.17 (1975). Just as misconceptions or archaic notions about
the role of women implicit in gender-based classifications may not ser. c to validate those
classifications under the equal protection clause, it can be argued that misconceptions about
aliens' loyalty, for example, should not be used as a pretext for discrimination without any
empirical proof of the truth of such an assumption.
273. 435 U.S. at 308 (footnote omitted). See note 269 supra.
274.
275.
276.
277.

Id. at 310.
Id. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 245-47 (1974).
435 U.S. at 310. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
435 U.S. at 310.

278. Id., quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973).
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the constabulary nor the military is vested with broad policymaking
responsibility. Instead, each implements the basic policies formulated
directly or indirectly by the citizenry." 7 9 Justice Stevens would apply
the following rationale: a state may not deny aliens equal access to employment opportunities without a good and relevant reason. Although
aliens may be excluded from participation in policymaking, the police
officer is not such a policy formulator. Even were this analysis not employed, the Court "should not uphold a statutory discrimination
against aliens, as a class, without expressly identifying the group characteristic that justifies the discrimination."2 8 Because Justice Stevens
found that there was no such group characteristic, in his view the exclusion was a violation of equal protection.
Connelie leaves the "suspect" classification of alienage in an uncertain position. What was thought to be a classification to which strict
judicial scrutiny applied2 8 1 is now subject to varying standards of review. If a statutory exclusion of aliens is within a state's "constitutional
prerogatives," the rational basis test will be applied. If not, then presumably a state must demonstrate a compelling interest in the exclusion and that no less drastic alternative is available. As Justice Stewart
noted in his concurring opinion, "it is difficult if not impossible to reconcile the Court's judgment in this case with the full sweep of the reasoning and authority of some of our past decisions." '8 2 The status of
classifications based on alienage, after Connelie, is thus uncertain.
ANNE HIARING*

279. 435 U.S. at 310. Justice Stevens concluded, "[u]nder the standards announced in
Sugarman,therefore, a blanket exclusion of aliens from this particular governmental institution is especially inappropriate." Id.
280. Id. at 311-12.
281. See note 219 supra.
282. 435 U.S. at 300 (Stewart, J., concurring).
* Member, third-year class.

Preemption and Commerce Clause
PREEMPTION

I. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
In March of 1978, the Supreme Court handed down a decision
that had been anxiously awaited by two often antagonistic
groups-environmentalists and oil companies. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield

Co. I involved the question of whether the State of Washington could
enforce certain regulations against oil tankers operating in Puget
Sound. The resulting decision had more practical than legal significance. Although the Court did not stray from its established mode of
preemption analysis, the decision struck down restrictive state regulations that would have increased shipping costs for oil, thereby increasing the retail costs of petroleum products.2
The federal law involved in Ray was the Ports and Waterways
Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA),3 enacted to protect life, property and the
marine environment. The PWSA was designed to ensure vessel safety
and the protection of navigable waters and adjacent shore areas from
tanker cargo spillage.4 Title I of the PWSA authorizes the Secretary of
Transportation, through the Coast Guard, to establish and operate vessel traffic control systems for congested ports and to require ships to
comply with such systems.5 Title II requires the Secretary to establish
rules and regulations concerning the design, construction and operation
of vessels covered by the Act.6 Amendments to the Act, proposed in
1977, 7 would supplement the federal standards for tankers over 20,000
1. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
2. An example of the increased costs that would have resulted from enforcement of the
invalidated requirements are those that would have arisen from the prohibition against the
operation in Puget Sound of any oil tanker larger than 125,000 deadweight tons. This restriction would prohibit the use of "supertankers," which transport over half of all the oil
shipped by water and achieve significant economies of scale.
3. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA) §§ 101-107, 33 U.S.C. §§ 12211227 (1976); PWSA § 201, 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975). The sections codified in 33
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1976) are under Title I of the PWSA, Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 424;
the section codified in 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975) is under Title II of the same Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-340, 86 Stat. 427. Subsequent textual references to Title I and Title II will
refer to the above enumerated sections of the PWSA.
4. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. at 161.
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1221(l)-(2) (1976).
6. 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975).
7. ProposedAmendmentsto the Portsand Waterways SafetyAct, S. 682, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S8748 (1977).
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deadweight tons (DWT)8 and set up comprehensive standards and procedures governing their design and operation.
The state regulations at issue were known collectively as the
Washington Tanker Law.9 They were enacted to regulate certain aspects of the design, size and movement of oil tankers in Puget Sound in
order to decrease the likelihood of oil spills in the Sound and adjacent
areas. '0 Three of the Tanker Law's provisions were challenged in Ray:
(1) a requirement that both enrolled and registered" oil tankers of at
least 50,000 DWT carry a state-licensed pilot while navigating Puget
Sound;' 2 (2) a requirement that enrolled and registered oil tankers
weighing between 40,000 and 125,000 DWT satisfy certain design or
safety standards, or else use tug escorts while navigating the Sound;' 3
and (3) a complete prohibition against operation in the Sound of any
tanker exceeding 125,000 DWT. 14
An oil company, Atlantic Richfield, and a shipping concern, Seatrain Lines, Inc., challenged the constitutionality of the Tanker Law,
claiming that it was invalid under both the commerce clause' 5 and the
supremacy clause16 of the United States Constitution. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Evans,'" a three-judge district court ruled the Tanker Law
unconstitutional in its entirety. 8 The court held that the operative
state regulations were preempted by the PWSA since both statutes were
intended to regulate the same subject matter.' 9 In looking to the con8. Id § 104(5).
9. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
10. Id § 88.16.170.
11. See note 50 infra.
12. WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.

§§ 88.16.170-.190 (Supp. 1977).

§ 88.16.180 (Supp. 1977).
13. Id § 88.16.190(2).
14. Id § 88.16.190(1).
15. The commerce clause gives Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several states." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
17. No. C 75-648-M (W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 1976).
18. Id, slip op. at 6.
19. Id The court viewed the purpose of Title II of the PWSA as the establishment of"a
uniform set of regulations governing the types of ships permitted within the coastal waters of
the United States and the conditions under which they would be permitted to operate." Id,
slip op. at 3. "Balkanization" of the regulatory authority over those interstate transportation
systems, the court stated, was foreclosed by the national policy embodied in the federal act.
Id
The State of Washington had argued that the minimum design specifications required
by WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 88.16.190(1) were not preempted since they could be avoided
so long as the tanker had a tugboat escort. No. C 75-648-M, slip op. at 3. The court rejected
this argument, however, pointing out that Congress had given the Coast Guard the authority
to require tug escorts in Puget Sound under hazardous conditions, 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3)(iv)
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gressional intent embodied in the PWSA, the court noted that Congress
did not invite state participation in the regulation of oil tankers.2 0
Since the state statute had invaded, or at least overlapped, a federal
regulatory scheme, supremacy clause principles mandated preemption
of the state law. The United States Supreme Court agreed to review
the case 2 and heard oral arguments in the fall of 1977.22
A.

The Preemption Doctrine

Under the supremacy clause, state laws may be superseded or preempted by federal enactments in two situations: (1) where the state law
can be "fairly interpreted"2 3 to be in actual conflict with a valid congressional act;24 and (2) where Congress has expressly or impliedly reserved the field for federal authority, whether or not there is a federal
law in effect. 2 Thus, a state law that otherwise has no constitutional or
legal infirmity may still be unenforceable if Congress has occupied the
regulatory field. Although preemption has been referred to as a "preferred ground" in the constitutional analysis of state power to regulate,26 courts have differed as to the appropriate mode of analysis and
the doctrine's application has at times been inconsistent. 7 Generally,
preemption on the grounds of conflict between the state and federal
laws does not require conflict on the face of the provisions. State laws
28
have been struck down where a court has found an "actual conflict"
(1976), and that the Coast Guard had considered so doing. No. C 75-648-M, slip op. at 3-4.
Thus, even the Tanker Law's tugboat escort provision was held preempted by the PWSA.
20. No. C 75-648-M, slip op. at 4-5. In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished
the congressional intent behind the PWSA from that embodied in other environmental regulations, including the Estuarine Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1226 (1976), the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1165 (1976), the Deepwater Ports Act of
1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1976), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1976). In
these other statutes, Congress had invoked the concept of "cooperative federalism," whereby
it funded and encouraged the coastal states to design comprehensive and forward-looking
coastal management plans.
21. 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
22. The case was argued on Oct. 31, 1977.
23. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912).
24. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663
(1962); McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
25. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218 (1947); Erie R.R. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914).
26. See Note, Preemption as a PreferentialGround-A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959). See generally Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword,86 YALE L.J.
1019 (1977); Note, The PreemptionDoctrine- Shiffing Perspectiveson Federalismand the Burger Court,75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975).
27. See generally Catz & Lenard, The Demise of the Implied Federal Preemption
Doctrine,4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295 (1977).
28. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. at 533.
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with the objectives behind the federal enactment.2 9 In such cases,
courts have examined the effect of the state provision to see if it encourages or discourages conduct that Congress has also sought to regulate.3 °
In the 1977 case of Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,3 for example, the
Court invalidated a California labeling regulation requiring that the
average weight of any given package not be less, at the time of sale,
than the net weight or measure stated upon the package.3 2 In deciding
the preemption question, the Court viewed its task as that of determining "whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, [the
State's] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. ' 33 The federal law in
question was the Fair Packaging and Labeling Act (FPLA), as
amended by the Wholesome Meat Act. 34 The Court pointed out that
Congress had clearly stated that a major purpose of the FPLA was to
facilitate value comparisons among similar products; this goal, the
Court declared, "[o]bviously. . . cannot be accomplished unless packages that bear the same indicated weight in fact contain the same quantity of the product for which the consumer is paying."3 5 The California
law allowed differences in weight only where they were caused by unavoidable deviations in the manufacturing process; 36 in contrast, the federal law permitted deviations caused by unavoidable losses due to both
the manufacturing and distribution processes. 37 Thus, the Court stated,
"[C]onsumers throughout the country who attempted to compare the
value of identically labeled packages of flour would not be comparing
packages which contained identical amounts of [the product]. '38 As a
result, a major purpose of the FPLA-the promotion of comparison
shopping-was frustrated by the California law.39 Due to this "obsta29. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Nash

v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967). Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
30. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 377-S4 (1978).
31. 430 U.S. 519 (1977).
32. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 12211 (West Supp. 1977).
33. 430 U.S. at 526 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1041) and citing De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,363 (1976); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, t49 (1971); Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141 (1963)).
34. 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1976). Section 607(b) requires that "[a]ll. .. meat and meat
food products inspected at any establishment under the authority of this subchapter...
shall at the time they leave the establishment bear ... the information required under paragraph (n) of section 601 of this title." Id § 607(b).
35. 430 U.S. at 541.
36. Id at 531.
37. Id at 533.
38. Id at 543.
39. Id
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cle" 40 to the federal goal, the state law was held preempted.
Even where a court fails to find a conflict between state and federal laws, it can still hold the state statute preempted if it determines
that Congress has expressly or impliedly decided that federal authority
shall occupy the field.4 1 If such a determination of congressional intent
is made, the state law will be preempted even if it essentially duplicates
the federal policy or provisions. When searching for the intent of Congress, the Supreme Court has generally started with the assumption
that the state police powers are not to be superseded by the federal act
absent a "clear and manifest" purpose of Congress.4 With respect to
implying such a purpose, the Court has developed the rule that federal
occupation "should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory
power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of
conclusion, or that the
the regulated subject matter permits no other
43
ordained.
so
unmistakably
has
Congress
Although the above-mentioned principles embrace the basic concepts behind a preemption analysis, courts have considered a variety of
factors when attempting to ascertain congressional intent: (1) whether
the federal regulatory scheme is so comprehensive or pervasive as to
make reasonable the inference that Congress has deemed the federal
authority to occupy the field;' (2) whether the federal act touches upon
an area in which the federal interest is so dominant that preclusion of
enforcement of state laws on the same subject may be assumed;45 (3)
the presence of a federal regulatory agency or licensing administration;46 and (4) whether the field requires uniformity as opposed to local
regulation.4 7 It was against this background of preemption analysis
that the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the enforceability of the Washington Tanker Law.
40. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
41. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
42. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
43. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). See L. TRIBE,
supra note 30, at 384-86.

44. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
45. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52

(1941).
46. See, e.g., Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines, Inc.,
348 U.S. 61 (1954). Cf.Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
47. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
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The Ray Case

After briefly stating the facts of the case and summarizing the
traditional preemption principles outlined above, the Court in Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield4 8 proceeded to examine the challenged provisions of
the Washington Tanker Law, measuring them against the corresponding provisions of,-and.the congressional intent embodied in, the PWSA.
Part III of Justice White's majority opinion4 9 was an examination of
the section of the Tanker Law that required both enrolled and registered5 0 oil tankers of at least 50,000 DWT to have a state-licensed pilot
on board while navigating Puget Sound."1 The Court agreed with the
district court's holding that the Tanker Law directly conflicted with 46
U.S.C. §§ 215 & 36452 insofar as vessels enrolled in the coastal trade
were concerned.5 3 Thus, to that extent, the Tanker Law was
preempted.
The Court reached this conclusion by examining the language of
the two federal sections. Section 364 provides that unregistered coastwise seagoing steam vessels subject to the federal navigation laws shall
be under the control and direction of pilots licensed by the Coast
Guard. 4 Section 215, prohibits state and municipal governments from
imposing upon pilots of such vessels any obligation to procure state
licenses. The Court focused specifically on the language in section
215, explaining that the statute should not be construed to affect any
state laws requiring a state-licensed pilot on vessels other than coastwise steam vessels.5 6 The Court also noted that under long-standing
precedent, the two PWSA sections had been read together to give the
federal government exclusive authority to regulate pilots on enrolled
48. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
49. Id at 158-60. In Part I, Justice White related the facts of the case, id. at 155-57; Part

II summarized the basic principles of the federal preemption doctrine. id at 157-58.
50. The Court explained in a footnote that enrolled vessels are those "engaged in domestic or coast-wise trade or used for fishing;" registered vessels are those engaged in trade
with foreign countries. Id at 158 n.7 (quoting Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S.
265, 272-73 (1977)).
51. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 88.16.180 (Supp. 1977).

52. 46 U.S.C. §§ 215, 364 (Supp. V 1975).
53. 435 U.S. at 158-59. All nine Justices joined in this part of the opinion.
54. 46 U.S.C. § 364 (Supp. V 1975). Section 391a(2) of that title includes within the

definition of "steam vessels" all vessels, regardless of size, that carry liquid cargo in bulk that
is (A) inflammable or combustible or (B) oil of any kind or in any form or (C) designated as
a hazardous polluting substance. 46 U.S.C. § 391a(2) (Supp. V 1975).
55. 46 U.S.C. § 215 (Supp. V 1975).
56. 435 U.S. at 159.
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vessels.57 The state provisions directing enrolled tankers to take on
state-licensed pilots were therefore in direct conflict with federal law
and, accordingly, invalid under the preemption doctrine. 58 On the
other hand, there was no corresponding coverage in the PWSA with
respect to registered vessels; the states were therefore free to enforce
pilotage requirements on such vessels.59
In Part IV of the opinion, Justice White examined the Tanker
Law's requirement of standard safety features for tankers between
40,000 and 125,000 DWT.6 ° His discussion of this provision involved
an interpretation of both the congressional intent underlying the
PWSA and the objective sought to be accomplished by the state in imposing the requirements. In this respect, Justice White focused on
whether the state law would "frustrate the congressional desire of
achieving uniform, international standards" and therefore be at odds
with the objective sought to be obtained by the federal law.6 '
Title II of the PWSA was interpreted by the Court as having the
twin goals of providing for vessel safety and protecting the marine environment. 62 The Secretary of Transportation is required to establish
the necessary rules and regulations relating to the design, construction,
and operation of all vessels specified within the Act. 63 No vessels subject to Title II may have on board any of the specified cargoes until a
certificate of inspection is issued. 6' In lieu of such inspection, the Coast
Guard can accept from foreign vessels valid certificates of inspection
recognized under law or treaty by the United States. Similar provisions
57. Id See Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187 (1912); Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U.S. 90 (1886).
58. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
59. 435 U.S. at 159-60. In this respect, Justice White differed with the lower court's
decision, which held the state law null and void in its entirety, even though the pilotage
requirement only conflicted with federal law to the extent that it applied to coastwise seagoing tankers. Justice White called the lower court's judgment "overly broad" since 46 U.S.C.
§ 215 explicitly left to the states the power to regulate pilots of registered vessels. Id See
note 56 and accompanying text supra.
60. 435 U.S. at 160-68. WASH. RaV. CODE ANN. § 88.16.190(2) (Supp. 1977) requires,
in part, the following features: (a) shaft horsepower in the ratio of one horsepower to each
two and one-half DWT; (b) twin screws; (c) double bottoms, underneath all oil and liquid
cargo compartments; and (d) two operational radars.
61. 435 U.S. at 168 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
62. Id at 161. 46 U.S.C. § 391a(l) (codifying Title II) states that the protection of life,
property, and the marine environment from harm requires the promulgation of "comprehensive minimum standards of design, construction, alteration, repair, maintenance and operation" for vessels carrying certain cargoes in bulk-primarily oil and fuel tankers. 46
U.S.C. § 391a(l) (Supp. V 1975).
63. 46 U.S.C. § 391a(3) (Supp. V 1975).
64. See generally46 C.F.R. §§ 30.01-1 to 40.15-1 (1977).
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exist with respect to inspections for compliance with federal regulations
issued for the protection of the marine environment. 6 The Court interpreted this statutory pattern as indicating that insofar as design characteristics were concerned, Congress had vested in the
Secretary of Transportation the duty of determining which oil tankers
were safe enough to navigate in United States waters.6 6 Congress
therefore intended to establish "uniform national standards for design
and construction of tankers that would foreclose the imposition of different or more stringent state requirements. 6 7 In so characterizing the
statutory scheme, the Court was careful to note that it did not question
prior cases which had held that enrolled and registered vessels must
conform to reasonable, nondiscriminatory conservation and environmental protection measures imposed by a state.6 8 It distinguished them
by pointing out that the cases sustaining the application of state laws to
federally licensed or inspected vessels did not involve a substantive federal law that attempted to achieve the same object as the state law in
question. 9 In Ray, on the other hand, the federal and state schemes
were aimed at precisely the same ends-ensuring vessel safety and protecting the marine environment. The Court, therefore, held: "The
Supremacy Clause dictates that the federal judgment that a vessel is
safe to navigate United States waters prevail over contrary state
judgment."7
A different conclusion was reached with respect to the Tanker Law
provision requiring tug escorts for tankers over 40,000 DWT that did
65. See generally 49 C.F.R. § 1.46(n)(4) (1977).
66. 435 U.S. at 163.
67. Id
68.

Id See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 277 (1077) (citing Smith v.

Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855)); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440 (1960); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891).
69. 435 U.S. at 164. In Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960), for
example, the Court held that no overlap existed between the scope of the federal ship inspection law and the challenged municipal smoke abatement law. Id at 446. In Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), the limited nature of the federal regulations was held not to
exclude state regulation of matters beyond the federal statute. Id at 8.
70. 435 U.S. at 165. The Court also noted that the legislative history of Title II demonstrated a "decided congressional preference for arriving at international standards for building tank vessels." Id at 166. Since Congress expressed "a preference for international
action and expressly anticipated that foreign vessels would or could be considered sufficiently safe for certification by the Secretary if they satisfied the requirements arrived at by
treaty or convention," id at 167-68, the Court determined that "Title II leaves no room for
the States to impose different or stricter design requirements than those which Congress has
enacted with the hope of having them internationally adopted or has accepted as the result
of international accord." Id Six members of the Court joined in this part of the majority
opinion. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
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not satisfy the specified design requirements. 7 ' The Court held that the
state was not precluded by the supremacy clause from enacting the tug
escort requirement. The preemption analysis of this provision involved
an examination of Title I of the PWSA.72 Under that federal law, the
Secretary is authorized to establish and operate "vessel traffic services
and systems" for ports that suffer from congested traffic in their waterways; the Secretary may also require ships to comply with those systems and have the equipment necessary to do So.73 The Court viewed

the purpose behind this grant of power as that of preventing "damage
to vessels, structures, and shore areas, as well as environmental harm to
navigable waters and the resources therein that might arise from vessel
or structure damage."'7 4
The relevant inquiry under Title I with respect to the state's power
to impose a tug escort rule was deemed by the Court to be "whether the
Secretary has either promulgated his own tug requirement for Puget
Sound tanker navigation or has decided that no such requirement
should be imposed at all."'75 In answer to this question, the Court
noted that it did not appear that the Secretary had taken either
course. 76 An advance notice of proposed rulemaking to require tug escorts for certain vessels operating in confined waters had been issued,7 7
but even if those rules would preempt the Tanker Law's tug escort provision, the state law would not have to give way to the federal enactment under the supremacy clause until the federal rules were actually
71. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 88.16.190(2) (Supp. 1977).
72. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1976).
73. Id § 1221(l)-(2).
74. 435 U.S. at 169. Other powers vested in the Secretary include: (1) control of vessel
traffic under hazardous conditions by means of specifications with respect to travel times,
size and speed limitations, and "safe" operating characteristics, 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3) (1976);
(2) authority to require foreign trade vessels to carry pilots in the absence of a state requirement, id § 1221(5); (3) power to establish minimum safety equipment requirements for
shore structures, id § 1221(7); and (4) power to establish waterfront safety zones or other
measures for limited, controlled, or conditional access when necessary for the protection of
vessels, structures, waters, or shore areas, id § 1221(8). In addition, § 1222(b) provides that
nothing in Title I is to "prevent a State or political subdivision thereof from prescribing for
structures only higher safety equipment requirements or safety standards than those which
may be prescribed pursuant to this chapter." Id § 1222(b).
75. 435 U.S. at 171-72.
76. Id at 172.
77. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,770 (1976) (amending the Navigation Safety Regulations issued
under Title I, 33 C.F.R., pt. 164 (1977)). The professed purpose of these rules is to reduce
the potential for collisions, rammings, and groundings in confined waters. 435 U.S. at 172
n.22. The following factors will be considered in developing the rules: size of vessel, displacement, propulsion, availability of multiple screws or bow thrusters, controllability, type
of cargo, availability of safety standards, and actual or predicted adverse weather conditions. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,771 (1976).
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in effect.7 8 Accordingly, the Court held that the district court had erred
in holding that the alternative tug requirement of the Washington
79
Tanker Law was preempted due to its conflict with the PWSA.
The sixth part of the Ray opinion examined the provision of the
Tanker Law excluding from Puget Sound iny tanker in excess of
125,000 DWT.80 This provision was perhaps the most controversial of
those challenged, since upholding it would effectively prohibit the oil
companies from using their supertankers to transport oil, despite the
fact that such tankers were the most common mode of transport for the
major companies. 8' The Court focused on the PWSA provisions codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3)(iii), which authorized the Secretary of
Transportation to establish vessel size and speed limitations, and 33
U.S.C. § 1222(b), which, by implication, forbade the states from imposing higher equipment or safety standards on vessels. 2 Limitations on
vessel size were interpreted as being safety standards; thus, the relevant
legal inquiry was whether the Secretary had addressed and acted upon
the question of such limitations.8 3
According to the Court, it appeared "sufficiently clear" that Federal authorities had dealt with the issue of tanker size. 4 The Secretary
had already promulgated a rule prohibiting the passage of more than
one 70,000 DWT vessel through Rosario Strait at any given time; in
periods of bad weather, that size limitation is reduced to approximately
40,000 DWT. 8 5 This rule was much more limited than that of the
Tanker Law, which would impose a general ban on the operation of
large tankers in Puget Sound. Given that section 1222(b) prohibits a
state from imposing higher safety standards than those set by the Secre78. 435 U.S. at 172.
79. Id at 173. Seven members of the Court joined in this part of the majority opinion.
See notes 98-99 and accompanying text infra.
80. 435 U.S. at 173-78. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 88.16.190(l) (Supp. 1977).
81. See note 2 supra.

82. 435 U.S. at 174. Section 1222(b) permitted the states to impose higher equipment
and safety standards "for structures only." 33 U.S.C. § 1222(b) (1976). Thus, the Court

stated, higher standards for vessels were impliedly barred. In support of this interpretation,
the opinion cited an explanation in the House Report that § 1222(b) Uas amended to pro-

vide "a positive statement retaining State jurisdiction over structures and making clear that
State regulation of vessels is not contemplated." Id at 175 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 563,
92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1971)).
83. Id at 174. The Court began its discussion with the premise that the Secretary had
the authority to establish "vessel size and speed limitations," 33 U.S.C. § 1221(3)(iii) (1976),

and that local Coast Guard officials had been authorized to exercise that power on his behalf. 435 U.S. at 174.
84. 435 U.S. at 175.
85. Id at 174-75.
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tary, the state size limits were unenforceable.8 6
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, wrote
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.8 7 He agreed with
the majority's conclusion that the pilotage requirement was preempted
only with respect to enrolled vessels and that the tug escort requirement
was valid until the Secretary of Transportation promulgated a federal
rule or determined that such a rule was unnecessary.88 Justice Marshall did not, however, agree with the Court as to the necessity of deciding the validity of the safety features alternative to the tug
requirement. He pointed out that the practical effect of the state provision was that all tankers had employed tug escorts rather than attempt
to satisfy the alternative safety requirements.8 9
Justice Marshall also disagreed with the majority's opinion that
the Tanker Law's size limitation was preempted under the supremacy
clause. Since Title I merely authorized and did not require the Secre-

tary to issue regulations to implement the provisions of the Title, Justice Marshall agreed that the pertinent inquiry was whether the
Secretary had addressed and acted upon the question of size limits. 9°
However, he did not view the rule regulating vessel passage in the Rosario Strait as constituting a determination that the Tanker Law's size
limitations were inappropriate or unnecessary. He found no indication
that the Coast Guard had considered the need for promulgating size
86. Id at 175. The Court also noted that its conclusion was consistent with the legislative history of Title I of the PWSA. The twin themes of consistency of regulation and thoroughness of consideration pervaded the House and Senate Committee Reports on the
federal act. For example, one representative had expressed the view that "[w]e do not want
the States to resort to individual actions that adversely affect our national interest." Id at
176 n.27 (quoting Hearingson H. 867, HA 3635, HR. 8140 before the Subcomm. on Coast
Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, andNavigation ofthe House Comm. on MerchantMarine
andFisheries,92d Cong., Ist Sess. 30 (1971) (statement of Rep. Keith) [hereinafter cited as
1971 Hearings].Admiral Bender, Commandant of the Coast Guard, had responded that the
Coast Guard believed it "preferable for the approach to the problem of the giant tankers in
particular to be resolved on an international basis." 1971 Hearings,supra,at 30. The Court
viewed such statements as indicating "that [Congress] desired someone with an overview of
all the possible ramifications of the regulation of oil tankers to promulgate limitations on
tanker size and that he should act only after balancing all of the competing interests." 435
U.S. at 177. Six members of the Court joined in this part of the majority opinion. See notes
90-93 and accompanying text infra.
87. 435 U.S. at 180-87.
88. Id at 181.
89. Ia Justice Marshall also noted that the relative expense of compliance with the
state's safety requirements made it "extremely unlikely" that any tankers would be constructed or redesigned to meet the law's requirements, at least in the foreseeable future. Id
90. Id at 181-82.
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limitations for the entire Sound. 9 In addition, even if the Rosario
Strait rule did result from such a consideration, the challengers had not
demonstrated that the rule evinced a judgment contrary to the Tanker
Law's provisions.9 2 Justice Marshall felt that under the PWSA, the
existence of local vessel traffic control schemes should be weighed to
determine "whether, and to what extent, federal size limitations should
be imposed."9 3 Since the Rosario Strait rule was not even under consideration prior to the passage of the Tanker Law, there was no basis
for finding that the Tanker Law's size limitation was in conflict with the
federal rule.94 Justice Marshall concluded his preemption discussion
by pointing out that the Tanker Law was a measure tailored to respond
to unique local conditions----"the unusual susceptibility of Puget Sound
to damage from large oil spills and the peculiar navigational problems
associated with tanker operations in the Sound."95 Thus, the state law
in general,
was not merely aimed at safety and environmental problems
96
and the federal policy therefore did not have to prevail.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Powell, wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.9 7 He agreed with the Court that the
state's "standard safety features" provision was invalid, but took issue
with the Court's conclusion that the tug escort requirement was a permissible alternative. 98 In Justice Stevens' view, the tug escort requirement was merely part of the invalid design requirements, since it was
imposed only on those tankers that did not comply with those requirements. Accordingly, "[t]he federal interest that prohibits state enforcement of these requirements should also prohibit state enforcement of a
special penalty for failure to comply with them." 99
Ray did not mark any significant change in the Court's preemption analysis. Justice White's opinion was consistent with prior cases in
that it first looked for a direct conflict between the state and federal
laws and, where it found none, went on to inquire whether Congress
91. Id at 183.

92. Id at 183-84.
93. Id at 184. Justice Marshall cited 33 U.S.C. § 1222(e) (1976), which states in part
determining the need for, and the substance of, any rule or regulation or the exerthat "[i]n
cise of other authority hereunder the Secretary shall, among other things, consider. . .(6)
existing vessel traffic control systems, services, and schemes; and (7) local practices and customs ... " 435 U.S. at 184 n.4 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1222(e) (1976)),
94. 435 U.S. at 184.
95. Id at 184-85.
96. Id.
97. Id at 187.
98. Id at 188.
99. Id at 189.
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had intended to occupy the regulatory field. Also in accordance with
the traditional preemption doctrine, the determination of congressional
intent was made by first examining the federal law's language and then
focusing on the legislative history of the federal enactment. Thus, the
practical result of the case is perhaps the most significant-Washington
was severely restricted in its attempt to protect its environment from
the serious danger posed by supertankers transporting vast amounts of
oil.
The problem emerging from Ray pertains to the alternatives a
state may have when it wishes to impose environmental safeguards on
the use of its waterways. Although the Ray decision appears sound
with respect to the Court's established precedents in the area of preemption analysis, the decision has severely limited the states' ability to
enact provisions that may provide the only protection against the dangers inherent in the transporation of oil.
Aside from the theoretical and practical implications of Ray, the
case poses another question: whether the Court's decision can be read
as an indication of a heightened concern for federal supremacy in the
energy field. By striking down the Tanker Law provision"°° that would
have excluded from Puget Sound any tanker displacing in excess of
125,000 DWT,I°1 the Court in Ray prevented the State of Washington
from prohibiting the use in its waters of the most common mode of oil
transportation-supertankers.10 2 This particular holding of preemption generated the most extended debate within the Court. The majority found that by promulgating a rule concerning size limitations with
respect to Rosario Strait, °3 the federal authorities had dealt with the
issue of tanker size in relation to navigation in Puget Sound."°4 In contrast, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Rehnquist, believed that on the record, the Rosario Strait rule "cannot be said to
reflect a determination that the size limitations set forth in the Tanker
Law are inappropriate or unnecessary."'' 0 5 He found no support for
holding that the Rosario Strait rule represented a consideration of the
question of size limitations for the entire Sound."°6 He further noted
100. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 88.16.190(1) (Supp: 1977).

101. 435 U.S. at 173-78. See notes 80-86 and accompanying text supra.
102. See note 2 and text accompanying note 81 supra.
103. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
104. 435 U.S. at 175.
105. I1d at 183 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
106. 1d In a footnote, id at 183 n.3, Justice Marshall pointed out that the Rosario Strait
size limitation was not contained in any written rule or regulation, that the Puget Sound
Vessel Traffic System, 33 C.F.R. § 161.(B)(1976), asamended by 42 Fed. Reg. 29,480 (1977),
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that those challenging the Tanker Law had not shown that it was necessarily inconsistent with that rule." 7 Because local regulatory schemes
must be taken into account in determining whether federal size limitations should be imposed,0 8 and since there was no evidence that the
Rosario Strait rule preexisted the Tanker Law, 0 9 the two provisions
could well have been designed to coexist." 0 Thus, the majority opinion
and Justice Marshall's dissent on this point demonstrate that there was
considerable doubt as to whether the Secretary, through the Coast
Guard, had acted so as to preempt the Tanker Law prohibition against
the operation of supertankers. In such situations, the Court has held
that "the proper approach is to reconcile 'the operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than holding one completely
ousted.' """1 There was therefore ample authority for holding that this
Tanker Law provision was not preempted until such time as it became
clear that its prohibition was indeed in actual conflict with a federal
rule.
The result in Ray can perhaps be explained by the strong federal
interest in governing the interstate and international flow of goods
within the United States free from the potentially divisive and disruptive effect of numerous inconsistent state regulations.' 12 In recent
years, the continuing national energy crisis has arguably underscored
the need for a centralized approach to energy problems. The state law
challenged in Ray, a singular response to the perceived ecological
threat arising from the use of oil tankers, would have effectively prohibited the operation of supertankers in Puget Sound. I" Although the
did not include any size limitation, and that the need for such a limitation was never considered during the rulemaking process, see 39 Fed. Reg. 25,430 (1974) (summary of comments
received during rulemaking); 38 Fed. Reg. 21, 228 (1973) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
107. 435 U.S. at 183-84 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1222(e) (1976). See 435 U.S. at 184 n.4.
109. 435 U.S. at 184 & n.5.
110. Id at 184.
I1l. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973)
(quoting Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)). H17re was a unanimous
decision; Justice Stewart took no part in the decision of the case. The Ware Court cited as
support for its approach to preemption Florida Lime & Avocado Grouers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960);
Irternational Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Union Brokerage Co. v.
Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912). 414 U.S. at 127 n.8.
112. Such concerns led the framers of the Constitution to include the commerce clause
which granted Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with toreign Nations, and
among the several States." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
113. See note 2 and text accompanying note 81 supra.

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

Fall 1978]

states have a strong interest in protecting their environments, 114 the supertanker provision of the Washington Tanker Law encroached upon
an area of dominant federal concern in which Congress has established
substantive rules of law. As such, it could not withstand scrutiny under
the supremacy clause.
Because there was a reasonable basis for holding the supertanker
provision preempted," 5 it is probably premature to view Ray as indicative of a bias toward exclusive federal regulation in the energy field.
The question of whether the Court is moving in this direction must
await further litigation implicating federal supremacy in this area.
Nevertheless, a clearer indication of the Court's attitude on the matter
should be forthcoming, as questions concerning supremacy in the
energy field will undoubtedly be litigated with increasing frequency in
the future.
FEDERAL LABOR LAW PREEMPTION

Introduction
A mode of preemption analysis somewhat different from the tradi-

tional approach discussed above" 6 is utilized where a federal regulatory agency is involved. Althoigh the establishment of such an agency
is not necessarily indicative of a congressional intent to occupy a given
field, an examination of Congress' motivation in creating the agency
may aid in defining the parameters of federal preemption of state jurisdiction. In its October 1977 Term, the Supreme Court decided two
cases concerning the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB). Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District
Council of Carpenters1 7 addressed the question of state court jurisdiction in a trespass action arising from labor picketing. Malone v. White
Motor Corp." 8 examined the extent and nature of federal preemption
of state legislation in the area of employee pension plans. Although the
two cases dealt with very different aspects of labor law preemption, it is
significant to look at them together as they both resulted in a limitation
of the federal role in labor-management relations.
114. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 277 (1977); Huron Portland

Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960).
115. See notes 80-86 and accompanying text supra.
116. See notes 23-47 and accompanying text supra.

117. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
118. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
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I. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters
A.

Background

The significance of Sears,Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters"9 cannot be understood without an examination of the preceding line of Supreme Court decisions involving the
jurisdiction of state courts over labor-management relations.12 0 The focal point in this line of cases is the 1959 case of San Diego Building
Trades Council v. Garmon,12 1 which involved a state court action arising out of union picketing. The defendant unions had sought from
plaintiff lumber company an agreement to hire only union members.
The company refused, claiming in part that they could not enter into
such an agreement unless their employees had designated one of the
unions as the collective bargaining agent. The unions began peaceful
picketing in front of plaintiffs business, exerting pressure on both employees and customers to stop dealing with the company, whereupon
plaintiff sued for damages and injunctive relief. Although the trial
court found the sole purpose of the unions' activities was to compel
execution of a union contract, 22 the unions claimed that their only aim
was to educate plaintiffs employees and to persuade them to join the
union.' 2 3 The trial court enjoined the unions from picketing until one
of them had been designated as a collective bargaining agent; the court
also awarded damages.' 2 4 In addition to this state court proceeding,
the plaintiffs had commenced a representation proceeding before the
NLRB (Board), which declined to exercise jurisdiction, apparently because an inadequate monetary amount of interstate commerce was
25
involved.'
On appeal, 26 the California Supreme Court sustained the trial
court's judgment, reasoning that the state court had jurisdiction over
the dispute because the NLRB had declined to hear the case.' 27 On
review by certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held that the
119. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
120. For a comprehensive discussion of these labor law preemption decisions, see Cox,
Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337 (1972).
121. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See generaly Cox, supra note 120; Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered" The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 46) (1972).

122. 359 U.S. at 237.
123. Id
124. Id at 237-38.

125. id at 238.
126. 45 Cal. 2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955).

127. Id at 663, 291 P.2d at 5.
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NLRB's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction did not give a state the power
to regulate activities from which it was otherwise precluded.128 The
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration
on the issue of damages. On remand, the California Supreme Court set
aside the injunction but sustained the award of damages. 2 9 The
United States Supreme Court reversed that decision,13 ° holding that the
jurisdiction of any court is preempted by the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) if the activity in question is arguably within the jurisdic13 1
tion of the Board.
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, 32 noted that it had
been 'judicially necessary to preclude the States from acting" when
their exercise of power over particular activities "threatened interference with the clearly indicated policy of industrial relations."'133 Absent such interference, however, a state properly could exercise
concurrent jurisdiction with the NLRB; Justice Frankfurter proceeded
to describe some situations in which this concurrent authority would be
appropriate. The states have power to regulate where the activity in
question is merely a peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act. 134 The states also have such authority in situations where
the regulated conduct touches "interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional
direction, we could35not infer that Congress had deprived the States of
1
the power to act."'
In contrast to the situations justifying state jurisdiction, Justice
136
Frankfurter stated that when it is "clear or may fairly be assumed"'
that the activities which the state attempts to regulate are either pro128. 353 U.S. 26 (1957). Two companion cases were Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd.,
353 U.S. 1, and Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
129. 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
130. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
131. Id at 245.
132. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan, Douglas and Black joined in the majority opinion. Justices Clark, Whittaker and Stewart joined in Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion.
133. 359 U.S. at 243 (citing, inter alia, Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Guss
v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Local 25, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. New
York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 350 U.S. 155 (1956); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468
(1955)).
134. Id (citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1957)).
135. Id at 244 (citing UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1957); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355
U.S. 131 (1957); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956); United
Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1955)).
136. Id
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tected by section 7 of the NLRA, 11 7 or constitute an unfair labor practice under section 8 of that Act,13 the state jurisdiction must yield to
the federal enactment.13 9 Acknowledging that it is not always clear
whether an activity is either protected or prohibited under the NLRA,
the Court directed that this determination be made by the Board and
not by state courts or even the United States Supreme Court.' 4 0 If the
NLRB decides that a certain activity comes under the Act, the states
are precluded from adjudicating the matter;14 if, on the other hand,
the Board decides that the activity is neither protected nor prohibited,
the states may exercise jurisdiction. 4 2 If the Board declines to make
any determination on the issue, the states are still precluded from exercising jurisdiction over the dispute. 143 Justice Frankfurter reasoned
that to allow the states to regulate activities that are even potentially
subject to federal control would involve too great a risk that a state's
action would conflict with national labor policy.'" Thus, emphasis
was placed on the NLRB's unifying role.
In the decade following the Garmon decision, the Court appeared
to retreat somewhat from its strict construction of state power in labormanagement relations. Although the Court generally showed deference to federal authority in such areas as strikes, boycotts and picketing,14 5 there were some cases that the Court found touched local
concerns without significantly interfering with federal primacy, including laws prohibiting defamation 146 and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 4 7 A few of the Justices have voiced dissatisfaction
with the Garmon rule, 148 but the doctrine was reaffrmed in 1971 in
137. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .... " Id
138. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976). Section 8 generally describes "unfair labor practices."
139. 359 U.S. at 244. See also id at 245: "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or
§ 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence
of the [NLRB] if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted."
140. Id. at 244-45. The Court stated that "[i]t is essential to the administration of the
[NLRA] that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board." Id.
141. Id at 244.
142. Id

143. Id at 246.
144. I1d
145. See Lesnick, supra note 121, at 470.
146. See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).

147. See Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
148. In a concurring opinion in Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970), for
example, Chief Justice Burger indicated that he would allow the states to adjudicate trespass
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Amalgamated Association of Streeet, Electric Railway & Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge,149 wherein a divided Court 150 held that a state
court did not have jurisdiction over conduct arguably protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the NLRA. In Lockridge, state
jurisdiction over activity arguably prohibited by the NLRA was held
preempted, even though the state was acting pursuant to a law of general application.'' But although it was clear that Garmon was still
alive, the question of what constituted a local interest sufficient to allow
adjudication of a labor dispute in a state court proceeding remained
unanswered.
actions arising from labor disputes. In his view, "any contention that the States are preempted in these circumstances is without merit. The protection of private property, whether
a home, factory, or store, through trespass laws is historically a concern of state law....
Nothing in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garon ... would warrant this Court to
declare state-law trespass remedies to be ineffective and thus to remit a person to his own
self-help resources if he desires redress for illegal trespassory picketing." Id at 227-28 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citations omitted). See also Justice White's concurring opinion in
Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970), in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined. Justice White concurred in the Court's decision
that the Florida courts did not have jurisdiction over relations between the operators of
foreign-flag vessels and the American longshoremen who work on those vessels while they
are docked in American ports. However, he declared that he "would hold that only labor
activity determined to be actually, rather than arguably, protected under federal law should
be immune from state judicial control. To this extent [Garmon] should be reconsidered."
Id at 202 (White, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
149. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
150. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Black, Brennan,
Stewart and Marshall joined. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Douglas, White
(joined by Chief Justice Burger) and Blackmun.
151. 403 U.S. at 292. In Lockridge, a union member was suspended from his union and
discharged from his job for failure to pay his union dues. The union's involvement in the
member's loss of employment was either arguably protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8 of
the NLRA. Instead of filing a complaint with the NLRB, however, the member brought suit
in a state court for breach of contract, claiming that the suspension in violation of the
union's constitution and general laws constituted a breach by the union of its contract with
the member. The trial court found for the member, awarded monetary damages for lost
wages and ordered his reinstatement into the union. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the
decision. 93 Idaho 294, 460 P.2d 719 (1969).
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Garmon, the arguably
protected or prohibited nature of the union's conduct brought the matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The Court noted that while it did not claim that the Garmon
doctrine was without flaws, "we do think that it is founded on reasoned principle and that
until it is altered by congressional action or by judicial insights that are born of further
experience with it, a heavy burden rests upon those who would, at this late date, ask this
Court to abandon Garmonand set out again in quest of a system more nearly perfect. A fair
regard for considerations of staredecisis and the coordinate role of the Congress in defining
the extent to which federal legislation pre-empts state law strongly support our conclusion
that the basic tenets of Garmon should not be disturbed." 403 U.S. at 302.
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The Sears Case

In Sears, the Court for the first time addressed the question of
whether state courts have jurisdiction over an action for trespass when
a labor union pickets the private property of an employer. In holding
that a state court could exercise jurisdiction over such a case, the
Supreme Court not only gave a new construction to the "arguably protected or prohibited conduct" limitation of state court jurisdiction established in Garmon, but also provided a new approach to Garmon's
152
"primary jurisdiction" rationale for preemption.
The factual situation underlying the Sears litigation was straightforward.' 53 The petitioner (Sears) owns a national chain of department
stores. In 1973, business representatives of the San Diego County District Council of Carpenters (the union) discovered that certain carpentry work at Sears' Chula Vista, California, store was being done by
carpenters who had not been dispatched from the union hiring hall. ' 4
On that same day, the union representatives met with the store manager and requested that Sears either see to it that union carpenters were
used or sign an agreement to abide by the terms of the union's master
labor agreement concerning the dispatch and use of carpenters. 155 After two days had passed without word from the Sears manager, the
union established picket lines on Sears' property,'5 6 and picketing began in an orderly and peaceful manner.
The union refused to honor the store security manager's demand
that the pickets be removed from Sears' property, stating that only legal
action would force them to leave.' 5 7 Accordingly, Sears sought an injunction in the California Superior Court, which entered a temporary
restraining order enjoining the union from picketing on Sears' property; the union thereupon moved the pickets to the adjoining public
sidewalks.' 51 The superior court heard argument on the issue of
whether state or federal law protected the union's picketing on Sears'
152. See notes 136-44 and accompanying text supra.
153. 436 U.S. at 182.
154. Id.

155. Id
156. The Court described the location as follows: "The store is located in the center of a
large rectangular lot. The building is surrounded by walkways and a large parking area. A
concrete wall at one end separates the lot from residential property; the other three sides
adjoin public sidewalks which are adjacent to the public streets. The pickets patrolled either
on the privately owned walkways next to the building or in the parking area a few feet
away." Id
157. Id at 182-83.
158. Id The union ultimately concluded that this location was too far from the store, see
note 156 supra, and discontinued the picket. 436 U.S. at 183 n.2.
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property and subsequently issued a preliminary injunction. 159 The
state court of appeal affirmed, holding that state court jurisdiction over
the dispute was not preempted because the union's activity fell within
touching interests deeply rooted
the established exception for conduct
60
in local feeling and responsibility.
The union appealed to the California Supreme Court, which reversed the court of appeal decision. 16 1 The California court held that
the Garmon doctrine was applicable because the picketing was arguably protected by section 7 of the Act. 162 The trespassory nature of the
picketing did not disqualify it from protection under section 7; rather,
this was a factor which the NLRB would consider in determining
whether or not the activity was in fact prohibited. In addition, the California court found that the union's conduct was also at least arguably
prohibited by the Act. 163 Thus, state court jurisdiction was precluded
because the picketing fell within both the arguably protected and arguably prohibited branches of Garmon. In Feburary, 1977, the United
States Supreme Court granted Sears' petition for certiorari.164
The Sears case was decided in May of 1978. Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion in the six-three decision. 65 The Court began its discussion of the legal issues involved by stating the two
premises underlying its analysis: (1) The union's picketing on Sears'
property after being requested to leave constituted a continuing trespass in violation of state law, and (2) the picketing was both arguably
prohibited and arguably protected by federal law. 166 The Court then
gave its formulation of the Garmon rule. It observed that as regards
conduct that is clearly prohibited or protected by the Act, "due regard
167
for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield."'
As to activity only arguably subject to section 7 or section 8 of the Act,
the Court declared that it had not in the past supported an approach
159. The trial court held that the injunction was not prohibited by state law and that the
picketing was not protected by either the First or Fourteenth Amendments. 436 U.S. at 183
n.3.
160. Id at 183. See notes 145-47 and accompanying text supra.
161. 17 Cal. 3d 893, 553 P.2d 603, 132 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1976).
162. Id at 898-99, 553 P.2d at 607-08, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 447-48.
163. Id at 900-01, 553 P.2d at 609, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
164. 430 U.S. 905 (1977).
165. 436 U.S. at 183-208. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell
and Rehnquist joined in Justice Stevens' majority opinion. Justices Powell and Blackmun
filed separate concurring opinions. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stewart and Marshall joined.
166. Id at 187.
167. Id at 187 n.l1.
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that would preempt state jurisdiction without "careful consideration of
the relative impact of such a jurisdictional bar on the various interests
affected."' 6 8 The determination of whether or not state power is precluded depends upon the nature of the particular interests being asserted and the effect that permitting the states to adjudicate labor
disputes would have upon the administration of national labor policy. 169 The Court further stated that while its approach to "arguably
prohibited" and "arguably protected" conduct involved some of the
same considerations, the two categories differed in significant respects;
thus, they would be treated separately within the discussion and

analysis. 170
Part IV of the majority opinion addressed the question of whether
the arguable illegality of the picketing as a matter of federal law should
preclude the state court from exercising jurisdiction over the trespass
action. After a brief review of the history of the NLRA and some early
cases holding that the states were without power to entbrce rules that
overlapped with that enactment, the Court focused on the 1953 case of
Garner v. Teamsters Local 776.171 In that case, peaceful organization
picketing arguably violated section 8(b)(2) of the NLRA. 7 2 A Pennsylvania equity court enjoined the picketing because it violated the
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act. 173 The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reversal of that judgment, holding that because Congress had "taken in hand this particular
type of controversy. . . [in] language almost identical to parts of the
[state] statute,"' 74 the state courts were
without power to adjudge the
17 5
same controversy and grant relief.
The Sears Court construed Garneras holding that if conduct was
arguably prohibited by the Act, state law would be preempted if two
168. Id at 188. In a footnote, the Court attributed this sensitivity to the consequences of
preemption to the manner in which the labor law preemption doctrine had evolved: "The
doctrine is to a great extent the result of this Court's ongoing effort to decipher the presumed
intent of Congress in the face of that body's steadfast silence. . . . And it is 'because Congress has refrained from providing specific directions with respect to the scope of pre-empted
state regulation, [that] the Court has been unwilling to "declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees,
employers, and unions .... "' " Id at 188 n.12 (quoting Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25,
430 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1977)).
169. Id at 189. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967).
170. 436 U.S. at 190.
171. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
172. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976).
173. 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 211.6 (Purdon 1952).
174. 346 U.S. at 488.
175. Id at 501.
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separate
remedies were brought to bear on precisely the same activity; 176 the diversities and conflicts likely to result from a variety of local
procedures and attitudes toward labor disputes would run counter to
the congressional goal of maintaining uniformity in the application of
its substantive rules by means of a centralized administration of specially designed procedures.1 77 The Court also noted its decision in
Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25 ,178 wherein it held that a state court
could adjudicate an action for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress, even though the dispute also gave rise to an arguable violation
of the federal act. 179 The Court distinguished Farmerfrom Garnerby
noting that in Garner, the controversy presented to the state court involved precisely the same issues that would be examined by the NLRB
were an unfair labor practice charge filed with the Board.'8 0 In contrast, in Farmer the focus of the state court tort proceeding was on
whether the union's conduct had caused its complaining member to
suffer severe emotional distress and physical injury; the focus of an
NLRB proceeding, on the other hand, would have been on whether the
statements or conduct of the union officials discriminated or threatened
discrimination against the member in employment referrals for reasons
other than the member's failure to pay his union dues.'"' Because of
these differences in the issues to be adjudicated in the state and federal
proceedings, the exercise of state power in Farmerentailed little risk of
interference with the Board's administration of national labor policy.
In determining whether the arguably prohibited status of any
given conduct will preclude state jurisdiction, the Sears Court deemed
the critical inquiry to be "whether the controversy presented to the state
court is identical to (as in Garner) or different from (as in Farmer)that
' 82
which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board."'
The Court stated that it is only in the first situation that a state court's
exercise of jurisdiction necessarily entailed the risk of interference with
83
federal labor policy that the Garmon doctrine was designed to avoid.
Applying these concepts to the facts in Sears, the Court concluded that
the trespass controversy brought in the state court was not the same as
176. 436 U.S. at 193-94.
177. Id at 192.
178. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).

179. 436 U.S. at 195-96.
180. Id at 196-97 & n.25.
181. Id at 195-97 & n.26.
182. Id at 197.
183. Id The Court noted that in the case of a special remedy under a state labor relations law, there is more of a chance that there will be an unacceptable intrusion upon federal
labor policy. Id. at 197 n.27.
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that which Sears might have presented to the Board.184 The issue in a
federal (Board) proceeding would have been whether the picketing had
a recognitional or work reassignment objective. The state court adjudication merely required a finding as to whether or not a trespass had
occurred-the location, not the objective of the picketing was the relevant issue in the state action. Accordingly, the Court concluded that
permitting the state court to adjudicate the trespass claim would not
create a realistic risk of interference with the Board's primary jurisdiction over violations of the NLRA. 18 5 The usual bases for federal preemption of state jurisdiction with respect to arguably prohibited
conduct therefore did not exist in Sears and state jurisdiction over the
trespass action was held permissible.18 6
In Part V of the majority opinion, the Court addressed the question of whether the arguably protected nature of the union's picketing
provided a sufficient justification for preemption of the state court's jurisdiction. Justice Stevens began his discussion by noting that resolution of this issue involved somewhat different considerations than those
pertaining to the regulation of arguably prohibited activity.'8 7 His
analysis focused on two questions: (1) whether Garmon's "primary jurisdiction" rationale 88 supported preemption in the instant case, and
(2) whether the danger of state interference with federally protected
conduct would preclude state jurisdiction over the case.
Justice Stevens considered the primary jurisdiction doctrine to be
relatively unimportant in the context of the facts in Sears.18 9 He stated
that the primary jurisdiction rationale justified preemption "only in situations [involving protected conduct] in which an aggrieved party has a
reasonable opportunity either to invoke the Board's jurisdiction himself
or else to induce his adversary to do so."' 19 0 In Sears, however, the
employer did not have an acceptable method of invoking-or inducing
the union to invoke-the jurisdiction of the NLRB. An employer cannot directly obtain a ruling by the Board as to whether a union's tres184. Id. at 198.

185. Id.
186.

d

187. Id at 199-200.
188. See notes 136-44 and accompanying text supra.
189. 436 U.S. at 200-03. Justice Stevens explained in a footnote that "primary jurisdiction" referred to the various considerations articulated in Garmon that lead a court to find

state court jurisdiction preempted by the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices.
The term as used in -Searsis not to be confused with the "primary jurisdiction" doctrine that
allocates power between courts and agencies as to which body will make the initial decision
on a particular issue. Id at 199 n.29.
190. Id at 201.
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pass is federally protected; he must wait until the union files an unfair
labor practice charge alleging interference with its right to picket peacefully. Therefore, if the union does not file such a charge, the employer
has to resort either to self-help or bring an action for an injunction
under state trespass laws. In the instant case, by demanding removal of
the pickets Sears gave the union a chance to file an unfair labor practice charge, but the union chose to force Sears to seek an injunction.
Thus, Sears pursued the only legal remedy available. "9 ' Since the issue
of whether the union's conduct was protected under the NLRA was
never raised before the Board, the Sears Court held that the primary
jurisdiction rationale did not provide a sufficient justification for
preemption.' 92
The next section of the majority opinion addressed the problem of
state interference with federally protected conduct. To Justice Stevens,
"the acceptability of 'arguable protection' as a justification for preemption in a given class of cases is, at least in part, a function of the
strength of the argument that § 7 does in fact protect the disputed conduct." ' 93 The Court noted that in those cases in which it had held that
state court jurisdiction to enforce local law was not preempted by the
NLRA,' 9 4 none of the violations of state law involved protected conduct. 9 5 In contrast, some violations of state trespass laws may actually
be protected by section 7. The Court cited as an example NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox, 196 wherein it held that in certain circumstances,
nonemployee union organizers may have a limited right of access to an
employer's premises to engage in organizational solicitation. Under
Babcock, the employer has a right to bar nonemployee union organizers from its property unless the union carries the extremely heavy
burden of showing that either the employer's access rules discriminate
191. The Court noted that Sears had two other options besides that of bringing the state
court action. It could have either permitted the pickets to remain on its property or forcefully evicted them. Since the former would have allowed a violation of state law and since
the latter entailed a risk of violence, the Court held that "[the primary jurisdiction] rationale
does not extend to cases in which an employer has no acceptable method of invoking, or
inducing the Union to invoke, the jurisdiction of the Board." Id at 202.
192. Id at 202-03.
193. Id at 203.
194. See Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (defamation); UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (obstruction of access to private property);
Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957) (state law prohibiting violence by striking employees); United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (law against violence),
citedin 436 U.S. at 204 & nn.35-38.
195. 436 U.S. at 204.
196. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
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against union solicitation or there exists no other reasonable means of
communicating with the employees. 197
The Court in Sears reasoned that due to this heavy burden of
showing that the trespassory conduct was protected under section 7, a
union would probably invoke the Board's jurisdiction by filing an unfair labor practice charge only in situations wherein there is a strong
argument for protection.1 9 On the other hand, in cases where the
union thought it had a weak argument for protection under the Act,
state court jurisdiction would probably be invoked; the union could
avoid an adverse ruling by the Board, force the employer to bring a
state court action and then argue that state jurisdiction over the matter
was preempted based on the protected nature of the conduct at issue.' 99
Because it found that the state courts would receive only those cases in
which the argument for protection was weak, the Sears Court reasoned
that the risk of state courts enjoining a trespass actually protected
under the Act would be minimized. 2°' The Court concluded that this
minimal risk of error by a state tribunal was outweighed by the effects
of a rule which would deny the employer access to any forum in which
to litigate either the trespass or the protection issues. 2 1' Accordingly,
the Court declared:
Because the assertion of state jurisdiction in a case of this kind
does not create a significant risk of prohibition of protected conduct, we are unwilling to presume that Congress intended the arguably protected character of the Union's conduct to deprive the
California courts of jurisdiction to entertain Sears' trespass
action.2 o2
197. Id at 112.
198. 436 U.S. at 206-07. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan disputed the majority's assessment of the likelihood of the Board finding trespassory picketing to be protected.
He noted that the trespass in Babcock was on industrial property and interfered with the
employer's business. In contrast, the picketing in Sears was peaceful, nonobstructive and
took place on a parking lot open to the public. In Justice Brennan's view, the trespass in
Searswould therefore probably be considered protected. Id at 230-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-23 (1975).
199. 436 U.S. at 207. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan questioned this conclusion. He stated that the union's decision whether or not to invoke the jurisdiction of the
Board would depend upon tactical considerations and not merely on its assessment of the
strength of its arguments as suggested by the majority. Id at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 206-07.
201. Id
202. Id at 207. In a footnote, Justice Stevens stated that it was critical to the Court's
holding that Sears had demanded that the union discontinue the trespassory picketing
before it initiated the state court action. Because the NLRB had earlier taken the position
that the mere resort to court action does not constitute an unfair labor practice, see NLRB v.
Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 142 (1971), the reasoning in Sears is applicable only in situations where the employer had demanded discontinuation of the trespass. If the employer

Fall 19781

CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

The effect of Sears on the labor law preemption doctrine is unclear. The Court's approach to arguably protected conduct, balancing
the risk of state court error against the employer's interest in having a
forum,20 3 was a departure from Garmon's relatively absolute rule barring state regulation of protected conduct. 2°4 In a strongly worded dissent,20 5 Justice Brennan accused the Court of bringing about a "drastic
abridgement of established principles" that was "unjustified and unjustifiable." 20 6 Pointing out that the Garmon test had provided stability
and predictability for nearly twenty years, the dissenting Justice declared that "the most elementary notions of staredecisis dictate that the
test be reconsidered only upon a compelling showing, based on actual
experience, that the test disserves important interests. 20 7 Justice Brennan stated that such a showing had not and could not be made; he
viewed the Garmon test as embodying the best possible accomodation
between the competing state and federal interests.20 8
Justice Brennan also noted that the Sears exception to the Garmon
rule created a situation entailing a risk that the Court had been trying
to avoid over the past few decades-the risk of state court interference
with the administration of national labor policy.20 9 This point was
well-taken, as the reasoning of the Sears decision does appear to run
counter to concerns expressed repeatedly by the Court in the past. The
main thrust behind the labor law preemption cases has been to avoid
unlimited, possibly inconsistent, adjudications by state and federal
courts of matters subject to regulation by the Board.2 10 Although the
Court has carefully carved out exceptions to the Board's exclusive jurisdiction,2 ' the Sears Court did not strictly limit the parameters of its
were not required to make such a demand, the union would be deprived of its opportunity to
invoke the Board's jurisdiction. 436 U.S. at 207-08 n.44. The Court thus recognized both
the employer's and the union's need for a forum in which to air their grievances.
203. See note 201 and accompanying text supra.
204. See notes 136-44 and accompanying text supra.
205. 436 U.S. at 214 (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
206. Id at 216.
207. Id
208. Id In Justice Brennan's opinion, the fact that an employer's remedies may be limited produces no social harm. He stated that, "on the contrary, the limitation on employer
remedies is fully justified both by the ease of application of the test by thousands of state and
federal judges and by its effect of averting the danger that state courts may interfere with
national labor policy." Id
209. Id at 216-17.
210. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285-89 (1971); San Diego
Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239-45 (1959); Garner v. Teamsters Local
776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
211. See, e.g., Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (mal-
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holding.2" 2 Consequently, there is a substantial likelihood of much litigation attempting to-refine the balancing/accommodation approach established in Sears to determine whether state court jurisdiction is
appropriate in a given situation.
The disagreement reflected in the majority and dissenting opinions
appears to rest on a difference in their respective appraisals of the practical effect of Sears on the lower courts. Both the majority and Justice
Brennan balanced the interest of the employer in having a remedy for
potentially illegal union conduct against the societal interest in maintaining a uniform national labor policy. The majority found it relatively unlikely that protected conduct would be infringed upon and
believed that this justified the added protection given to employers.21 3
In contrast, Justice Brennan acknowledged that the employer would be
denied a remedy, but found this to be "an entirely acceptable social
the danger of
cost for the benefits of a pre-emption rule that avoids
2 14
policy.
labor
national
with
interference
state-court
cious libel); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 230 (1959) (conduct
touching interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility); UAWV v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634 (1958) (mass picketing and threats of violence); Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S.
617 (1958) (activity merely a peripheral concern of the NLRA).
212. See 436 U.S. at 234-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
213. See notes 198-202 and accompanying text supra. For another argument in favor of
holding the state courts a proper forum for employers, see Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion, 436 U.S. at 208-12 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He agreed with the majority that
where the union failed to file an unfair labor practice charge against the employer after
being asked to leave its premises, preemption was inappropriate since the employer would
then be deprived of any forum in which to resolve either the trespass or thc protection issue.
Id at 209. Thus, there would be a "no-man's land" situation entailing the possibility of an
employer's resort to violence. Id at 208.
Justice Blackmun emphasized, however, that the logical corollary to the majority's reasoning was that if the union did file a charge with the NLRB after being asked to leave the
employer's property, it could continue to picket; state court jurisdiction would be preempted
until either the NLRB held the picketing to be unprotected or the General Counsel declined
to issue a complaint. Id at 209. Such a course of union conduct could indefinitely frustrate
an employer's attempt to stop picketing on its property, causing economic damage brought
about by possibly illegal activity on the part of the union.
For a contrary view of the likelihood of violence arising from an employer's lack of a
forum, see Justice Brennan's dissent, id at 214-37, wherein he stated that "any suggestion
that the faithful application of Garmon creates a 'no-man's land' which results in a substantial risk of violence.

. .

can be dismissed as the most unfounded speculation. .

.

.There is

simply no basis whatsoever for a conclusion that the risk of violence is any greater when an
employer is told by a state court that Garmon bars his state trespass action than when he is
told either that § 7 protects picketing on a public area immediately adjacent to his business,
• ..or that § 7 in fact privileges the entry onto his property." Id at 227-28 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
214. Id at 227. Justice Brennan's appraisal of the propriety of denying the employer a
remedy was based on his belief that where the picketing is peaceful and nonobstructive, the
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The dissent is convincing in its appraisal of the chance of inconsistency in the application of the Sears exception to the general rule of
preemption. Justice Brennan pointed out that state courts adjudicating
trespass actions arising from arguably protected picketing would have
to address exceedingly complex labor law issues that had heretofore
been uniquely within the province of the Board.21 5 Such a court initially would have to assess the relative strength of the section 7 right2 16
by characterizing the picketing as either prohibited or protected.21 7
Given the complexity of the factual and legal determinations involved
in such a characterization, as well as state courts' lack of expertise in
and sensitivity to labor relations matters, Justice Brennan found there
to be a "substantial danger" that a state court would enjoin picketing
entitled to protection under the Act.218 The court would also have to
make a number of factual inquiries to determine whether the trespass
was protected by section 7.219 In Justice Brennan's view, "[i]t simply
cannot be seriously contended that the thousands of judges, state and
federal, throughout the United States can be counted upon accurately
to identify the relevant considerations and give each the proper weight
in accommodating the respective rights." 220
The final section of Justice 'Brennan's dissent addressed the
problems inherent in the application of the Sears reasoning to different
employer's interest in preventing the picketing is weak and the § 7 interest in picketing on
the employer's property is strong. Id He found the § 7 interest to be strong because the
object of picketing was arguably protected as either area standards or recognitional picketing and because its relocation diluted its impact to the point of virtual ineffectiveness. He
found the private property interest to be weak because the picketing was confined to an area
open to the public where Sears permitted solicitation by other groups; thus, Sears' private
property in reality resembled public property. Id at 225-26.
215. Id at 230.
216. Id (citing NLRB v. Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507, 522 (1975)).
217. Id at 229.
218. Id
219. Id at 229-30. These factual inquiries would include whether and to what extent
relocating the picketing would dilute its impact, whether the picketing was recognitional or
area standards, whether or to what extent the employer had opened up the property to the
public, and the importance of whether the picketers were actually employees. Justice Brennan stated that, if relevant, these types of inquiries would also suggest a number of subsidiary questions. Id
220. Id at 230. Justice Brennan pointed out that the manner in which the California
Superior Court and Court of Appeal had handled the ase indicated that a careful consideration of all the relevant issues had been precluded. The Superior Court entered an exparte
order and apparently did not even consider the federal labor law issues implicit in enjoining
picketing arguably protected by the NLRA. See id at 183 n.3 (majority opinion). Moreover, the court of appeal failed to take into account the significance of the location of the
picketing, a criterion critical to the proper application of federal law. Id at 230 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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generic situations. He envisioned state and federal courts applying the
Sears analysis whenever an employer has requested that a labor organization cease allegedly unprotected conduct and the union fails to respond by filing an unfair practices charge. 22' A court in this situation
initially would have to determine whether the employer had a reasonable opportunity to invoke the Board's jurisdiction. In Justice Brennan's view, the Sears Court had adopted this "reasonable opportunity"
test without defining what constituted such an opportunity. 222 If the
employer was found incapable of invoking the Board's jurisdiction, the
court would have to decide whether there was a substantial likelihood
that its judgment would be incompatible with the national labor policy.
Justice Brennan predicted that judges with no special expertise in federal labor law would undoubtedly err in resolving this issue. 223 Finally,
the court would have to determine whether the anomaly of denying an
employer a remedy outweighed the risk of an erroneous determination.
Justice Brennan stated that the range of circumstances which might
lead a court to find in favor of the employer's interest was "limitless."' 224 He therefore concluded that "[t]he Court's new exception to
Garmon cannot be expected to be correctly applied by those [lower]
courts and thus most inevitably will threaten erosion of the goal of uniform administration of the national labor laws. 2 25
The Sears opinion will undoubtedly spark an increase in litigation
involving the question of the extent of state court jurisdiction over labor law disputes. The Court established a rule with respect to a state
tribunal's jurisdiction over a private property trespass action, but it is
unclear how much of the Court's reasoning is applicable to and can be
expanded to cover other violations of state law. It is also difficult to
predict whether adjudications by state courts will actually prove to interfere only minimally with a uniform federal labor policy. Sears
could be the seminal decision in a new line of labor law preemption
cases that grant more power to the states and show declining deference
to the expertise and almost exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor
Relations Board.
.221. Id at 235.
222. Id

223. Id at 235-36: "It is not clairvoyant to predict that many local tribunals will misconceive the relevant criteria and erroneously conclude that they are capable of correctly applying the labor laws."
224. Id at 236.

225. Id at 234.
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Malone v. White Motor Corp.

The Supreme Court's decision in Malone v. White Motor Corp.,226
the other labor law preemption case decided during the October 1977
Term, was much less controversial than that in Sears. In Malone, the
Court applied the traditional preemption analysis227 and examined the
legislative history of the relevant federal act to determine the implied
intent of Congress. The members of the Court did not disagree on the
approach to be utilized; rather, the dissenting Justices differed from
those joining in the plurality opinion 228 in respect to their interpretation of the underlying congressional intent.
The factual background of the Malone litigation was rather complex. 29 White Motor Corporation operated farm equipment manufacturing plants in Hopkins and Minneapolis, Minnesota. The employees
at these plants, represented since 1955 by the International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America (UAW), were covered by a pension plan (Plan) established
in 1950 through collective bargaining. This plan had been carried forward through each of the subsequent years in which collective bargaining agreements were negotiated. The 1971 version of the Plan provided
that any employee who attained the age of forty and completed ten or
more years of credited service with the company was entitled to a pension, the amount of which would depend upon the employee's age at
the time of his or her retirement. Since its establishment, the Plan had
specifically provided that these pensions would be payable only from a
fund established for that purpose and that rights to pensions would be
enforceable only against that fund. The Plan was funded on a deferred
basis: the unpaid past service liability-the excess of the accrued liability above the present value of the fund's assets-was to be met through
contributions by the employer derived from its continuing business
operations.
One section of the Plan provided that White would have the sole
right to terminate the entire plan at any time. During the 1968 and
1971 negotiations with the UAW, however, White gave pension plan
guarantees providing that upon termination of the Plan, benefits of a
226. 435 U.S. 497 (1978).
227. See notes 136-44 and accompanying text supra.
228. Malone was a four-three decision, since Justices Brennan and Blackmun took no
part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice White wrote the plurality opinion of
the Court, in which Justices Marshall, Rehnquist and Stevens joined. Justices Stewart and
Powell both filed dissenting opinions, in which Chief Justice Burger joined.

229. 435 U.S. at 499-503.
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specified amount would be given to those persons entitled to pensions.
By extending these guarantees, White assumed a direct liability for
pension payments of approximately $7,000,000 above the fund's assets.
Between the years 1969 and 1972, White suffered substantial losses,
particularly in its Minneapolis operations. Consequently, in May of
1974, White exercised its contractual right to terminate the pension
plan. As of January 1, 1975, there were 981 retirees under the Plan and
233 persons eligible for deferred pensions.
A few weeks before White terminated the Plan, the State of Minnesota had enacted the Private Pension Benefit Protection Act (Pension
Act).2 3 ° This statute imposed a "pension funding charge" directly
against any employer who had ceased to operate either a place of employment or a pension plan. 23 1 Pursuant to the Pension Act, the Commissioner of Labor and Industry of the State of Minnesota undertook
an investigation of White's pension plan and certified that the sum necessary to achieve compliance with the Act was $19,150,053;32 under
the Pension Act, this amount became a lien on White Motor Corporation's assets.2 3 3 White promptly filed a suit in federal district court,
challenging the constitutionality of the Pension Act on the grounds that
it violated the supremacy clause, the contract clause and the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3
White's supremacy clause claim was based on the argument that the
Pension Act was preempted because it conflicted with several proviSpecifically,
sions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).2
to barright
the
company's
White argued that the Act interfered with
gain collectively and that it impermissibly modified collective-bargaining agreements entered into pursuant to the NLRA by imposing upon
230. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181B.01-.12 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).

231. Id § 181B.03-.06. According to the Act, the charge was to be equal in amount to
the vested benefits described in the statutory provisions.
232. 435 U.S. at 502. The Pension Act provided that the Commissioner, after investigation, should certify the amounts owing by the employer. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181B.09-.12
(West Cum. Supp. 1978).
233. 435 U.S. at 502. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181B.11 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
234. The district court resolved only the supremacy clause issue, stating that where a
statute is challenged both on preemption and other constitutional grounds, the preemption
issue should be decided first. White Motor Corp. v. Malone, 412 F. Supp. 372, 376 (D.
Minn. 1976) (citing Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974)).
235. Id at 317. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1970). Section 7 of the
NLRA establishes the right of employees to form and join labor organizations and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. Id § 157. Sections 8(a)(5),

(b)(3), and (d) generally require employers and labor organizations to bargain in good faith.
_d §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d).
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223

White obligations that the agreements expressly made optional.2 36 On
for partial summary
the basis of its preemption claim, White 2 moved
37

judgment or for a preliminary injunction.
The district court denied the requested relief, holding that the Pension Act was not preempted by the NLRA. 238 The court initially held
that the NLRA does not regulate the substantive terms of a collective
bargaining agreement,2 39 and that the Garmon doctrine2 40 was therefore not implicated by the Pension Act.24 1 After examining the legislative history of the applicable federal statute, the Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act2 42 (Disclosure Act), the court determined that
plans,
Congress did not intend to preempt state laws regulating pension
24 3
even those that were the product of collective bargaining.
The final section of the district court opinion involved an analysis
of the Supreme Court's decision in Local 24, Teamsters Union v.
Oliver.24' In Oliver, a collective bargaining agreement between labor
unions and a group of interstate motor carriers provided that drivers
who owned and drove their own vehicles would be paid at least a designated minimum rental for the use of their trucks, in addition to the
prescribed wage.245 Suit was filed in state court, seeking to enjoin certain carriers and a local union from complying with the minimum
rental provision. The state court held that the collective bargaining
agreement violated a state antitrust law.246 The Supreme Court held
that since the challenged provision was part of an agreement concerning wages resulting from the exercise of collective bargaining rights
granted by the NLRA,2 47 the state was precluded from applying its antitrust law as a basis for an injunction. 248 Although the Court inti236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

412 F. Supp. at 377.
Id at 373.
Id at 382.
Id at 379 (citing NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952)).
See notes 121-44 and accompanying text supra.

241. 412 F. Supp. at 379: "The state is not attempting to regulate a subject matter which
lies within the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board." Id
242. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1976). This act was the controlling federal pension statute in
effect when Minnesota's Pension Act was adopted. Subsequent to the enactment of the Pension Act, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1031 (1976), which expressly superseded any state laws regulating pension funds and employee benefit plans. ERISA did not take effect, however, until January 1,

1975, after the events leading to the Malone litigation had taken place.
243. 412 F. Supp. at 380-81.
244. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).

245. Id at 287.
246. Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 1331.01 (Page Supp. 1977).

247. 358 U.S. at 292-95.
248. Id at 295-97. The Court determined that the primary congressional purpose behind
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mated that it might have reached a different result were the state law in
question a local health or safety regulation, it pointed out that the antitrust law sought "specifically to adjust relationships in the world of
commerce," 24 9 and that it was for Congress to determine whether there
should be any limitation on the types of provisions includable in collective bargaining agreements. °
The district court found Oliver inapposite, declaring that "[s]tate
antitrust statutes present unique problems in the area of labor preemption. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the NLRA precludes their application to appropriate labor union activities."'" The
inherent conflict between labor law and antitrust policy was found not
to exist between labor policy and the regulation of pensions.25 2 Since
Congress indicated that the states could regulate pensions, Oliver did
not require the invalidation of the Pension Act.2 3
The court of appeals reversed the district court decision in
Malone,254 holding that federal labor policy precluded the state from
imposing upon the employer any obligations contrary to the collective
bargaining agreement entered into by that employer and the employee's union. Thus, White could not be forced to fund completely its
employee pension plan upon its termination since the agreement provided that the pensions were to be paid solely from the fund.2 51 Noting
that pension plans are mandatory subjects of bargaining under the
NLRA,2 5 6 the court further stated that the states could not regulate the
substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements by regulating the
conduct of the parties to the agreement. 257 The court of appeals also
disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of Oliver.258 The court
establishment of a federal labor policy was to promote collective bargaining. .d at 295.
Application of the Ohio antitrust law would wholly defeat the full realization of that purpose. Id at 295-96. Congress did not intend to regulate the substantive terms of labor
agreements. Because application of the state law would frustrate that intent by limiting the
solutions that the parties' agreement could provide in regard to wages and working conditions, state jurisdiction to apply that law was held precluded. Id. at 2Q6.
249. Id at 297.
250. Id
251. 412 F. Supp. at 381 (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1975); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955)).
252. Id at 381.
253. Id
254. 545 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1976).
255. Id at 609-10.
256. Id at 604 (citing Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert.
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949)).
257. Id at 606. The court relied on Lodge 76, Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
258. 545 F.2d at 607. See notes 244-53 and accompanying text sura.
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did not read Oliver so restrictively; rather, it stressed that other cases
had cited Oliver for "the general proposition that a state cannot modify
or change an otherwise valid and effective provision of a collective bargain agreement."2 5' 9 Finally, the court determined that the legislative
history of the Disclosure Act emphasized the limited purpose of that
federal enactment; the Act was not intended to effect the substantive
terms of any employee benefit plans.2 60 The preemption disclaimer relied on by the lower court2 6 1 was found to encompass only those state
laws regulating employee benefit fund trustees. Accordingly, the states
were without power to change the substantive provisions of pension
plan agreements.2 62
The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the district court's decision on the issue of preemption.2 6 3 Justice White, writing for the Court
in the four-three decision, 2 " began his discussion by summarizing the
Court's preemption analysis. He stated that it was "uncontested that
whether the Minnesota statute is invalid under the Supremacy Clause
depends on the intent of Congress." 265 He further observed that Congress did not always clarify its intent within the legislation itself; in
those cases, a local law was usually sustained unless it conflicted with
federal law or policy, or unless the Court could ascertain a congressional intent to occupy the field to the exclusion of the states.2 6 6
Applying these concepts to the instant case, the Court first stated
that nothing in the NLRA expressly foreclosed all state regulatory
259. 545 F.2d at 608 (citing Lodge 76, Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 153 (1976); NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960).
260. Id The court of appeals quoted a section of a Senate Report that read in part:
"Complete disclosure of the details of welfare and pension plan operations provides the
most effective single deterrent against abuses and the many other weaknesses of these plans.
It would provide the greatest incentive to good management and investment policies and the
best protection to the interests and rights of employees, employers, and the Government
alike." Id (citing S. REP. No. 1940, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1958] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4153.
261. See notes 242-43 and accompanying text supra.
262. 545 F.2d at 609.
263. 435 U.S. at 515. The Court's holding was limited to the preemption issue. The case
was remanded to the district court for consideration of the appellee's contentions that the
Minnesota statute impaired contractual obligations and violated the due process clause of
the federal constitution. Id at 514-15. For the ultimate outcome of the Malone litigation,
see note 288 infra.
264. For a summary of the Court's votes and abstentions, see note 228 supra.
265. 435 U.S. at 504 (citing Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)
('Ithe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone")).
266. Id (citing Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)).
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power concerning pension plans.2 67 The Court noted that one indicium
of congressional intent could be found in the Disclosure Act preemption disclaimer, which was relied upon by the district court and found
inapposite by the court of appeals.268 In addition, another section of
the Act emphasized that other state laws remained unaffected: "Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prevent any state
from attaining such additional information relating to any
such plan as
269
plan.Y
such
regulating
otherwise
from
or
desire,
may
it
Disagreeing with the court of appeals,27° the Supreme Court interpreted these provisions as indicating that Congress intended to preserve
state authority to regulate pension plans, "including those plans which
were the product of collective bargaining." 271 Justice White pointed
out that the federal statute did not prescribe any substantive rules; the
Senate Report stated, "the legislation proposed is not a regulatory statute. It is a disclosure statute and by design endeavors to leave regula'
tory responsibility to the States."272
The report further explained that
the statute was designed "to leave to the States the detailed regulations
relating to insurance, trusts and other phases of their operations. 273
The Court's analysis of the legislative history drew upon the Senate
and House Reports and the floor discussions,2 74 all of which pointed
toward the Court's conclusion that Congress intended that the substantive standards for employee pension plans, even those which were the
product of collective bargaining, be established by the states.275
After ascertaining the controlling congressional intent, the Court
2 76
declared that its conclusion was consistent with its decision in Oliver.
The Malone Court construed Oliver as "affirming the independence of
the collective-bargaining process from state interference." 277 However,
the Court also noted that Oliver recognized exceptions to the general
267. Id at 505-06.
268. Id See notes 242-43 & 262 and accompanying text supra.

269. 435 U.S. at 505. See 29 U.S.C. § 310(a) (1976).
270. See note 262 and accompanying text supra.
271. 435 U.S. at 505.
272. Id at 507 (quoting S. REP. No. 1465, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 1958)).
273. S. REP. No. 1465, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1958). The report also noted that "a
disclosure statute which is administered in close cooperation with the States could also be of
great assistance to the States in carrying out their regulatory functions." Id at 18.
274. See S. REP. No. 1465, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 8, 14 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 2283, 85th

Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958). See also 104 CONG. REc. 16420 (1958) (remarks of Rep. Lane); Id
at 16425 (remarks of Rep. Wolverton); id at 7049-7052 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
275. 435 U.S. at 510.
276. Id at 512. See notes 244-50 and accompanying text supra.
277. 435 U.S. at 513. The Court referred to the language in Oliver that stated: "We

believe that there is no room in this scheme for the application here of this state policy
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rule. Where Congress did not intend to preempt state jurisdiction, state
27 8
regulatory power is permitted to coexist with the federal scheme.
Based on his analysis of the legislative history and congressional intent
underlying the Disclosure Act,27 9 Justice White declared that Malone
presented such a situation.2 8 It therefore fit within the exception outOliver and the Minnesota Act was not preempted by federal
lined in
281
law.
Three justices dissented.2 82 Justice Stewart wrote a brief opinion
in which he declared that he substantially agreed with the court of appeals' reasoning. 8 3 He did not think that a congressional intent to permit state regulation should be implied from Congress' failure to
undertake substantive regulation of pension plans when it enacted the
Disclosure Act.2 84 Justice Powell joined in that conclusion, stating that
evidence as to what Congress did not do in the Act was "insufficient to
override national labor policy banning interference by the States with
privately negotiated solutions to problems involving mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. '2 85 He viewed Oliver as granting an exemption from the general rule of preemption only when local health or
safety regulations conflict with the collective bargaining agreements at
issue.286 Because such a situation did not exist in Malone, Oliver was
preemption in
inapplicable and the strong federal labor policy required
2 87
the absence of a congressional intent to the contrary.
The Malone decision did not establish any new inroads in federal
labor law preemption aside from its arguably new interpretation of
Oliver. The Court's approach was straightforward; it examined the debates and other legislative history of the Disclosure Act in an attempt
to ascertain the congressional intent with regard to employee pension
plans. Although the Justices disagreed as to the proper interpretation
limiting the solutions that the parties' agreement can provide to the problems of wages and
working conditions." Id. (quoting Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. at 296).
278. Id See Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. at 296.
279. See notes 268-75 and accompanying text supra.
280. 435 U.S. at 514.
281. Id The Court also mentioned briefly the equitable considerations arising from the
application of the Pension Act to a previously negotiated collective bargaining agreement. It
stated that the claim of unfair retroactive impact could be considered by the district court on
remand. Id at 514-15.
282. Justices Stewart and Powell filed dissenting opinions. Chief Justice Burger joined in
each of those opinions.
283. 435 U.S. at 515-16. See notes 254-62 and accompanying text supra.
284. 435 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
285. Id at 516 (Powell, J., dissenting).
286. Id at 517.
287. Id at 517-18.
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of the legislative history, none of them appeared to question the Court's
mode of preemption analysis in labor law cases. In light of this basic
consensus, the Malone opinion may be significant primarily to the parties involved.2 88
COMMERCE CLAUSE

I. Raymond Motor Transportation Inc. v. Rice
In Raymond Motor Transportation,Inc. v. Rice,2 " the Supreme
Court was once again forced to resolve a traditional commerce clause
problem: the Constitution's negative implications concerning state regulations which somehow burden interstate commerce. -90 Two of the
parties to the litigation, appellants Raymond Motor Transportation,
Inc., and Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware, are common carriers of general commodities with primary interstate routes
through the State of Wisconsin.2 91 Both Raymond and Consolidated
use two different types of trucks. One consists of a three-axle tractor
that pulls a single two-axle, forty-foot trailer. This single-trailer unit
(single), with an overall length of fifty-five feet, has been used on the
nation's highways for many years and is an industry standard. The
other type of truck used consists of a two-axle tractor that pulls two
single-axle trailers. Each such trailer is twenty-seven feet long, resulting in a double-trailer unit (double) with an overall length of sixty-five
feet. The double has come into increasing use in recent years and is
thought to have certain advantages over the single for general commodities shipping.2 92
Although most states permit the operation of sixty-five foot
doubles on their interstate highways and access roads, Wisconsin law
generally does not allow trucks longer than fifty-five feet to be operated
on highways within that state. The key statutory provision, Wisconsin
Statutes section 348.07(l),293 sets a limit of fifty-five feet on the overall
288. Although White Motor's preemption challenge to the Pension Act failed, that statute was subsequently held to violate the contract clause in Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 98 S. Ct. 2716 (1978).
289. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
290. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 30, at 319-44.
291. Raymond's primary interstate route is between Chicago and Minneapolis; it does
not serve any points in Wisconsin. Consolidated operates nation-wide, providing service in
42 states, including Wisconsin. 434 U.S. at 431.
292. For example, a double can carry a greater volume of general commodities than a
single, often without exceeding legal limits on gross vehicle weights. Because fewer doubles
than singles are needed to carry a given amount of cargo, there is a savings in fuel and driver
time. Id at 432 n.2.
293. Wis. STAT. § 348.07(1) (1975). Subsequent to the district court's decision upholding
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length of a vehicle pulling one trailer; anyone wishing to operate a single-trailer unit of greater length must obtain a permit from the State
Highway Commission. Wisconsin Statutes section 348.08(1) provides
that no vehicle pulling more than one other vehicle shall be operated
on a state highway without such a permit.29 4 In addition to being authorized to issue various classes of annual permits for the operation of
vehicles not conforming to the statutory standards, the State Highway
Commission may "impose such reasonable conditions" and "adopt
such reasonable rules" of operation with respect to vehicles operated
under permit "as it deems necessary for the safety of travel and protection of the highways."2'95 The Commission had issued administrative
regulations describing the conditions under which "trailer train" and
other classes of permits would be issued. Although it is authorized to
29 6
grant "trailer train" permits for the operation of double-trailer units,
in practice the Commission limited such permits to intrastate
carriers.2 97
The Raymond litigation arose when Raymond and Consolidated
each applied to the appropriate Wisconsin officials for annual permits
to operate sixty-five foot doubles on interstate highways running
through the state. The permits were denied because neither of the carriers' proposed operations were within the narrow scope of the Commission's administrative regulations specifying when such permits
would be issued. The carriers thereupon filed suit in federal district
court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the regulations barring the proposed operation of doubles burdened and discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the commerce
clause.2 98 Specifically, the complaint alleged that Wisconsin's refusal
to issue the permits disrupted and delayed the carriers' transportation
of goods in interstate commerce. The complaint further alleged that
sixty-five foot doubles were as safe as, if not safer than, the fifty-five
foot singles whose operation was allowed without permits. Moreover,
the statutory and administrative exceptions to the general prohibition
its constitutionality, this section was amended to allow "singles" up to 59 feet to be operated
without a permit if the truck tractor and cargo space of the semi-trailer were within certain
statutory limits. 1977 Wis. Laws, ch. 29, § 1487h, adding § 348.07(2)(g). See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. at 432 n.3.
294. Wis. STAT. § 348.08(1) (1975).
295. Wis. STAT. § 348.25(3) (1975). See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S.
at 433-34.
296. Wis. STAT. § 348.27(6) (1975).
297. Wis. AD. CODE § Hy. 30.14(3)(a) (1975). See Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 433-34 & n.5.
3.
298. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
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were claimed to result in permits being issued to carriers whose vehicles
were indistinguishable from those used by Raymond and Consolidated.
The case was heard by a three-judge district court. 29 9 The carriers
presented a substantial amount of evidence supporting their contention
that doubles were as safe as singles, including testimony from the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety, Federal Highway
Administration, United States Department of Transportation, 300 various highway safety experts and highway safety officials from twelve
different states. The evidence adduced by these experts demonstrated
that doubles were safer because of their greater maneuverability, more
even distribution of loads, better braking capability, lesser capacity for
jackknifing, and lower production of splash and spray, which obscures
the vision of drivers in following and passing vehicles.30 ' The experts
also agreed that the difference in the amount of time needed to pass a
fifty-five foot single and a sixty-five foot double had no appreciable
safety on limited-access, four-lane divided
effect on motorist
30 2
highways.
In contrast to the overwhelming showing as to relative safety made
by the carriers, the state made no effort to contradict any of that evidence with its own evidence.3 °3 Moreover, the Chairperson of the State
Highway Commission stated that the regulations prohibiting the issuance of permits to the carriers were not based on an), administrative
assessment of the safety of sixty-five foot doubles. Rather, the Commission adopted the regulations based on a belief that Wisconsin residents did not want vehicles over fifty-five feet long on the state's
highways. 3" The state failed to produce any evidence at all to suggest
or prove that sixty-five foot doubles were less safe than fifty-five foot
singles; indeed, the state agreed that the carriers had shown that "65
299. 417 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Wis. 1976) (per curiam). The three-judge court was con-

vened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1976) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119
(1976)).
300. The Deputy Director testified concerning the Bureau's five-year study of the acci-

dent experience of selected motor carriers that use both singles and doubles. The study
showed doubles to be safer than singles both in terms of accidents, injuries, and fatalities per
100,000 miles, and in terms of the amount of property damage and number of injuries and

fatalities per accident. 434 U.S. at 436.
301. Id
302. Id at 436-37.
303. The state did introduce expert testimony that occupants of smaller vehicles are more
likely to be killed in collisions with large trucks than are occupants of larger vehicles. How-

ever, the study upon which that testimony was based did not distinguish between 55 foot
singles and 65 foot doubles, and the state's expert witness did not have an opinion as to the
comparative safety of doubles and singles. Id at 437 n.10.
304. Id at 437.
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foot twin trailers have as good a safety record as other large
vehicles."3 5
The carriers also produced uncontradicted evidence showing that
their operations were disrupted, their costs raised and service slowed as
a result of the challenged regulations. Most of th problems arose from
having to switch from doubles to singles before entering Wisconsin.
For example, Consolidated had to maintain a crew of drivers in Wisconsin whose sole responsibility was to shuttle the second trailer to and
from the state line. Finally, the carriers' evidence-again, uncontradicted--demonstrated that Wisconsin routinely permitted the operation of numerous oversized vehicles on its highways.
Despite the one-sided nature of the evidence, the three-judge district court ruled against the carriers.30 6 It held that the Wisconsin regulatory scheme neither discriminated against interstate commerce 30 7 nor
burdened it to an extent that outweighed "the benefits to the local
popul[ace]. ' 3°s The court was of the opinion that the carriers had not
shown that the state's refusal to issue the permits had no relation to
highway safety.3 0 9 The added cost to the carriers' operations was con3
sidered to be "of no material consequence." 10
The United States Supreme Court, after noting probable jurisdicreversed the three-judge district court, holding that on the record, the Wisconsin regulations violated the commerce clause by placing
a substantial burden on interstate commerce without making any more
than "the most speculative contribution to highway safety. ' 3 12 However, the Court also noted that its holding was "a narrow one," for it
did not decide "whether laws of other States restricting the operation of
tion, 3 11

305. Id at 438 n.12.
306. 417 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
307. Id at 1356-58.
308. Id at 1358.

309. Id at 1359. The court focused on the longer time it took for motorists to pass
doubles than singles.
310. Id at 1361.
311. 430 U.S. 914 (1977).
312. 434 U.S. at 447. Raymond and Consolidated had challenged the district court's

holding on two grounds. They claimed that: (1) the state's refusal to issue the requested
permits burdened interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause because it substantially interfered with the movement of goods in interstate commerce without making any
contribution to highway safety; and (2) the regulation authorizing the issuance of permits for
general, industrial interplant, and double-trailer milk trucks discriminated against interstate
commerce by allowing permits to be issued to carry the products of Wisconsin industries,
but not those of other states, over Wisconsin highways in trucks longer than 55 feet. Id at
439-40. The Court found it necessary to address the second challenge "only as it bears on
the first." Id at 440.
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trucks over 55 feet long, or of double-trailer trucks, would be upheld if
the evidence produced on the
safety issue were not so overwhelmingly
'31 3
one-sided as in this case.
Justice Powell began his opinion for the Court 3 4 by stating the
basic principle that even in the absence of a congressional exercise of
the commerce clause power, that provision prevents the states "from
erecting barriers to the free flow of interstate commerce." 31 5 Where
there is an overlap between "'national interests'" and "'activities of
legitimate local concern,'" in the absence of congressional guidance
the Court is called upon to make "' "delicate adjustment of the conflicting state and federal claims." '",316 Justice Powell observed that in
the process of making this delicate adjustment, the Court in the past
had employed various tests to express the distinction between permissible and impermissible interference with interstate commerce, but that
"experience teaches that no single conceptual approach identifies all of
the factors that may bear on a particular case."3' 17 Justice Powell further observed that all the Court's recent decisions had applied a balancing test. He relied on the Court's opinion in Pike i'. Bruce Church,
Inc.3 1 8 for a statement of the general rule: Where there is a legitimate
local public interest and the statute operates in a nondiscriminatory
manner to effectuate that interest, the state law will be upheld unless
the burden imposed upon interstate commerce is "'clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits.' ",319 The Pike Court viewed the
inquiry as one of degree, giving consideration to the existence of less
restrictive alternatives. 2 0
313. Id at 447 (footnote omitted).
314. All members of the Court joined in Justice Powell's opinion with the exception of
Justice Stevens, who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice
Blackmun filed a concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan
and Rehnquist joined. Id at 448.
315. Id. at 440 (citing Great A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976);
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852)).
316. Id at 440 (quoting Great A & P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 3o6, 371 (1976) (quot-

ing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 553 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting)).
See also Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977).

317. Id at 440-41 (footnote omitted). See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 552-53 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sulli-

van, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362-63 (1943); Di Santo v.
Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
318. 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidating the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable Standardization
Act).
319. 434 U.S. at 441 (quoting 397 U.S. at 142). See Huron Portland Cement Co. v.

Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
320. 397 U.S. at 142, quoted in Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 44142 (1978).
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Justice Powell rejected the state's argument that South Carolina
State Highway Departmentv. Barnwell Brothers3"2 ' mandated the application of a "rational relation" test.32 2 Rather, Barnwell was read to
require a weighing of state and federal interests. 323 Despite this refusal
to follow literally the deferential approach outlined in Barnwell, Justice
Powell noted that the Court had been reluctant to invalidate legislation
in areas where, as in Barnwell, the "'propriety of local regulation has
long been recognized.' "324 Highway safety regulation was identified as
3 25
an area warranting this strong presumption of validity.
On the facts in Raymond, however, such a presumption was overcome. Justice Powell focused on the overwhelming amount of undisputed evidence the carriers had amassed to demonstrate that the
regulations did not in fact contribute to highway safety. The state, on
the other hand, had "virtually defaulted in its defense of the regulations as a safety measure. '326 Moreover, the carriers had, without con-

tradiction, demonstrated that the Wisconsin laws burdened interstate
commerce. In the Court's view, "the burden imposed on interstate
commerce by Wisconsin's regulations is no less than that imposed by
the statute invalidated in Bibb. ,327 Finally, the numerous exceptions to
the state regulatory scheme either facially discriminated in favor of
Wisconsin industries or were enacted at their instance.32 8 Such exemp321. 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (upheld South Carolina law setting stricter limitations on truck
width and weight than did surrounding states' laws).
322. 434 U.S. at 442-43.
323. Id at 443. The Raymond Court noted that language in Barnwell could, when read
in isolation, be interpreted to suggest that absent an element of discrimination against interstate commerce, no showing of a burden on such commerce would suffice to invalidate a
local safety regulation. Id However, the Court also noted that in Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959), the Barnwell approach to burdens on interstate commerce had
been rejected. 434 U.S. at 443. In Bibb, the applicable test was formulated as follows: "Unless we can conclude on the whole record that 'the total effect of the law as a safety measure
in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the
national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it'. . . we must uphold the statute." 359 U.S. at 524 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v.
Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945)).
324. 434 U.S. at 443 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. at 143 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. at 796 (Douglas, J., dissenting))).
325. Id at 443-44.
326. Id at 444. The Court concluded that "the State's assertion that the challenged regulations contribute to highway safety is rebutted by appellants' evidence and undercut by the
maze of exemptions from the general truck-length limit that the State itself allows." Id at
445 (footnote omitted).
327. Id at 445-46 (footnote omitted). See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520,
527-28 (1959).
328. 434 U.S. at 446-47. For example, under Wis. STAT. § 348.27(4) (1975), the Commission issued permits to Wisconsin industries and their agent motor carriers to transport goods
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tions, the court noted, weakened the presumptive validity of the laws
by undermining the assumption that a state's political processes will
serve as a check on unduly burdensome regulations. 329
The significance of Raymond lies in the Court's refusal to accord a
state highway regulation the degree of deference seemingly mandated
330
by South CarolinaState Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers.
Although the force of that decision has been limited by subsequent
opinions, 33 1 its rationale has never been repudiated. Raymond provides
new insights into how the Court will approach challenges to allegedly
burdensome state highway regulations, but it does not resolve the
problems created by the Court's varying precedents in this area. This
332
conclusion is supported by Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion,
in which he emphasized the narrow scope of the majority opinion. He
initially stated that the Court's reliance on Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.,
did not portend a new approach to the analysis of state highway safety regulations under the commerce clause. Rather, Justice
Blackmun noted that even in the case of safety measures, the Court has
recognized its responsibility "to weigh the national interest in free-flowing commerce against 'slight or problematical' safety interests. 33 4
Justice Blackmun also clearly outlined the limits to the nature of
the Court's role in the balancing process. He was careful to distinguish
between the factual balance struck in Raymond and that established in
Pike. In the latter case, the state attempted to justify its regulation of
the interstate shipment of cantaloupes by claiming an interest "to promote and preserve the reputation of Arizona growers by prohibiting
deceptive packaging."3 35 In striking down the challenged law, however, the Court determined that this interest, although legitimate, was
in trucks over 55 feet long from Wisconsin plants to the state boundary line and then on to
other states. The Commission did not, however, issue permits to industries with plants in
other states to transport goods in trucks over 55 feet through Wisconsin to markets in other
states. 434 U.S. at 446 n.24.
329. 434 U.S. at 447.
330. See South C. St. Highway Dep't v. Baruwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187-92 (1938).
331. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 528-29 (1959). See also Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
332. 434 U.S. 429, 448-51 (Blackmun, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J., Brennan &

Rehnquist, JJ.). This is a significant opinion, as half of the Justices who took part in the
consideration and decision of the case, see note 314 supra, signed the opinion.

333. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
334. 434 U.S. at 448 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959) (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S.
761, 776 (1945))).
335. 397 U.S. at 143.
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not important enough to justify the substantial burden on commerce.
Justice Blackmun explained that neither the Pike opinion nor the
Raymond decision suggested that a similar balance would be struck
"when a State legitimately asserts the existence of a safety justification
for a regulation. ' 337 If the safety justifications are not illusory, the
Court will not question the legislative judgment by balancing the importance of the safety considerations against the consequent burdens
on interstate commerce.3 3 8

Raymond Motor Transportation,Inc. v. Rice3 39 does not mark any
radical change in the Court's analysis of questions involving the extent
of state power to regulate interstate commerce in the absence of federal
action. Justice Powell affirmed that once a legitimate state interest has
been identified, the proper approach necessitates a balancing of state
and federal interests. 34 Even in the case of highway safety regulations,
where there is a presumption of validity, the state must, in the face of
evidence to the contrary, carry the burden of substantiating the efficacy
of the challenged law as a safety measure. The Court also indicated the
state should rebut any suggestion that its political processes are not performing their function as checks on local laws that unreasonably burden interstate commerce; the failure of the state to do so, while not
decisive, will clearly weaken any presumption in favor of a regulation's
constitutionality. 4
With respect to the challenging party's role, the Court specifically
focused on increased costs as an indication that the regulations impose
a burden on interstate commerce.3 42 That the regulations substantially
increase the cost of the interstate movement of goods is not, as the dis336. Id at 145. The statute in question would have required the grower to build and

operate an unneeded $200,000 packing plant in the state. Id
337. 434 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
338. Id Applying this rule to the factual record developed in Raymond, Justice Black-

mun observed that the Court had reached its conclusion based on its finding that "the safety
interests ha[d] not been shown to exist as a matter of law." Id at 450.
In conclusion, Justice Blackmun stated that the illusory nature of the safety interests in
Raymond was illustrated not only by the substantial, uncontradicted evidence presented by
the carriers, but also by the state's willingness to permit the use of oversized vehicles on its
highways. Justice Blackmun viewed the numerous exceptions to the length limits, see note
328 and accompanying text supra, as an indication that the state in practice did not believe
that vehicles such as the 65 foot doubles which the carriers sought to operate presented a
threat to highway safety. 434 U.S. at 450-51.
339. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
340. See note 316 and accompanying text supra.
341. See note 324 and accompanying text supra.
342. 434 U.S. at 445-46.
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trict court indicated,3 4 3 entirely irrelevant. Although Justice Powell did
not regard cost increase as a dispositive factor, he affirmed the view
expressed in Bibb that, taken into consideration with other factors, cost
might be relevant to the issue of whether there was a burden on interstate commerce. 3 "
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